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This thesis explores three of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s seminal texts, Nature 
(1836), the “Woodnotes” poems (1840, 1841), and Representative Men (1850), in a 
transatlantic Romantic context. Augmenting typical transatlantic explorations of 
Emerson’s literature which often use these three works in demonstration of the 
various European Romantic assimilations n Emerson’s writing, the texts considered 
in this study are understood to engage with one British work predominately. 
Emerson engages antagonistically in the pages of Nature with Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection (1825), in the “Woodnotes” poems with William 
Wordsworth’s The Excursion (1814), and in Representative Men with Thomas 
Carlyle’s On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History (1841).  
In each instance, Emerson engages with a text that he understands to be 
particularly representative of the intellectual and creative genius that its British 
author wields and, as such, one that is anxiety-inducing in the influence that it 
wields. This thesis demonstrates that, in engaging with these works, Emerson 
performs with increasing sophistication a process of “‘creative reading,’ that is, an 
act of reading (influx) through which creation (efflux, expression) is made possible 
through a transcendence of the past. In doing so, Emerson confronts and attempts 
to gain independence both from the personal influence that these texts and, more 
significantly, their authors wield.  
In engaging in Nature, the “Woodnotes” poems, and Representative Men 
with Aids to Reflection, The Excursion, and On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic 
in History respectively, Emerson assimilates into his works various elements of 
Coleridge’s, Wordsworth’s, and Carlyle’s thought. Each of the three chapters 
comprising this thesis explores Emerson’s intellectual indebtedness in this regard 
and, as such, the explorations incorporate a scholastic focus like that found in the 
majority of Emersonian transatlantic scholarship. In each instance, however, 
explorations of Emerson’s works also reveal the American writer’s performance of a 
liberating act of detachment or departure from the ideas with which he engages. 
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These intellectual detachments distinguish Emerson’s thought from that of 
Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Carlyle, and are often attended by formal departures 
from the texts with which Emerson engages. Augmenting typical transatlantic 
explorations of Emerson’s works, this thesis focuses not only Emerson’s Romantic 
assimilations, but also on his detachments. 
Finally, in each instance, Emerson’s confrontations reflect Robert 
Weisbuch’s assessment in Atlantic Double-Cross (1986) that nineteenth century 
Anglo-American literary relations are ‘always more than personal and individual’ 
(21). That is to say, in each instance, Emerson confronts not only Coleridge, 
Wordsworth’s, and Carlyle’s personal creative and intellectual influence, but their 
extrapersonal or national influence as British writers. This confrontation of national 
influence is reflected in the fact that Emerson’s detachments incorporate temporal 
reimaginings, re-visions of time that nullify the potency of the past and of the 
influence wielded by tradition by emphasising the present and the future, focusing 
on the subjective power of the mind. As such, Emerson’s conceptions of time 
demonstrate a conflation of two specifically American understandings of 
temporality as defined by Robert Weisbuch – vertical time and futurism – both 
developed by nineteenth century American writers in order to nullify the influence 
of Old World, specifically British, tradition, and to establish an account of time in 
which the United States’ comparative lack of distinct cultural history is excused. 
In precis, this thesis demonstrates that Nature, the “Woodnotes” poems, 
and Representative Men issue from Emerson’s creative reading of Aids to Reflection, 
The Excursion, and On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History respectively. 
These acts of creative reading demonstrate in each instance the inextricability of 
Coleridge’s, Wordsworth’s, and Carlyle’s ‘personal’ creative and intellectual 
influence, as well as their ‘extrapersonal’ or national influence.  
  




This thesis explores three instances in which Ralph Waldo Emerson’s writing 
engages with and emerges from antagonistic interactions with texts by three 
seminal British writers: Samuel Taylor Coleridge, William Wordsworth, and Thomas 
Carlyle.  
While Emerson’s literature is often considered in the context of his 
engagements with transatlantic, namely British, Romantic writers and their works, 
often and most recently, Emerson’s writing has been explored for its various and 
varied connections to Romanticism. Scholars have looked across Emerson’s oeuvre 
and noted the various elements indebted to, assimilated from, and influenced by 
the writing of various Romantic figures. This thesis augments that approach by 
identifying three of Emerson’s works, two of which are often considered in relation 
to British influence, in which the American writer engages predominately with a 
single work. Chapter one concerns the relationship between Emerson’s essay, 
Nature (1836) and Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection (1825); chapter two 
explores Emerson’s engagement in his poems, “Woodnotes I” (1840) and 
“Woodnotes II” (1841), with William Wordsworth’s The Excursion (1814); and 
finally, chapter three considers Emerson’s longer work, Representative Men (1850) 
alongside Thomas Carlyle’s On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History 
(1841). 
In each instance, Emerson uses the British text as a target for a process by 
which he confronts and attempts to nullify the influence that its author wields, 
influence that is at once both ‘personal’ and creative, as well as ‘extrapersonal’ or 
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national. This process, which Emerson outlines obliquely in various works 
concerned with the relationship between reading and writing, is one in which a 
writer can be both indebted to a source and self-reliant from it, by first submitting 
to and assimilating from that source before performing an act of ‘detachment’ or 
moving away. Emerson performs this process in his engagements with the three 
British texts and in doing so attempts not only to distinguish himself and his works 
intellectually from these influential sources, but also to distinguish himself as an 
American writer specifically.  
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This thesis considers three of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s seminal texts, Nature (1836), 
the “Woodnotes” poems (1840, 1841), and Representative Men (1850) in a 
transatlantic context. More specifically, these works are understood as issuances 
from Emerson’s antagonistic readings of three significant transatlantic texts. In 
Nature, Emerson engages antagonistically with Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s Aids to 
Reflection (1825), and this engagement is the subject of chapter one. “Woodnotes 
I” and “Woodnotes II” are positioned in antagonistic relation to Wordsworth’s The 
Excursion (1814), and chapter two centres on the relationship between these texts. 
Finally, Representative Men is an expression of Emerson’s antagonistic engagement 
with Thomas Carlyle's On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History (1841), 
and this engagement is explored in the third and final chapter of this thesis. 
In these three instances, the antagonistic nature of Emerson’s engagements 
reflects his confrontation with the intellectual and creative influence wielded by the 
transatlantic work with which he engages. More significantly, however, each 
transatlantic text itself is a surrogate for the more pervasive creative and 
intellectual influence wielded by its author and presents a convenient target for 
Emerson’s confrontation of that influence. This study understands the authorial 
influence that Emerson confronts in his antagonistic reading to be at once both 
‘personal; (poetic) as well as ‘extrapersonal’ (national). Such a conceptualisation is 
indebted to Robert Weisbuch’s ideas regarding nineteenth century Anglo-American 
literary relations first expressed in Atlantic Double-Cross (1986). 
Emerson’s confrontation of the British writers’ personal or poetic influence 
is reflected in the fact that Emerson engages in each instance with one of 
Coleridge’s, Wordsworth’s, and Carlyle’s most ‘representative’ works. That is to say, 
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in each instance Emerson confronts the most threatening (influential) qualities 
presented by each writer – Coleridge’s philosophical genius, Wordsworth’s talents 
as a philosophical poet and as a poet of ‘low’ subjects, and Carlyle’s conceptualising 
of history – by engaging with the text that he considers most representative of that 
threatening expressive power. Additionally, as expressions of British genius 
specifically, each of these works, as well as the writers who penned them, pose a 
second, extrapersonal threat: the spectre of British culture and history which itself 
jeopardises to American originality (independence). 
Each chapter explores Emerson’s assimilation of both formal and thematic 
elements of the transatlantic work with which he engages. This assimilation is 
considered in light of the fact that each of Emerson’s texts also incorporates 
significant shifts in theme, structure, and style. Such shifts are reflective of what has 
been described variously as Emerson’s unsettling, inconsistent, or circumlocutory 
style, but in these three instances, the abrupt stylistic and thematic voltas also 
correspond to significant intellectual and creative departures from the British work 
with which Emerson engages. This concurrence reflects Emerson’s performance of 
departure from Coleridge’s, Wordsworth’s, and Carlyle’s personal poetic influence, 
and as such, his attempts to distance himself from representative examples of their 
expression. 
Additionally, the above shifts in Nature, the “Woodnotes” poems, and 
Representative Men coincide with significant changes in Emerson’s presentation of 
time in the texts. Specifically, in each instance Emerson embraces and emphasises 
what Robert Weisbuch calls ‘vertical time’ (Atlantic Double-Cross 170). This 
conception of temporality collapses linear time ‘into an expanded present inhabited 
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by an expansive self,’ and is a feature in several examples of nineteenth century 
American literature that Robert Weisbuch links directly to attempts at combating 
the threat of British cultural influence (171).  
The simultaneity of Emerson’s temporal reimaginings and his departures 
from formal and thematic elements of the transatlantic texts with which he engages 
– his rejection of elements assimilated into his works prior to his thematic and 
stylistic shifts – reflects the simultaneous and equal significance of Coleridge’s, 
Wordsworth’s, and Carlyle’s personal and extrapersonal influence. Reading Nature, 
the “Woodnotes” poems, and Representative Men as issuances from Emerson’s 
antagonistic reading lends new significance to the nature of the relationship 
between Coleridge’s, Wordsworth’s, and Carlyle’s transatlantic influence and 
Emerson’s mode of expression in three seminal works. 
  




 By 1850, Ralph Waldo Emerson and Thomas Carlyle had been friends and 
correspondents for nearly two decades. They began exchanging letters in 1834, and 
although their correspondence was not limited to discussion of their literary and 
intellectual endeavours, as is expected of two men who shared the same 
profession, the topic of their letters often turned to the subject of work. Such is the 
case with a letter from Carlyle to Emerson dated 19 July, 1850. In this instance, 
Carlyle offered his thoughts regarding what was at the time Emerson’s latest 
published work, Representative Men (1850). The letter opens with Carlyle’s 
apologies for the amount of time elapsed since his last correspondence (in the later 
years of their correspondence, intermittent and oftentimes lengthy periods of 
silence between the writers was common), but the Scottish writer soon transitions 
into an account of his experience reading Representative Men and his opinion of 
the text.  
The passage in which Carlyle records his impressions of Representative Men 
is lengthy in its entirety and will be considered in greater detail in chapter three. For 
the moment, it is a specific aspect of Carlyle’s experience in reading Emerson’s 
work to which I would like to call attention. Nearing the conclusion of his thoughts 
on the text, Carlyle writes the following of Representative Men: ‘…I generally 
dissented a little about the end of all these Essays; which was notable, and not 
without instructive interest to me, as I had so lustily shouted “Hear, hear!” all the 
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way from the beginning up to that stage’ (The Correspondence of Emerson and 
Carlyle 460; original emphasis). 
 The aspect of the text to which Carlyle’s comments refer is the conspicuous 
and subversive volta that occurs at the end of each of the essays comprising 
Representative Men. Each of these essays ostensibly centres on Emerson’s portrayal 
of one of history’s greatest and thus most ‘representative’ men, and Emerson’s 
case for their representative greatness. In each instance, however, Emerson 
concludes these portrayals with an account of the manner in which each of his 
representative men in fact fall short of true greatness; in each instance, Emerson 
effectively undermines his preceding argument. Again, a more extensive 
exploration of these shifts and of their significance within the greater conception of 
history in Representative Men appears in chapter three. In this moment, I wish 
specifically to call attention to the peculiarity of these reversals and the unsettling 
effect they apparently have on Carlyle as a reader who had, up to that point, 
‘shouted “Hear, hear!” all the way…’. 
 Interestingly, Francis Bowen remarked upon a similarly unsettling shift in 
Emerson’s early essay, Nature (1836). In an early review of the text for The Christian 
Examiner in 1837, Bowen wrote the following: 
Having thus considered the uses of the material world, its adaptation to 
man’s physical wants, to his love of beauty, and his moral sense, the author 
turns and aims a back blow at the universe, which he has been leading us to 
admire and love. The heavens are rolled together like a scroll, the solid earth 
cracks beneath our feet, “Wide wilderness and mountain, rock, and sea / 
Peopled with busy transitory groups,” are shadows, and exist only in the 
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mind. Matter is nothing, spirit is all. Man is alone in the vast inane with his 
God. (375–376)1 
Bowen’s seismic description of Nature reflects his apocalyptic interpretation of the 
thematic shift that occurs in the final chapters of Emerson's essay. In these 
chapters, the ground does in a sense begin to crack and give way beneath the 
reader’s feet as Emerson presents an account of the natural world’s transparency, 
its falling away in a ‘reverential withdrawing…before its God’ (CW 1:30). Bowen’s 
description has a dual effect, however, in that it also conveys the unsettling, 
decentring effect of this thematic shift upon the reader. In Bowen’s understanding 
of the essay, Emerson elucidates his case for the natural world’s ‘adaptation to 
man’s wants’ throughout the first six chapters, only to unceremoniously and 
without warning execute a philosophical about-face that leaves readers reeling. 
 The shifts that Bowen and Carlyle identify in Nature and Representative Men 
exemplify a pervasive and more general element of Emerson’s style: Emerson’s 
works, both prose and verse, often appear to embrace abruptness. In Barbara 
Packer’s understanding, the abrupt and unsettling manner of Emerson’s texts is 
deliberate, and the American writer intentionally courts the decentring quality that 
is identified by the reviews of his works noted above. In her exploration of 
Emerson’s style that opens Emerson’s Fall (1982), Packer correlates Emerson’s 
peculiar style with his desire to write literature that provokes intellectual activity, 
involving the reader actively in the process of reading and interpretation (6). 
                                                     
1 The quotation to which Bowen turns is from Sir Henry Taylor’s Philip van Artevelde: A Dramatic Romance, in 
Two Parts. Interestingly, Emerson would go on to include these very lines the following year in a lecture entitled 
“Demonology” from his “Human Life” series, read at the Masonic Temple in Boston on 20 February, 1839 (EL 
3:151–152). 
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Associating this quality with the emphasis on self-reliance that was fundamental to 
the American writer throughout his career, Packer describes how Emerson ‘did 
everything he could to make the reader’s task difficult’ in his works: 
He deliberately rejected the carefully sloped introductions, the graceful 
transitions, the carefully modulated crescendos and decrescendos of the 
popular essayistic style. Emerson’s beginnings are abrupt, his transitions, 
equally so. […] The connection between one sentence and another, one 
paragraph and another, or between anything within the essay and the world 
outside it, is something Emerson eliminates, something he offers the reader 
no assistance in forming. Self-reliance is to him first of all what it was to his 
Protestant ancestors: the liberty to interpret texts according to the Spirit. 
(6–7) 
In the case of the shifts identified by Bowen and Carlyle in Nature and 
Representative Men specifically, an additional element augments Packer’s account 
of the relationship between self-reliance and the act of reading. In these instances, 
Emerson’s abrupt stylistic voltas and the thematic developments with which they 
coincide not only reflect Emerson’s attempts to cultivate an active reader, they are 
products of Emerson’s own active and antagonistic reading. That is to say, they are 
the products of and expressions of Emerson’s own assertions of self-reliance. 
 Such an interpretation of the ideological and stylistic shifts in Nature, the 
“Woodnotes” poems, and Representative Men is indebted to Julie Ellison’s 
scholarship in Emerson’s Romantic Style (1984). In the text, Ellison considers how 
Emerson’s prose conveys and demonstrates his dramatization of the ‘antagonistic 
relationships among influence, analysis, and invention’ (10). Specifically, the 
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following explorations of Emerson’s three works and of the transatlantic 
engagements from which they issue are indebted to Ellison’s understanding of the 
abrupt transitions and stylistic discontinuity in Emerson’s seminal essays. Ellison’s 
explorations of Emerson’s prose demonstrates how transition and discontinuity, 
among other stylistic elements, reflect the American writer’s understanding of 
reading as an inherently antagonistic act, the ‘conscious struggle of the will, the 
contest between reader and writer, Jacob and angel’ (79). Augmenting Ellison’s 
ideas, the following chapters proceed from the notion that Emerson’s antagonistic 
reading practices, which will be discussed at length in forthcoming pages, influence 
a handful of his works not only conceptually but also in practice. That is to say, 
there are instances in which Emerson’s antagonistic reading practices are directed 
at specific works, and in such instances these practices are reflected in both stylistic 
and thematic elements of Emerson’s texts. 
The following chapters consider three examples of works in which Emerson 
engages antagonistically with individual and specific texts, and in which this 
engagement is reflected in both formal and ideological shifts within the American 
writer’s works. In each instance, this engagement an effort to nullify the power he 
perceives these texts and, more importantly, their authors to wield. Decentring 
stylistic and thematic shifts in Nature, the “Woodnotes” poems, and Representative 
Men gain new significance and further clarity when considered in terms of an act to 
which Emerson refers as ‘detachment’ in his accounts of reading and writing. In 
turn, the nature of Emerson’s transatlantic engagements with these three 
significant writers and their texts is also further illuminated. 
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Nature and Representative Men, two of the texts considered in the following 
chapters through the lens of detachment, have been noted previously, and to these 
is added a third example: Emerson's "Woodnotes" poems, first published in 1840 
and 1841 respectively. Each of these texts are significant works in Emerson's 
oeuvre. Nature stands as Emerson's first and only attempt to delineate the 'species 
of moral truth' he calls his ‘first philosophy’ in a single, unified philosophical treatise 
(JMN 4:78–79). Emerson's "Woodnotes" poems, drafted over a number of years, 
represent one of the writer's first and most carefully considered attempts to 
delineate this philosophy in verse rather than in prose, in the form of a 
philosophical poem. Joseph Beach, referring to the poems as two parts of a single 
entity, describes “Woodnotes” as ‘the great comprehensive nature-poem of 
Emerson’ (348). Finally, Representative Men is Emerson's definitive attempt at 
writing history following a period in the 1840s Robert Weisbuch refers to as one in 
which Emerson ‘test[ed] his distinctive thought to see what it could include’ 
(Atlantic Double-Cross 179). 
In composing each of these seminal works, Emerson is influenced 
significantly by a perceived exemplar of the type of text that he is himself 
attempting to write; in each instance, it is a work that Emerson values greatly for its 
‘representative’ nature. Emerson’s engagement with these representative works in 
each instance incorporates acts of assimilation by which the American writer 
adopts but also often adapts significant formal and thematic elements of the text 
with which he engages. It is this assimilative practice that renders the connections 
between Emerson’s work and the British text with which he engages so apparent. 
However, assimilation also necessitates Emerson’s detachment. That is to say, it is 
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exactly because these representative works have the power to influence him that 
Emerson must perform a departure from them. This influence, is an incursive power 
that threatens the authority of Emerson’s own thought and expression (author-ity), 
and as such it must be engaged with antagonistically in order to convert this 
incursive energy into expressive power.  
In composing Nature, Emerson engages antagonistically with Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge's Aids to Reflection (1825), a text representative for Emerson of 
philosophical genius. "Woodnotes I" and "Woodnotes II" are positioned in 
opposition to Wordsworth's The Excursion (1814), a text Emerson described 
throughout his lifetime as the epitome of philosophical poetry, and a poem capable 
of incorporating ‘low’ subjects – a quality that some critics disparaged, but that 
Emerson admired. Finally, Representative Men is an expression of Emerson's 
antagonistic engagement with Thomas Carlyle's On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the 
Heroic in History (1841), a text that encapsulates Carlyle’s influential conception of 
history as biography.2 
The representative nature of these British texts can only go so far to explain 
why Emerson turned to them specifically in attempting his own expressions of 
philosophy, philosophical poetry, and history. There are other works to which 
Emerson turns throughout his lifetime when he desires inspiration in all of these 
realms. Numerous scholars have traced Goethe’s influence and that of Bacon and 
Victor Cousin on Emerson, for example, and references to Shakespeare, Chaucer, 
and Milton litter the American writer’s essays – it is clear that Emerson recognises 
                                                     
2 On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History will henceforth be referred to simply as On Heroes. 
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other literature to be of great intellectual value. However, while the term ‘first 
philosophy’ Emerson uses to describe his conception of the world expressed in 
Nature derives from Bacon’s term philosophia prima, it is not the Novum Organum 
but Aids to Reflection against which Nature is positioned antagonistically. Similarly, 
Cousin’s conception of dialectical history certainly informs Emerson’s 
understanding of history, as Gustaaf van Cromphout has noted.3 It is not Cousin’s 
Introduction à l`histoire de la philosophie that is placed in opposition to 
Representative Men, however, but On Heroes. 
Bacon and Cousin, like many others to whose works Emerson turned 
throughout his life, represent a kind of proximity that I will call ‘intellectual 
proximity,’ but they lack a second element of proximity that incurs anxiety: 
temporal proximity. Temporal proximity is that quality to which Robert Weisbuch 
refers in Atlantic Double-Cross (1986) when he describes how contemporaries 
'matter most' to writers like Emerson (16). Emerson's contemporaries are those 
who are 'crowding his books off the stalls in New York,' and 'crowding his own 
potential idea out of his dominated brain' (xv). Emerson will admit as much of 
Coleridge and Wordsworth in his journal in 1836, when he lists them alongside 
Southey as modern writers whose spirit ‘diffuses itself into pulpits & parliaments & 
magazines & newspapers’ (JMN 5:202).  
Temporal proximity exacerbates and intensifies the anxiety-inducing nature 
of Coleridge’s, Wordsworth’s, and Carlyle’s intellectual proximity, that to which 
Weisbuch’s statements also refer, albeit obliquely. The intellectual work of these 
                                                     
3 Van Cromphout’s essay “Emerson and the Dialectics of History” (1976) explores at length the relationship 
between Emerson’s conception of history, Cousin’s, and Hegel’s. 
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writers is certainly crowding Emerson's own ideas out of his head, and what renders 
this crowding particularly anxiety-inducing is that Emerson’s mind is being flooded 
with ideas he recognises. It is this quality that David Greenham identifies, for 
example, in his own recent transatlantic exploration of Emerson's works, Emerson's 
Transatlantic Transcendentalism (2012), noting of Emerson's first encounter with 
Coleridge's thought in Aids to Reflection that 'it must have come as less of a surprise 
and more with a shock of recognition' (36). Emerson himself acknowledges this 
quality in great writing generally, in a now infamous passage from the essay "Self-
Reliance": 
A man should learn to detect and watch that gleam of light which flashes 
across his mind within, more than a lustre of the firmament of bards and 
sages. Yet he dismisses without notice his thought, because it is his. In every 
work of genius we recognise our own rejected thoughts: they come back to 
us with a certain alienated majesty. (CW 2:27) 
In Aids to Reflection, The Excursion, and On Heroes, and in Coleridge’s, 
Wordsworth’s, and Carlyle’s works more generally, Emerson recognises his own 
rejected thoughts reflected back at him. 
 One can best understand Emerson’s antagonistic engagements in Nature, 
the "Woodnotes" poems, and Representative Men with Aids to Reflection, The 
Excursion, and On Heroes respectively, to issue from Emerson’s identification of 
threatening proximity of both thought and of time. Emerson has many 
contemporaries and there are many thinkers with whom he is intellectually 
proximate. There are few, however, who coalesce both elements, and thus few 
whose creative presence is threatening enough to necessitate antagonistic 
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engagement and detachment. In these three instances, Emerson’s detachment is 
one not only from the transatlantic text with which he engages but also a symbolic 
detachment from the more significant and threatening influence that the 
intellectually and temporally proximate authors of the texts wield over Emerson 
both intellectually and creatively. 
Identifiable in such an interpretation of Emerson’s thematic and formal 
detachments is the inimitable presence of Harold Bloom and his ideas regarding the 
anxiety of influence. Specifically, the notion of a detachment that issues from an 
unconscious need to distinguish one’s self from the influence of a precursor has an 
apparent corollary in one of Bloom’s six revisionary ratios, clinamen. However, the 
struggle with the power of the poetic precursor that Bloom describes in The Anxiety 
of Influence is one with what Michael Macovski describes as a ‘more distant, 
psychodynamic antecedent’ (Dialogue and Literature 43). For Bloom, the further 
removed temporally the poet is from the poetic precursor, the more potent the 
precursor’s anxiety-inducing effects; temporal distance endows the poetic 
antecedent with almost mythical proportions as he or she looms over the present 
from the depths of literary history. As such, the following chapters, which explore 
Emerson’s transatlantic engagement with the works of three contemporary or near-
contemporary literary figures, and which understand this temporal proximity to be 
an exacerbating factor in regard to Emerson’s creative anxieties both personal and 
extrapersonal, are necessarily distinguished from Bloom’s framework. 
Additionally, although the notion of a detachment from a source of creative 
and intellectual influence shares conceptual similarities with Bloom’s notion of a 
swerve or clinamen, the term detachment, as well as my understanding of its 
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significance as an act related to reading and to expression, derives directly from 
Emerson’s own writing. The following section outlines Emerson’s understanding of 
detachment as expressed in early essays such as “Self-Reliance” and “Circles,” as 
well as later works like the 1859 lecture “Quotation and Originality,” and 
demonstrates Emerson’s situation of this act within a larger process of antagonistic 
engagement. Emerson develops this process in order to navigate and to define the 
relationship between influence and originality, which we might also understand as 
the relationship between reading and writing, indebtedness and self-reliance. 
Before undertaking a discussion of Emerson’s conception of reading, writing, and 
the relationship between the two, however, it is important to note a final and 
significant distinction from Harold Bloom’s influence theory, referred to briefly 
above in regard to ideas of nation. 
Like Joel Pace and Matthew Scott, I believe Bloom’s theory of influence 
requires augmentation on the grounds that influence cannot be understood solely 
as a literary matter (3). Rather than explore influence in relation to the cultural 
contexts that inform American allusion and reference to British writing, as Pace, 
Scott, and their contributors to Wordsworth in American Literary Culture (2005) do, 
however, the subsequent three chapters incorporate ideas of nation. The following 
comparative explorations are guided by the fundamental notion of Stephen 
Spender’s Love-Hate Relations (1974), later augmented by scholars like Robert 
Weisbuch, that American writers formed the identity of their ‘patria’ by  
…comparing their idea of European civilization with their own country’s 
force and vitality. They either reacted against Europe or they gravitated 
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toward it, but the shadow image of England and Europe qualified their 
attitudes to their own country and state of culture. (Spender xxvii) 
Robert Weisbuch’s Atlantic Double-Cross (1986) gave name to Spender’s ‘shadow 
image’ looming over American writers in the nineteenth century specifically, calling 
it the ‘burden of Britain,’ and it is to his account of Anglo-American literary relations 
to which the following chapters are most indebted. 
 In Weisbuch’s understanding of the burden of Britain, American writers not 
only construct their identity in comparison to British cultural models, but they do so 
on temporal grounds. American writers, according to Weisbuch, ‘redefine the very 
meaning of history and society’ because, in comparison to Britain, their closest and 
most anxiety-inducing model, they lack a sufficiently full history (xiii). Deliberately 
avoiding the language of cause and effect, Weisbuch suggests that ‘in the course of 
their rethinkings,’ those necessitated by accusations of and anxiety regarding their 
apparent lack, American writers either developed his own sense of history or ‘an 
answering substitute for one’ (xv). 
 Like Weisbuch, I do not wish to draw any connection between Emerson’s 
‘rethinkings’ of time in Nature, the “Woodnotes” poems, and Representative Men 
addressed in each chapter and broader Anglo-American relations. Rather, I intend 
to acknowledge that Emerson’s engagements with Aids to Reflection, The Excursion, 
and On Heroes are undoubtedly ‘more than personal and individual’ (21). That is 
not to say that the extrapersonal or national significance that these texts and their 
authors represent override their personal, creative significance, only that the two 
sources of influence are present and consequential. In short, it is not only because 
the writers are temporally and intellectually proximate that Emerson engages 
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antagonistically with the work of Coleridge, Wordsworth, Carlyle, but also because 
they are British. Emerson himself acknowledges the significance of their nationally 
representative nature in 1837, when he writes in his journal ‘Carlyle and 
Wordsworth now act out England on us, – Coleridge also’ (JMN 5:370) 
 In Atlantic Double-Cross, Weisbuch identifies two basic responses in 
nineteenth century American literature to the ‘British taunt of no history’ (153–
154). American writers could either argue that America possessed a rich past or 
they could ‘argue that a sense of history could be replaced, and decisively improved 
upon, by considering the entire issue of man-in-time in ways that avoided the 
linear, secular trail of the past’ (153). Emerson’s accounts of time in Nature, the 
“Woodnotes” poems, and Representative Men fall into the second category. More 
specifically, Emerson combines two specific strategies of temporal reimagining 
identified by Weisbuch in Atlantic Double-Cross, vertical time and futurism, both of 
which will be delineated in greater detail in each chapter, and he does so in an 
increasingly sophisticated and effective manner. 
 Each of the following chapters acknowledges and incorporates a discussion 
of the national implications of Emerson’s temporal (re)vision in their concluding 
comments; however, the comparative explorations on which the chapters centre 
issue from a fundamental assumption: that Emerson engages in each instance with 
a single, specific British text. More specifically, I argue, Emerson’s texts in a sense 
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Reception, Use, and Creation through Detachment: Emerson 
and Tripartite ‘Creative Reading’ 
 
The first philosophy that Emerson establishes in Nature centres on his 
engagement with Coleridge’s account of transcendence in Aids to Reflection as a 
passage from unconscious thought to consciousness through reflection, the 
distinctions between the Reason and the Understanding and between Nature and 
Spirit on which Coleridge’s account is grounded, and Coleridge’s presentation of 
this account as a method rather than a system.  
In the “Woodnotes” poems, Emerson engages with Wordsworth’s 
conception of the relationship between ‘Man, Nature, and Society’ as presented in 
The Excursion, and the manner in which the dramatic element in Wordsworth’s 
poem plays a constitutive role in the text’s conception of this triad (The Excursion 
ii). Additionally, Emerson engages with the creative subtext of Wordsworth’s poem, 
the ideas presented in the text regarding the development of the poetic 
imagination; such ideas are at the heart of poems like the Intimations Ode, but are 
not as overtly manifest in The Excursion. Finally, Emerson centres “Woodnotes I” on 
a relationship similar to that found in Wordsworth’s poem between Poet and 
Wanderer.  
In Representative Men, Emerson engages with Thomas Carlyle’s biographical 
understanding of history, and specifically with the notion of hero-worship central to 
this conception. Emerson incorporates a Carlylean understanding of history as 
biography and of the biography of great men more specifically, and he 
accomplishes this by presenting history as a series of heroic biographical vignettes 
as Carlyle does in On Heroes. Lastly, Emerson includes among his historical portraits 
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the figures of Napoleon Bonaparte and William Shakespeare, incorporating two of 
the great men also found in Carlyle’s earlier work. 
In part, the following chapters seek to delineate and to explore Emerson’s 
indebtedness to Romantic tradition in these three instances of transatlantic 
engagement. As such, each chapter contains an exploration of the apparent 
influence in Nature of Coleridge’s spiritual philosophy; traces in the “Woodnotes” 
poems of Wordsworth’s revised conception of the Romantic triad; and the 
indebtedness of the account of history found in Representative Men to Carlyle’s in 
On Heroes.4 In this way, the following comparative explorations are aligned with 
much of the most recent transatlantic scholarship of Emerson’s works, namely 
Patrick Keane’s Emerson, Romanticism, and Intuitive Reason (2005), David 
Greenham’s Emerson’s Transatlantic Romanticism (2012), and Samantha Harvey’s 
Transatlantic Transcendentalism (2013). Each of these texts seeks to illuminate 
more fully the traces of Romantic influence across Emerson’s oeuvre and they have 
been indispensable in my own explorations of Emerson’s transatlantic 
engagements. However, Samantha Harvey’s was particularly influential to the 
development of my approach to Emerson’s transatlantic engagement.  
Harvey’s research in Transatlantic Transcendentalism, which focuses 
specifically on Emerson’s engagement with Coleridge’s works and ideas, 
understands Emerson’s interactions with Coleridge to constitute a new ‘category of 
influence’ that she deems ‘assimilative’ (9). Informed by Thomas McFarland’s 
                                                     
4 My use of the term ‘Romantic triad’ is indebted to Samantha Harvey’s research in Transatlantic 
Transcendentalism (2013) which, in turn, belongs to a scholastic lineage that includes M.H. Abrams, Thomas 
McFarland, Seamus Perry, and John Beer (16). Harvey defines the triad as follows: ‘…a triangle in which the 
bottom two feet represent the natural world and the human world, and the top point represents the realm of 
the spiritual’ (14). At the centre of Harvey’s triad is the figure of the poet-prophet (Ibid). 
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‘originality paradox,’ Harvey’s understanding of Emerson’s assimilative relationship 
to Coleridge’s works and her exploration of that relationship demonstrate the 
extent to which ‘profound indebtedness can enable, and even enhance the 
originality of a writer’ (3). Harvey’s understanding of Emerson’s assimilative 
practice, like my own study, also turns to Emerson’s own writing on the relationship 
between the influence wielded by tradition and the potential for original 
expression. The title of an 1859 lecture dedicated to the subject characterises this 
relationship as that between “Quotation and Originality,” and Harvey quotes from 
this text in establishing her understanding of Emerson’s assimilative approach to 
Coleridge’s works. In the central passage from Emerson’s essay to which Harvey 
turns, Emerson refers explicitly to the British writer: 
Original power in men is usually accompanied with assimilating power: and I 
value in Coleridge his excellent knowledge & quotations, perhaps as much, 
possibly more, than his original suggestions. If you give me just distinctions, 
if you give me inspiring lessons, imaginative poetry, – it is not important to 
me whose they are. If I possess them, & am fired & guided by them, I know 
you as a benefactor, & shall return to you as long as you serve me so well. I 
may like well to know what is Plato’s, & what is Goethe’s part, & what 
thought was always dear to you: but their very worth consists in their 
radiancy, & equal fitness to all intelligence. They fit all my facts like a charm. 
I respect myself (the more) that I know them. Next to the originator of a 
good sentence is the first quoter of it. (JMN 16:67; quoted Harvey 9) 
Such a passage might be read as a justification of plagiarism or as a denial of 
influence, Harvey concedes; but she points readers to Emerson’s comments 
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regarding possession, guidance, and benefactorship as ‘complicat[ing] such 
reductive models’ of reading (Ibid). For Harvey, this passage, alongside an extract 
from Emerson’s “Divinity School Address,” portrays Emerson’s ‘self-assessment of 
profound indebtedness to Coleridge,’ that which ‘at the same time galvanized great 
originality’ (10). More specifically, ‘Coleridge’s fragmentary oeuvre begged an 
imaginative completion’ in the eyes of the American writer, ‘much as ruin prompted 
an imagined vision of the whole’ (Ibid). 
 The assimilative practices Harvey outlines in Transatlantic 
Transcendentalism to illuminate and define Emerson’s relationship to Coleridge’s 
works and thought throughout his career, correspond to Emerson’s engagements 
with Aids to Reflection, The Excursion, and On Heroes in Nature, the “Woodnotes” 
poems, and Representative Men specifically. As outlined previously, in each 
instance Emerson assimilates or incorporates aspects of Coleridge’s, Wordsworth’s, 
and Carlyle’s thought into his texts. An exploration of these assimilations in relation 
to the larger systems of thought in which they are found – conceptions of the 
Romantic triad in Nature and the “Woodnotes” poems, and a system of history in 
Representative Men – reveals that Emerson’s indebtedness does not preclude his 
intellectual originality and suggest the applicability of Harvey’s assimilative model 
more broadly than to the American writer’s engagements with Coleridge alone. In 
the “Woodnotes” poems and Representative Men, as well as in Nature, Emerson 
not only assimilates key ideas from Carlyle’s, Wordsworth’s, and Coleridge’s 
thought, but he then ‘applie[s] those ideas in distinctive and original ways’ (Harvey 
9).  
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The following three chapters explore in greater detail the manner in which 
Emerson applies these ideas in an original manner in Nature, the “Woodnotes” 
poems, and Representative Men through acts of detachment. Augmenting extant 
research of Emerson’s transatlantic engagements, each of the following 
comparative explorations incorporate analysis of these acts as they are expressed in 
both thematic and stylistic shifts in Emerson’s three texts. 
In Aids to Reflection, Coleridge proceeds from the belief that ‘the CHRISTIAN 
FAITH (in which I include every article of belief and doctrine professed by the first 
Reformers in common) IS THE PERFECTION OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE’ (AR 6; original 
emphasis). Furthermore, Coleridge proposes an account of transcendence in which 
the individual’s relationship to God is mediated by the Bible. By way of contrast, 
prior to composing Nature, Emerson had abandoned the Bible as a source of 
revelation in favour of the Book of Nature, a shift that David Greenham explores 
extensively in Emerson’s Transatlantic Romanticism and which will be discussed in 
further detail in chapter one. Part of Emerson’s detachment from the influence 
wielded by Aids to Reflection and from Coleridge’s intellectual and creative 
influence is the American writer’s substitution of the revelatory value of scripture 
for that of a new text: the book of nature. In incorporating this ideological shift into 
his expression of the first philosophy in Nature, Emerson first embraces the 
fundamental distinction between the natural and the spiritual at the heart of 
Coleridge’s thought, only to blur the division between this universal opposition in 
the final two chapters of the essay. Emerson’s significant thematic detachment is 
accompanied by a stylistic shift in these chapters from the numbered sequences 
that characterise the rest of the text, those that emulate the more structured 
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philosophical prose of Aids to Reflection. Embracing a more fluid and imaginative 
prose, it is in these chapters that, in Barbara Packer’s words, Emerson ‘first really 
becomes “Emerson”’ (63). 
Emerson’s departure from Wordsworth’s thought in the “Woodnotes” 
poems centres on the significant role that community plays in the establishment, 
maintenance, and renewal of the individual’s faith in Wordsworth’s poem and 
throughout Wordsworth’s oeuvre. Emerson’s rejection of this element of 
Wordsworth’s thought involves an engagement with and eventual detachment 
from formal properties of Wordsworth’s poem, namely the constitutive dramatic 
element in The Excursion. 
In regard to the coincident stylistic and ideological detachments seen in 
Nature and the “Woodnotes” poems, Representative Men stands as somewhat of 
anomaly. There is no single prominent volta in Representative Men signalling 
Emerson’s detachment from Carlyle’s ideas or from formal elements of On Heroes. 
As aforementioned, there are shifts in each chapter comprising Representative 
Men, and in each instance they signal a departure from Carlyle’s thought, namely 
the notion that great men are exemplars to be emulated and worshipped. 
However, Emerson’s genuine detachment from Carlyle’s ideas of history is more 
thoroughly incorporated into Representative Men because this detachment is 
thoroughly embedded in Emerson’s conceptualisation of history. Emerson’s 
fundamental disagreement with Carlyle stems from Carlyle’s insistence on hero-
worship and leads to Emerson’s detachment from On Heroes on multiple grounds: 
the definition of biography, the manner in which history moves or progresses, and 
the current trajectory of this historical movement. Emerson’s detachment from 
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Carlyle is located in Emerson’s entirely distinct model of history, unique despite the 
fact that its biographical foundations are located in Carlyle’s thought, and despite 
superficial formal similarities between Emerson’s text and On Heroes. 
In each instance, Emerson’s detachment centres on his rejection of 
elements in Coleridge’s, Wordsworth’s, and Carlyle’s thought that are counter to 
his emphasis on self-reliance, a notion conveyed most concisely by the epigraph to 
his 1841 essay dedicated to the subject: ‘Ne te quaesiveris extra’ (seek nothing 
outside yourself) (CW 2:27). In Aids to Reflection, it is the mediating presence of the 
Bible and the rigid opposition of nature and spirit that unnecessarily mediates 
man’s self-reliant relationship to God and to the world around him; it is the 
intrusion of community on the individual’s experience of nature that Emerson 
rejects in the “Woodnotes” poems; and in Representative Men, Emerson departs 
from Carlyle’s thought on the grounds that its calls for idolatry are antithetical to 
Emerson’s idea of self-reliance.  
Complicating Emerson’s calls for radical subjectivity or self-reliance not only 
in these three texts but in all aspects of Emerson’s expression, is his indebtedness 
to ideas that are outside of himself. In a number of his works such as the “American 
Scholar Address” (1837) and in essays from Emerson’s First Series (1841), most 
notably in “Self-Reliance” and “Circles,” Emerson acknowledges and explores this 
tension, which we might call that between indebtedness and self-reliance, in 
relation to the notions of expression and the intellect. In this context, this tension is 
best expressed as that between reading and writing or, as in the title of Emerson’s 
aforementioned 1859 lecture, a tension between “Quotation and Originality.” In 
such works, Emerson not only acknowledges and explores tensions between the 
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incursions of tradition and original expression, he attempts to find a balance 
between the two oppositional or antithetical ideas. As will be explored in further 
detail in forthcoming pages, through his explorations Emerson succeeds in 
developing a model in which tradition and its influence do not disappear altogether, 
but rather one in which the presence of the past does not eliminate the possibility 
for future originality. 
The notion that original expression can be achieved through acts of 
assimilation – that is to say, the notion that original expression can be achieved by 
applying assimilated ideas in new and original ways – explains in broad strokes the 
model that Emerson develops. However, the manner in which Emerson imagines 
influence and self-reliance to co-exist is more complicated, and assimilation is only 
the first step in a larger process I will refer to throughout this thesis as creative or 
antagonistic reading. In short, and prefacing a far more in-depth exploration of 
creative reading,  assimilation must be followed by a second act, detachment, in 
which one moves away from or gains independence from the idea with which one 
engages. Augmenting extant transatlantic scholarship of Emerson’s works, the 
following chapters focus not only on evidence in Nature, the “Woodnotes” poems, 
and Representative Men of Emerson’s indebtedness to the three British sources 
with which he engages, but also the elements of Emerson’s thought that are 
distinct from these sources, reading these distinguishing features in relation to 








Emerson's 1837 American Scholar Address focuses centrally on the 
relationship between influence and originality presented in the manner in which 
Emerson would continue to describe it for the rest of his career: tradition 
(influence) on one side and future independence from tradition (originality) on the 
other. Featuring significantly in the address is Emerson's exploration of scholarship 
and, by extension, reading, as a matter of contending with tradition. Emerson 
presents a fundamentally antagonistic account of reading centred on the 
opposition between the individual intellect and the incursive force of tradition. In 
exploring these topics, he presents a brief but significant account of the relationship 
between reading and expression as he understands it in the early years of his 
literary career: 
I would not be hurried by any love of system, by any exaggeration of 
instincts, to underrate the Book. We all know that as the human body can 
be nourished on any food, though it were boiled grass and the broth of 
shoes, so the human mind can be fed by any knowledge. And great and 
heroic men have existed who had almost no other information than by the 
printed page. I only would say that it needs a strong head to bear that diet. 
One must be an inventor to read well. As the proverb says, "He that would 
bring home the wealth of the Indies must carry out the wealth of the 
Indies." There is then creative reading as well as creative writing. When the 
mind is braced by labor and invention, the page of whatever book we read 
becomes luminous with manifold allusion. Every sentence is doubly 
significant, and the sense of our author is as broad as the world. We then 
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see, what is always true, that as the seer's hour of vision is short and rare 
among heavy days and months, so is its record, perchance, the least part of 
his volume. The discerning will read, in his Plato or Shakespeare, only that 
least part,— only the authentic utterances of the oracle;—all the rest he 
rejects, were it never so many times Plato's and Shakespeare's. (CW 1:58) 
Describing books in terms of mental nourishment, the highest form of reading - 
creative reading - is nourishing only insofar as it is an active form of engagement. 
Through this active engagement a text's manifold allusions can be identified and, 
most importantly, through such an act the most significant portions of a text – 
those parts that are 'the authentic utterances of the oracle' - might be discerned. 
Commenting on Emerson's tendency to present reading in this manner, Barbara 
Packer notes that  
The assertion that a text reveals a meaning its author did not consciously 
intend (whether of unwitting folly or oracular wisdom) is the constitutive 
gesture of interpretation. For it turns the text into a figure of which our 
explanation is the fulfillment, and hence is not the least powerful of the 
counterattacks we launch at the centuries.... (21) 
When Emerson's account of reading in the American Scholar Address is understood 
in this light as a counterattack levelled at tradition or, at the very least, a defensive 
posture, we begin to see the foundations of the antagonistic relationship between 
influence and originality, past and future, that Emerson will develop over the next 
several years, particularly in the essays of the First Series (1841). However, in 1837, 
Emerson conceives of creative reading and creative writing as distinct albeit similar 
acts. Crucially, Emerson's fully developed understanding of the relationship 
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between past and future, influence and originality, reading and writing, posits a 
process of engagement in which writing is creative reading. That is to say, Emerson 
imagines a process by which reading leads to creation (is creative), a process that is 
reflected in his own engagements with sources of particularly potent influence like 
Aids to Reflection, The Excursion, and On Heroes. 
One of the central features of creative reading, antagonism, has been noted 
several times previously. Creative reading is antagonistic because it centres on what 
Emerson understands to be the fundamentally oppositional relationship between 
influence and self-reliance – that which is already expressed (the past; that which 
influences) and that which is yet to be expressed (original thought; future creation). 
In his own study of Emerson's ideas of reading and of writing in “Being Odd, Getting 
Even” (1985), Stanley Cavell calls the reader's attention to this very quality through 
analysis of Emerson statement in the essay "Self-Reliance" that ‘Self-reliance is the 
aversion of [conformity]’ (quoted "Being Odd" 113). Of this statement Cavell writes, 
This almost says, and nearly means, that you find your existence in 
conversion, by converting to it, that thinking is a kind of turning oneself 
around. But what it directly says is that the world of conformity must turn 
from what he [Emerson] says as he must turn from it, and that since the 
process is never over while we live – since, that is, we are never finally free 
of one another – his reader's life with him will be turning from, and 
returning from, his words, moving on from them, by them. In the later, 
major essay "Fate" Emerson calls this aversion "antagonism" - "Man is a 
stupendous antagonism"…. (113–114) 
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What Cavell identifies in this instance is the intimate relationship between the 
notions of self-reliance and antagonism not only in "Self-Reliance" but in the 
conceptions of reading and of writing presented throughout Emerson's oeuvre. To 
be self-reliant is to turn away or against that which would tempt you toward 
conformity. More accurately, to be self-reliant is to be consistently turning away or 
against conformity. The repetitive nature of this turning away, the notion that the 
achievement of self-reliance is, in Cavell’s words, a 'continuing task not a property,' 
is the second element central to Emerson's conception of reading and of its 
relationship to expression (Cavell "Being Odd" 103). 
In a passage from "Circles," an essay that is found, like "Self-Reliance", in 
Emerson's First Series (1841), Emerson explicitly describes the intertwined nature of 
antagonism and repetition, and their relationship to acts of expression: 
Every ultimate fact is only the first of a new series. Every general law only a 
particular fact of some more general law presently to disclose itself. There is 
no outside, no inclosing wall, no circumference to us. The man finishes his 
story,—how good! how final! how it puts a new face on all things! He fills 
the sky. Lo! on the other side rises also a man and draws a circle around the 
circle we had just pronounced the outline of the sphere. Then already is our 
first speaker not man, but only a first speaker. His only redress is forthwith 
to draw a circle outside of his antagonist. (CW 2:181) 
Using the image of the circle, that 'highest emblem in the cipher of the world' to 
which he would return time and again throughout his career, Emerson presents 
both reading and expression as acts akin to the expansion of an infinite number of 
circumferences (CW 2:179). For Emerson, nothing is final in either self-reliant 
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expression or in its corollary, self-reliant reading. Just as soon as the individual 
believes himself to have reached the absolute limits of thought, whether in his own 
expression or in reading those ideas that others have expressed, a new circle is 
drawn that moves intellectual boundaries ever further. Self-reliance in reading and 
in expression, then, is not only an antagonistic ‘turning from’ in order to draw a 
new circle outside of one's antagonist, but also a recognition of the fact that no 
new circumference is final.  
Emerson's emphasis on the constant movement that comes with the 
drawing of new circumferences does speak to a certain kind of poverty attendant 
with the notion that one’s position is never final, that we are always leaving (Cavell 
"Thinking of Emerson" 176). However, it is also in this quality of transition or 
movement that Emerson identifies an influx of power: 
Power ceases in the instant of repose, it resides in the moment of transition 
from a past to a new state, in the shooting of the gulf, in the darting to an 
aim. This one fact the world hates, that the soul becomes; for that forever 
degrades the past, turns all riches to poverty, all reputation to shame, 
confounds the saint with the rogue, shoves Jesus and Judas equally aside. 
(CW 2:40; original emphasis) 
This empowerment is originality of being, and the act that it facilitates – although 
only in those in possession of genius – is expression. Thus, through antagonistic 
opposition to the past and by recognition of the necessity for constant movement, 
creative reading or expression is made possible. However, while fundamental, 
these elements do not describe how the movement from antagonistic opposition to 
creation actually occurs. In sketching the particulars of the method by which an 
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influx of power can be gained through the act of creative reading I will turn to an 
1859 lecture in which Emerson’s ideas on the subject coalesce in a concise 
expression of this act. 
The title of Emerson’s 1859 lecture, “Quotation and Originality,” presents an 
antagonistic relationship between two concepts or ideas through a set of 
oppositional terms.5 The creative or expressive emphasis of these terms necessarily 
incorporates acts of reading, as it is only through one’s antagonistic engagement 
with an incursive force (reading) that creative impulses (writing) can be inspired. 
“Quotation and Originality,” originally delivered at Freeman Place Chapel in Boston 
in March 1859, is dedicated to outlining the process by which the transfer of power 
from incursive force to expression is achieved. That is to say, the lecture is 
dedicated to the process of creative reading. 
Emerson’s understanding of creative reading in “Quotation and Originality” 
is founded on the notion that the past is nothing more than ‘raw material’ for 
‘recomposition,’ and the process by which this transformation occurs, in its most 
basic conception, is tripartite: 
This vast memory is only raw material. The divine gift is ever the instant life 
which receives and uses and creates, and can well bury the old in the 
omnipotency [sic] with which Nature composes all her harvests for 
recomposition. (CW 8:107; emphasis added) 
                                                     
5 Like Julie Ellison, I have avoided the use of the term ‘dialectic’ when describing the antagonistic relationship 
between reading and writing, influx and expression. In Emerson’s Romantic Style, Ellison suggests that while 
Emerson’s ideas are often described in terms of dialectical unity, such a conception ignores the fact that 
resolutions of polarity in Emerson’s works are only ever temporary and that ‘[w]hen antitheses do issue in 
synthesis, it rarely endures…’ (76). Emerson’s conception of creative reading, as aforementioned, emphasises 
the necessity of perpetual motion; to unify oppositional elements is to stagnate and, as such, must necessarily 
only ever be temporary. 
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Beginning with a period of reception to a text, creative reading then requires 
engagement with or use of that which one has received. Although not explicit in the 
above quotation, which presents the process of creative reading in only a 
rudimentary outline, it is the act of use or engagement that facilitates the final, 
crucial step in the process, creation. While creation is straightforward in its 
correspondence to an act or acts of expression, the process by which one achieves 
this – that is, the nature of reception and use – require further exploration. 
 We might understand reception either in the manner of Stanley Cavell in his 
essay “Being Odd, Getting Even” as an act of ‘obedience’ and a ‘mode of listening,’ 
or like Julie Ellison in Emerson’s Romantic Style (1984), as a ‘surrender’ to that 
which ‘invades the reader’s territory and evicts him from it’ (111; 78). For Ellison, 
reading involves a violent incursion from which one must then recover, while for 
Cavell, to receive a text and to be received by it ‘is to find thinking in it. That would 
prove a human existence is authorized in it’ (“Being Odd” 113).  
The manner in which Emerson conceives of reception is not necessarily 
consistent throughout his works. Throughout her exploration of Emerson’s prose 
works, Ellison notes a preponderance of violent language and grotesque imagery, 
coupled with equally violent stylistic transitions that she links to the ‘association 
between interpretation and violence’ (92). When Emerson writes ‘We thrive by 
casualties. Our chief experiences have been casual,’ Ellison takes him to mean that 
‘we thrive by inflicting casualties,’ and that this violence ‘is always a recovery from a 
prior debility’ (13).  
Elsewhere in Emerson’s oeuvre one finds more innocuous accounts of 
reception, however. The aforementioned description of reading in “Self-Reliance” 
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as an act that involves recognising our rejected thoughts reflected back at us with 
alienated majesty, for example, exemplifies Cavell’s more organic understanding of 
what I call reception. Elsewhere, too, as we will see in the following pages, Emerson 
aligns reception as a process of self-identification and a sanctioning of one’s genius, 
rather than an act of violence. 
Whether reception is an act of violent incursion against which one must 
defend or a more organic, authorizing act, is beyond the scope of this discussion. 
What is significant is the fact that, in either case, reception must be understood 
fundamentally as an act of influx. That is to say, reception is influence in the most 
fundamental sense of the word – a flowing in of something from outside. 
Additionally, whether or not influence imposes itself violently, its effects require 
nullification, and self-reliance must be asserted. It is for exactly this reason that 
Emerson develops his understanding of creative reading – because, as we have 
noted earlier, the relationship between the influence of tradition on one side and 
the power of original thought and expression on the other is fundamentally 
antagonistic. 
 Emerson’s aforementioned portrayal of reading as a recognition of one’s 
own thoughts in works of genius should be understood at least in part as an 
expression of his desire to nullify the effects of influence. It appears not only in 
“Self-Reliance,” but also in the American Scholar Address in Emerson’s description 
of heroes and poets as those in whom individuals ‘behold…their own green and 
crude being, - ripened!’ (CW 1:65), and in his descriptions of Marvell’s, Chaucer’s, 
and Dryden’s works as those in which the poet expresses ‘that which lies close to 
my own soul, that which I had also well-nigh thought and said’ (CW 1:57–58). 
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Although such descriptions of reading and of great writing grant genius to others, 
they also simultaneously sanction one’s self-reliance; Emerson manages to 
transform the accomplishments of others into a reinforcement of the reader’s 
individual greatness and potential. A more concrete path toward the nullification of 
influence, however, is outlined in Emerson’s understanding of the second step in 
the tripartite process of creative reading, use, to be discussed in the forthcoming 
and concluding portion of this discussion.  
Use itself is not a concrete act; rather, this intermediate step in the process 
of creative reading is a state of transition, one in which a crucial act of 
transformation or recomposition occurs. It is perhaps best to think of use as a 
conversion of the raw material of the past into something new albeit still connected 
to that which came before. In the opening paragraphs of “Quotation and 
Originality,” Emerson presents this conversion of raw material in terms of weaving: 
‘Our debt to tradition through reading and conversation is so massive … 
that, in a large sense, one would say there is no pure originality. All minds 
quote. Old and new make the warp and woof of every moment. There is no 
thread that is not a twist of these two strands. By necessity, by proclivity 
and by delight, we all quote. (CW 8:94) 
The image of a thread formed by the twisting of two separate strands emphasises a 
notion integral to Emerson’s understanding of creative reading, namely, that 
engagement or use enables the creation of something paradoxically both new and 
indebted – a thread that is more than the sum of its parts. This process is perhaps 
most vividly conveyed in Emerson’s use of consumptive and digestive metaphors in 
his 1859 lecture. In one instance, for example, Emerson refers to our indebtedness 
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to the past as being ‘fed and formed’ by tradition. In addition to presenting the raw 
material of the past as a kind of intellectual food, Emerson refers to instances in 
which this might be transformed into a substance that empowers expression 
through a digestive process of sorts. Perhaps the most revealing passage of this 
kind is found toward the conclusion of Emerson’s lecture; it indicates not only the 
significance of Emerson’s consumptive and ingestive metaphors, but also their 
relationship to self-reliant originality: 
But there remains the indefeasible [sic] persistency of the individual to be 
himself. One leaf, one blade of grass, one meridian, does not resemble 
another. Every mind is different; and the more it is unfolded, the more 
pronounced is that difference. He must draw the elements into him for 
food, and, if they be granite and silex, will prefer them cooked by sun and 
rain, by time and art, to his hand. But, however received, these elements 
pass into the substance of his constitution, will be assimilated, and tend 
always to form, not a partisan, but a possessor of truth (CW 8:105) 
Beginning with an overt appeal to the notion of self-reliant individualism, Emerson 
elaborates further on the medial step in creative reading, use, aligning it with 
biological conversion. In this process, ingestion (influence) is necessarily followed 
by a transformative process in which a material’s most vital elements – what we 
might understand in this metaphor as ideas – are absorbed or ‘passed into the 
substance of one’s constitution.’ In biological terms, this is a process of digestion by 
which raw material of the past, intellectual food, is converted into energy that 
empowers acts of creation. Following this process, the individual is indebted to the 
original raw material that he or she consumed, but only insofar as it provides him or 
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her with the energy to perform original actions. In this instance, the original act 
with which Emerson is chiefly concerned is that of expression. 
The notion of absorption or assimilation is that on which Samantha Harvey 
builds her aforementioned understanding of Emerson’s assimilative engagements 
with Coleridge’s works and ideas. Linking this assimilation directly to notions of 
expression, Harvey defines the act as one in which ‘Emerson assimilated key 
aspects of Coleridge’s thought and then applied those ideas in distinctive and 
original ways’ (9). In the main passage from “Quotation and Originality” to which 
Harvey turns in establishing her understanding of Emerson’s assimilative practices, 
and that to which I have previously referred, however, it is important note the 
distinction between what Emerson calls ‘original power’ and ‘assimilating power’ 
(‘Original power in men is usually accompanied with assimilating power….’). 
Elsewhere in the lecture, Emerson similarly distinguishes between these powers 
when he writes that ‘We expect a great man to be a good reader; or in proportion 
to the spontaneous power should be the assimilating power’ (CW 8:93).  
In Emerson’s definition of a ‘good reader’ as one whose ‘spontaneous 
power’ is in proportion to that of his or her ‘assimilating power,’ spontaneous 
power is best understood as that which corresponds to what Stanley Cavell calls 
whim and explores in “Being Odd, Getting Even.” In Cavell’s essay, the significance 
of the term whim is derived from in its appearance in a curious passage from “Self-
Reliance” in which Emerson writes ‘I shun father and mother and wife and brother 
when my genius calls me. I would write on the lintels of the door-post, Whim’ (CW 
2:30; original emphasis). Cavell understands this statement to mean that 
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Whether [Emerson’s] writing on the lintels – his writing as such, I gather – is 
thought of as having the constancy of the contents of a mezuzah or the 
emergency of the Passover blood, either way he is taking upon himself the 
mark of God, and of departure. His perception of the moment is taken in 
hope, as something to be proven only on the way, by the way. This 
departure, such setting out is, in our poverty, what hope consists in, all 
there is to hope for; it is the abandoning of despair, which is otherwise our 
condition. (“Thinking of Emerson” 175; original emphasis) 
That is to say, the power and act of assimilation must be accompanied by another 
power and by an additional action, a power nearer to intuition or genius that 
involves an act of moving away or departure – what I refer to as detachment.  
At this point, we find ourselves as it were back at the beginning of the 
process of creative reading we began outlining some pages ago: at the point of 
transition or movement by which creation is empowered. Tracing Emerson’s 
portrayals of creative reading in greater detail has refined our understanding of the 
process and demonstrated that while assimilation in part describes the nature of 
the act or state to which Emerson refers in “Quotation and Originality” as use, it 
fails to acknowledge a second and equally significant act: detachment. Emerson 
conveys the multivalent significance of the act of detachment as an empowering act 
of self-reliance and one requiring the refusal of all outside influence in a passage 
from “Self-Reliance,” and the last to which I will refer in this discussion of creative 
reading:  
Let a stoic open the resources of man, and tell men they are not leaning 
willows, but can and must detach themselves; that with the exercise of self-
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trust, new powers shall appear; that a man is the word made flesh, born to 
shed healing to the nations, that he should be ashamed of our compassion, 
and that the moment he acts from himself, tossing the laws, the books, 
idolatries, and customs out of the window, we pity him no more but thank 
and revere him, - and that teacher shall restore the life of man to splendor, 
and make his name dear to all History. (CW 2:43–44; emphasis added) 
The following chapters consider Emerson’s shifts, both thematic and stylistic, away 
from Aids to Reflection, The Excursion, and On Heroes respectively to be expressions 
of this detachment – of tossing out the books and the intellectual idolatries that 
once overwhelmed Emerson’s self-reliance. In doing so, discussion in each chapter 
roughly corresponds to the process of creative reading outlined above. Each of the 
following three chapters opens with a discussion of reception, that is, Emerson’s 
affinity to various aspects of Coleridge’s, Wordsworth’s, and Carlyle’s thought 
generally, and in Aids to Reflection, The Excursion, and Representative Men 
specifically. The discussion of reception in chapter one is lengthier than those found 
in chapters two and three because it incorporates an exploration of significant 
intellectual and spiritual developments in the period leading up to and during 
Emerson’s first encounters with the works of all three writers. Comparative analysis 
of the two texts on which each chapter centres, traces the elements of Emerson’s 
texts indebted to the transatlantic sources with which he engages – that is to say, it 
traces Emerson’s assimilations. Each discussion also contains an extensive 
exploration of Emerson’s detachments from these ideas, each of which centres on 
ideas of self-reliance, as aforementioned. In Nature and the “Woodnotes” poems, 
Emerson’s thematic detachments coincide with an abrupt stylistic shift that is 
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interpreted as a creative product of Emerson’s assertion of intellectual 
independence. Representative Men differs somewhat in the manner of its 
detachment, and the significance of these differences will be discussed in greater 
detail in the conclusion to this thesis. However, while distinct, Representative Men 
follows a similar pattern of assimilation and detachment to that found in Nature 
and the “Woodnotes” poems. Finally, as noted above, each chapter concludes with 
a discussion of the national significance of Emerson’s temporal reimaginings in each 
of his texts; those that coincide with and attend his creative and intellectual 
detachments.  
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Emerson’s Nature and Coleridge’s 
Aids to Reflection 
 
In the preceding pages, I positioned the significance of Emerson’s respective 
interactions in Nature, the “Woodnotes” poems, and Representative Men with Aids 
to Reflection, The Excursion, and On Heroes in two ways. Firstly, Emerson’s 
engagements in these three instances were positioned in relation to his desire for 
personal independence from the creative and intellectual influence wielded by 
sources proximate in both time and in the quality of their thought. Secondly, I 
suggested that Emerson’s engagements were guided by a desire to distinguish 
himself as an American writer from the spectre of British influence represented by 
three sources whose reach across the Atlantic was particularly strong. The following 
chapter explores in greater detail this doubled significance in relation to Emerson’s 
engagement in Nature with Coleridge’s influence through his interaction with Aids 
to Reflection.  
The ensuing discussion roughly follows the tripartite process of intellectual 
engagement traced in the introduction – reception, use, and creation – opening 
with a brief exploration of Emerson’s intellectual development prior to and during 
the composition of Nature. The intellectual events leading up to and during 
Emerson’s composition of the essay contextualise his intellectual proximity to 
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That is to say this portion of the chapter explores Emerson’s receptivity to and 
subsequent reception of the themes, method, and structure found in Aids to 
Reflection, those elements which are eventually incorporated into Nature.  
As noted previously, use as an intellectual act involves not only assimilation 
(and possession through assimilation) but detachment. As such, the second portion 
of this chapter – that which concerns Emerson’s use in Nature of Coleridge’s 
thought, method, and style found in Aids to Reflection – is twofold. To begin, this 
discussion of use traces those aspects of Coleridge’s spiritual thought in Aids to 
Reflection that Emerson incorporates into the first philosophy outlined in Nature.  
A central element in Emerson’s assimilative approach to Coleridge’s thought 
is the incorporation into his Romantic first philosophy of a Coleridgean distinction 
between the mental faculties of reason and the understanding. This distinction is 
central to the foundational philosophical premise of Emerson’s Romantic thought in 
Nature and one that, again, is indebted to Coleridge’s spiritual enquiry in Aids to 
Reflection: an account of Atonement (at-one-ment) based on subjective experience 
– a transition from unconscious thought to consciousness via the use of the 
reasoning faculty – and on a process of reflection. Finally, Emerson ostensibly 
incorporates into Nature the rigid distinction between the natural and the spiritual 
that is central to Coleridge’s spiritual philosophy in Aids to Reflection. 
My use of the term ‘ostensibly’ presages the second aspect of Emerson’s 
use discussed in this chapter: detachment. Emerson’s detachment generally and in 
Nature specifically from Coleridge’s later religious thought, centres on Emerson’s 
ultimate inability to embrace the rigid and rigidly defined distinction between the 
natural and the spiritual on which Coleridge’s philosophy in Aids to Reflection rests 
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– that which Emerson appears at first to incorporate into Nature. In his essay, 
Emerson expands the intellectual parameters that define Coleridge’s idealism in 
Aids to Reflection, those that confine spiritual enquiry to one fundamental 
question, ‘What is matter?’, and which subsequently answer this question by 
defining matter in its simplest terms as ‘a phenomenon, not a substance’ (CW 1:30, 
37). Expanding the horizons of his thought, Emerson asks and attempts to answer in 
the final two chapters of his essay not only what matter is but also ‘Whence is it? 
and Whereto?’ (CW 1:38). In his incorporation of new intellectual territories, 
Emerson collapses the Coleridgean division between matter and spirit that also 
characterise the first seven chapters of Emerson’s essay, and includes within his 
new circumference of thought the previous Coleridgean boundaries, while also 
necessarily surpassing them. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the creation that emerges from 
and is empowered by Emerson’s engagement with Aids to Reflection. As with the 
discussion of use that prefaces it, the exploration of creation in this and in 
subsequent chapters is twofold, incorporating a discussion of creation in relation to 
both to Emerson’s personal and extrapersonal desire for intellectual and creative 
independence. This concluding section begins with an exploration of Emerson’s 
intellectual departure from Coleridge’s thought in relation to personal 
independence, focusing on the final two chapters of Emerson’s essay and their 
expansion of the intellectual circumferences that define Coleridge’s idealism. 
Although this discussion predominately explores Emerson’s departure from 
Coleridge thematically, it also considers the stylistic features that distinguish these 
final chapters of Emerson’s essay from those prior as a related expression of 
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Emerson’s detachment. Finally, to conclude the discussion of creation is an 
exploration of the account of the fall contained in the final chapter of Emerson’s 
essay in relation to ideas of nation. 
 
Emerson’s Reception of Coleridge: Coleridge in Emerson’s 
Journals 
 
 Evidence from Emerson’s journals and letters indicate that he first 
encountered Aids to Reflection in 1829, most likely the James Marsh edition of the 
text that was published the same year. Emerson also read Coleridge’s The Friend for 
the first time in 1829, and it appears that Emerson immediately recognised the 
significance of both of these works. In a letter to his aunt, Mary Moody Emerson, in 
December 1829, Emerson writes of Coleridge’s genius in relation to The Friend, that 
‘[Coleridge] has a tone a little lower than greatness,’ Emerson begins, ‘but what a 
living soul, what a universal knowledge!...’ (Journals of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 
2:277). In a second letter, again to Mary Moody Emerson and again from December 
1829, Emerson is more effusive in his praise of the British writer and of his 
theological thought specifically: 
I say a man so learned and a man so bold, has a right to be heard, and I will 
take off my hat the while and not make an impertinent noise. At least I 
became acquainted with one new mind I never saw before, - acquisition to 
my knowledge of man not unimportant, when it is remembered that so 
gregarious are even intellectual men that Aristotle thinks for thousands, and 
Bacon for his ten thousands, and so, in enumerating the apparently 
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manifold philosophies and forms of thought, we should not be able to count 
more than seven or eight minds. ’Tis the privilege of his independence and 
of his labour to be counted for one school. His theological speculations are, 
at least, God viewed from one position; and no wise man would neglect that 
one element in concentrating the rays of human thought to a true and 
comprehensive conclusion. Then I love him that he is no utilitarian, nor 
necessarian, nor scoffer, nor hoc genus omne, tucked away in the corner of 
a sentence of Plato. (L 7:189) 
Patrick Keane calls readers’ attention to Emerson’s use of the word scoffer and its 
probable reference to one of Emerson’s favourite passages of Coleridge’s poetry 
from The Destiny of Nations(62). However, more significant to the following 
discussion of Nature and the influence of Aids to Reflection on the text is Emerson’s 
specific praise in the letter for Coleridge’s ‘theological speculation.’ As Frank 
Thompson notes, such a reference to Coleridge’s theology almost certainly refers to 
the spiritual explorations found in Aids to Reflection (“Emerson’s Indebtedness” 57).   
The following discussion seeks to contextualise Emerson’s apparently 
immediate receptivity to Coleridge’s spiritual philosophy as expressed in Aids to 
Reflection upon encountering it in 1829. In order to accomplish this, Emerson’s 
engagement with Coleridge’s works will be considered in relation to the American 
writer’s intellectual and spiritual development in the years leading up to his first 
encounter with Aids to Reflection. The following pages demonstrate how Emerson’s 
exposure to German Higher Criticism and to natural history throughout the 1820s 
incurs significant intellectual and spiritual developments. Emerson’s encounters 
with German Higher Criticism led eventually to his rejection of revealed religion, 
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and while his subsequent embrace of natural history saw order and unity in the 
universe, Emerson was left with what David Robinson describes as a ‘moral gap’ 
without the Bible for spiritual support (74). Despite the complications that arose in 
his encounters with both of these schools of thought, Emerson’s exposure to both 
German biblical scholarship and to ideas of natural history greatly inform the 
conception of the Romantic triad that he would eventually establish in Nature. 
Additionally, his exposure to these ideas poised the American writer to receive and 
to embrace several elements of Coleridge’s philosophy that, in addition to 
revelatory events during Emerson’s European travels, aided in closing this moral 
gap.  
To begin, I will consider Emerson’s exposure to and reactions to German 
higher criticism. Julie Ellison and David Greenham have both considered the 
significance of this scholarship to Emerson’s intellectual development at length in 
Emerson’s Romantic Style and Emerson’s Transatlantic Romanticism respectively. 
The following discussion is greatly indebted to their research. 
 
Emerson’s Rejection of Revealed Religion: German Higher Criticism & 
Quantum Sumus Scimus 
 
 The higher criticism of German scholars in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century was a form of biblical scholarship that approached Christian 
scripture comparatively, demonstrating that it was written not through divine 
inspiration but by ordinary men (Ellison 44). These scholars compared passages 
from the Bible to one another, compared and contrasted Biblical narratives with 
those found in various global mythologies, and ‘compared Christian versions of 
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history with other surviving historical evidence, physical or written’ (Ibid). The 
effect although not necessarily the intent of this scholarship was, as Julie Ellison 
describes, ‘to deprive the Bible of its traditional status by calling into question its 
historical validity and by challenging the unitary canon’ (Ibid). 
 Emerson encountered German biblical scholarship throughout the mid-
1820s in several ways and from various sources. Situating Emerson’s exposure to 
such scholarship in relation to the broader transatlantic currents carrying German 
thought to New England in the early nineteenth century, David Greenham notes the 
significance of two American spiritual and intellectual figures in particular, Edward 
Everett and Nathaniel Frothingham (21).  
Everett, a fellow at Harvard’s Divinity School and one of Emerson’s tutors, 
had studied the biblical scholarship of Johann Gottfried Eichhorn in Germany in 
1815 (Ibid). Though Everett refused to teach the aspects of Eichhorn’s scholarship 
that called into question the accuracy of the Bible at Harvard, Emerson would have 
experienced Everett’s application of Eichhorn’s methods to the classics; he taught 
that ‘Homer was not an individual inspired writer but rather the editor of a pre-
existing tradition’ (Ibid). Nathaniel Frothingam, a Unitarian minister and pastor of 
Boston’s First Church, gave sermons on German Biblical criticism in Boston as early 
as 1820, and did so to congregations that included Emerson’s aunt, Mary Moody 
Emerson (Ibid).6 Emerson also would have gained an impression of the cultural 
atmosphere in which German biblical criticism flourished through his readings of 
German literature, book reviews, De Stael’s De L’Allemagne, Carlyle’s essays, as well 
                                                     
6 For more information regarding Mary Moody Emerson’s impact on Emerson’s intellectual development see 
Chapter 1 of Emerson’s Transatlantic Romanticism, “The Book of Nature,” in which David Greenham considers 
this subject at length and in great detail. 
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as Coleridge’s later prose works (Ellison 43). Perhaps the single most influential 
source of German higher criticism for Emerson, however, was his brother William 
who undertook Biblical scholarship in Germany between 1824 and 1825 while 
studying to become a minister; William subsequently abandoned those designs.  
Emerson and his brother exchanged letters during William’s time in 
Germany, several of which reveal William’s appeals to Emerson to learn German so 
that he might study the higher criticism as well.7 Exploring not only Emerson’s 
correspondence with William during this period, but other records of Emerson’s 
reaction to German higher criticism in his journals and in letters to his Aunt Mary, 
Greenham traces a change in Emerson’s response to such scholarship throughout 
the mid-1820s (21–23). Although upon his first encounters with these ideas 
Emerson is resistant to them, by 1827 he has ‘all but give[n] up on scripture’ as a 
source of revelation (Greenham 23). The 1827 letter to which Greenham refers in 
assessing Emerson’s eventual rejection of revealed religion is worth noting here, if 
only briefly: 
To ask questions, is what this life is for – to answer them the next. & those 
intermediate people who, like my correspondent, seem to partake of both. 
My eyes are not so strong as to let me be learned. I am curious to know 
what the Scriptures do in very deed say about that exalted person who died 
on Calvary, but I do think it at this distance of time & in the confusion of 
languages to be a work of weighting phrases & hunting in dictionaries. A 
                                                     
7 Both David Greenham and Julie Ellison trace in some detail the nature of William and Waldo Emerson’s 
correspondence during this period (Greenham 21–23; Ellison 43). 
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portion of truth bright & sublime lives in every moment in every mind. It is 
enough for safety tho’ not for education. (L 1:208) 
Although Emerson describes biblical scholarship as a matter of dictionaries and the 
‘work of weighting phrases,’ in this letter to Mary Moody Emerson, he does not 
disparage the scepticism of the task as much as he weighs the ratio of cost to 
benefit, finding that the benefits are not worth the expenditure of time and of 
scholastic capital. Having rejected the legitimacy of revealed religion, Emerson is 
able to present German biblical scholarship as an entirely intellectual activity rather 
than an attack on the foundations of faith. For revelation, he places onus on the 
individual intuition – ‘A portion of truth bright & sublime lives in every moment in 
very mind’ – a transformation that Greenham rightly associates with the idea 
Emerson develops in his published works ‘that the authority of the self’s own 
insights should replace the collapsed authority of the Bible’ (23).  
The theological and intellectual debate in which Emerson and his aunt are 
clearly engaged in this letter from 1827 is typical of their correspondence 
throughout the 1820s. In a similar vein are many of the letters exchanged between 
Emerson and his brother William, particularly those exchanged during William’s 
time in Germany in the mid-1820s. One of Emerson’s letters to his brother during 
this period is particularly revelatory when considered alongside the passage above. 
In a letter to William in 1824, Emerson had playfully asked ‘Why talk you not of my 
studies, --- how and what I should do? I shall be glad of any useful hints from the 
paradise of dictionaries and critics.’8 Writing on the subject of German biblical 
                                                     
8 Julie Ellison quotes this letter in Emerson’s Romantic Style (43), but it can also be found with further 
contextualising detail in James Eliot Cabot’s A Memoir of Ralph Waldo Emerson (1887) (109). 
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scholarship three years before he would compose to his letter to Mary, Emerson’s 
language echoes that which he will use in his later correspondence although with a 
significant tonal shift. Emerson’s reference to Germany as a scholastic paradise is 
sarcastic and playful but it is also disparaging. Again, Emerson presents biblical 
scholarship as a matter of dictionaries and a critical eye, but here such descriptions 
are prompted by fundamental scepticism of a branch of scholarship that would 
approach the Bible in this way. 
 We can best understand Emerson’s eventual rejection of revealed religion in 
relation to his predisposition to self-reliance. Revealed religion is for Emerson an 
unnecessary interference in and mediation of what he comes to see more clearly 
throughout the 1820s and 1830s as a personal relationship to God. In Barbara 
Packer’s words, even the ‘mild faith’ of Unitarianism – the most liberal 
denomination of Christianity available to the American writer – eventually became 
‘at once too constricting and too unsatisfying: constricting because it still imposed a 
weight of traditional forms upon the observer, unsatisfying because it placed all 
direct contact with the divine in the distant past’ (33). In January 1827, some 
months before the aforementioned letter to his aunt, Emerson recorded in his 
journal an indictment of revealed religion that, although lengthy, offers significant 
contextualisation for Emerson’s rejection of the Bible as a source of revelation. As 
such, it is important enough to consider one of its passages in its entirety: 
It is under this persuasion, that we think it a matter of importance to adapt 
the exercises of public worship to the changing exigences of society. If ethics 
were an immovable science the primeval altar of the Jews, might serve as 
the model of our holy place. The positive institutions in which God once 
  
46 | P a g e  
 
judged it proper to close the moral relations of men would be adequate 
today & forever. The noble speculations of ancient wisdom, the instructions 
of Socrates, of Epictetus, & of Cicero, of Seneca had been in vain; & the 
great institution of Jesus Christ, the just religion which embodied all that 
was known of the human heart & anticipated in its comprehensive 
revelations all that has since been known, had been in vain. On the other 
hand, we see that we are standing on a higher stage; that we are instructed 
by a better philosophy, whose greater principles explain to us the design 
whilst they comprehend themselves the petty provisions of the less. ----- We 
leave the ritual, the offering, & the altar of Moses, we cast off the 
superstitions that were the swaddling clothes of Christianity, the 
altercations of novices, the ambition that created a hierarchy, the images & 
the confession, and would accommodate the instructions of the church to 
the wants of worshippers. We already discern the broader light blazing 
before us when we shall have emerged from the porches of the temple & 
stand in the temple itself, when from the abundance of light the true 
character of God & man’s relations to him shall cease to be partially 
communicated shrouded up in absurd & monstrous errors with which man’s 
invention hath wrapt them, but shall fall upon the soul like the light of the 
sun. It is obvious that an hour must arrive in the progress of society, when 
disputed truths in theology will cease to demand the whole life & genius of 
ministers in their elucidation but will be admitted on the same footing of 
acknowledged established fact as are the long contested doctrines of 
political science at the present day. When the champions of the Cross will 
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be able to turn from this ungrateful task in which ages have so unprofitably 
elapsed of stripping off the manifold coats under which prejudice & 
falsehood had concealed the truth – and come at last to the dear & lofty 
employment of pointing out the secret but affecting passages in the history 
of the Soul. (JMN 3:61–62) 
To start as it were at the end, Emerson’s mention of history to close this passage 
speaks to what he understands to be central problem with revealed religion, also 
noted above: its placement of direct contact with God in a distant past. In this 
instance, Emerson reimagines history altogether, not as the history of thought and 
belief, as he does in the account of history outlined at the start of the passage, but 
as the secret – that is to say, the unrevealed, personal – passages of the Soul. In 
arriving at this conclusion, however, Emerson first establishes all that is wrong with 
revealed religion and with organised Christianity more generally. 
 Emerson’s central indictment of organised religion, and one that he 
emphasises through the repeated use of a sartorial metaphor, is the mediating or 
intervening nature of its central elements. The trappings of nineteenth century 
Christianity – the ritual, images, offerings, and altars – join distracting human 
interventions – prejudice, falsehood, and the hierarchy created by ambitions – to 
dim God’s divine light and thus intervene in our perception of it. Although never 
explicitly, Emerson obliquely notes the unnecessary mediation of scripture on 
several occasions, namely in his references to the ‘absurd & monstrous errors’ that 
shroud Christianity, and to the ‘disputed truths in theology’ that echo Emerson’s 
earlier censure of ‘altercations among novices.’ Additionally, Emerson’s reference 
to confession introduces a condemnation of Christian sacraments that assumes 
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new significance when considered in relation to his 1832 resignation from the 
Unitarian Second Church in Boston. This resignation ostensibly occurred on the 
grounds of Emerson’s disagreement with the Unitarian practice of the Eucharistic 
sacrament. 
 As in the letter he would write to Mary a few months later, in January 
1827Emerson is clear about what he believes should replace the mediated 
relationship between man and God and its encumbering clothing of superstition 
and tradition. Again Emerson proposes a personal, entirely unmediated relationship 
to God, and in an echo of the language he will use in his letter to describe the ‘truth 
bright & sublime’ that resides in every mind, Emerson turns to metaphors of 
illumination to describe it. Emerson is clear that he imagines a relationship between 
every man and God in which truth – divine light – falls directly on the soul ‘like the 
light of the sun.’ 
 A central theme of progress in the passage, that which provides the logical 
framework for Emerson’s statements regarding revealed religion and the additional 
mediating elements of organised Christianity. Although Emerson suggests a new, 
individualised conception of history, history as it is traditionally conceived is useful 
insofar as it reveals development in our understanding of morality. If ethics were, in 
fact, an ‘immovable science,’ Emerson suggests, we would not see in the passage of 
time the movement from ‘the primeval altar of the Jews’ to that upon which 
Christian society now worships; we would not see the progress from the ‘ancient 
wisdom’ of Classical philosophers to ‘the great institution of Jesus Christ.’ The key 
for Emerson, however, is the continuation of this progress. While the great 
institution of Christianity at one time ‘embodied all that was known of the human 
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heart & and anticipated in its comprehensive revelations all that has since been 
known,’ it has ceased in its progress toward truth. Now stagnant, it presents only an 
impediment to society’s spiritual advance. 
 In a brief but important prefatory statement, Emerson qualifies the meaning 
of spiritual progress as used in the passage: ‘Understand now, morals do not 
change but the science of morals does advance; men discover truth & relations of 
which they were before ignorant; therefore, there are discoveries in morals’ (JMN 
4:61; original emphasis). That is to say, it is not the divine presence – the ‘light 
blazing before us’ – that changes or develops over time; God is a constant 
unfaltering presence. Rather, Emerson suggests, our proximity to truth, our relation 
to it, may alter; it is for this reason that we now see ‘we are standing on a higher 
stage.’ These alterations in our standing come as a result of new spiritual and 
intellectual discoveries; according to Emerson, we are now ‘instructed by a better 
philosophy, whose greater principles explain to us the design whilst they 
comprehend themselves the petty provisions of the less.’ 
 Throughout the latter half of the 1820s, up to the composition and 
publication of Nature, Emerson develops the ideas found in this passage, namely 
the centrality of the mind to the revelation of truth, the notion of progress, and, 
crucially, the role that the natural world plays in this revelation. Central to each of 
these developments is Coleridge’s philosophy that, like the ‘species of moral truth’ 
Emerson calls the first philosophy and records in Nature, seeks to mediate what 
Samantha Harvey refers to as the ‘Romantic triad’: ‘…a triangle in which the bottom 
two feet represent the natural world and the human world, and the top point 
represents the realm of the spiritual’ (14). It is only natural that in developing a 
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conception of the Romantic triad, Emerson would turn to a philosophy like 
Coleridge’s which offered several philosophically attractive and valuable elements: 
an emphasis on the power of the individual mind, and a philosophical framework to 
support it in the form of the distinction between mental faculties of reason and 
understanding; a dynamic method that emphasises progress; and an emphasis on 
an underlying mystery to the natural world.  
It would take a number of years for Emerson to engage in a meaningful way 
intellectually with Coleridge’s distinction between reason and understanding. As 
Henry Pochmann notes, it is not until 1831 that Emerson’s use of the terms 
indicates his embrace of a Coleridgean relationship between them, and Greenham 
notes that it is not until 1834 that the distinction becomes a central element in 
Emerson’s Romantic philosophy (Pochmann 165; Greenham 37). Coleridge’s 
method would also increase in importance to Emerson in the two years prior to the 
publication of Nature, some years after Emerson first encountered Coleridge’s 
method as it is put into practice in Aids to Reflection and as it is outlined explicitly in 
The Friend. This increase in significance in Coleridge’s method coincides with 
Emerson’s similarly newfound appreciation for Coleridge’s emphasis on divine 
mystery in the natural world. What was immediately apparent to Emerson upon his 
first encounters with Aids to Reflection, however, was the significance of 
Coleridge’s emphasis on the power of the individual human mind. 
In the journal that Emerson used between 1829 and 1830, coinciding with 
his first encounters with Aids to Reflection, Emerson recorded the Latin phrase 
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Quantum sumus scimus for the first time.9 Emerson almost certainly encountered 
the maxim in Aids to Reflection where it appears with the addition of a gloss: 
‘Quantum sumus scimus. That which we find within ourselves, which is more than 
ourselves, and yet the ground of whatever is good and permanent therein, is the 
substance and life of all other knowledge’ (AR 30n). Emerson goes on to cite the 
phrase on two other occasions in the following months, and would continue to 
sporadically refer to it throughout his life (Greenham 51). The Latin roughly 
translates to ‘We are what we know,’ a phrase that sanctions what in 1829 was 
Emerson’s developing insistence on self-reliance, underscored by Coleridge’s gloss. 
In his own extensive exploration of the significance of Coleridge’s axiom to 
Emerson’s Romantic philosophy, Patrick Keane succinctly expresses its centrality to 
Emerson’s philosophical thought: 
Emerson found in the axiom and its gloss sanction for his concept of a self-
reliance at once immanent and transcendent, biographical and grandly 
spiritual: a power, even divinity within, that is the ground, substance, and 
life of our permanent ethical nature and of all we can come to know. (70; 
original emphasis) 
While Keane’s comments refer to Emerson’s Romantic philosophy in its fully 
developed state, Emerson would not arrive at a complete conception of the 
Romantic triad for a number of years following his first introduction to Aids to 
Reflection. Before Emerson could develop a full account and vision of the 
relationship between man, God, and nature, and therefore before Coleridge’s 
                                                     
9 As Greenham notes, Emerson actually records the phrase Quantum scimus sumus, transposing the final two 
words of the axiom (51). 
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philosophical thought became central to the expression of that relationship in 
Nature, Emerson would have to navigate his understanding of the triad’s three 
categories: nature. In order to do so, both natural history and Coleridge’s spiritual 
thought would be key. 
 
Emerson and Natural History 
Throughout the 1820s and the early 1830s, Emerson was not only coming to 
terms with revealed religion but also developing his conception of what could and 
would replace the Bible, filling the aforementioned moral gap that emerged when 
Emerson rejected the holy text as a source of revelation. The truncated account of 
this development is that in place of the Bible, God’s book, Emerson embraced the 
divine power of another text, the book of nature. What this abridged account does 
not convey however, is that this substitution was not immediate, but rather 
required Emerson to engage with and eventually to supplement ideas derived from 
his study of nineteenth century natural history and natural theology. This 
engagement, which takes place throughout the 1820s and 1830s, enables Emerson 
to overcome a significant obstacle, one that David Robinson succinctly outlines in 
his essay, “Emerson’s Natural Theology and the Paris Naturalists” (1980): 
While arguments from the design of nature would easily establish the 
existence of God, they could not so easily serve as the foundation for moral 
action. Nature clearly indicated a creator, but to desire an elaborate moral 
code from it, or even the moral principles necessary for the conduct of life, 
was much more problematic. (74) 
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Emerson’s path toward establishing an account of the triad in which nature could, 
in fact, supply a moral code, is the subject of the following discussion. Central in this 
process are both Emerson’s engagement with natural history and theology, and his 
later engagements with Coleridge’s spiritual thought. 
In the first chapter of Emerson’s Transatlantic Romanticism, David 
Greenham explores in detail what he defines as Emerson’s ‘transition from 
Unitarian to Natural Historian in the 1820s and 1830s’ (3). The following discussion 
provides its own necessarily abridged account of this period that is in fundamental 
agreement with Greenham’s assessment. However, it is important to qualify 
Greenham’s thesis by defining precisely what the terms ‘Unitarian’ and ‘Natural 
Historian’ signify in this context.  
It would be easy to assume that the transition Greenham describes is one in 
which the term “Natural Historian” is used liberally to encompass not only strictly 
empirical nineteenth century approaches to the natural world, but also those that 
found evidence of God’s existence in nature’s design, those used by natural 
theologians. Emerson was exposed early in his adult intellectual development to 
natural theology, specifically the work of Joseph Butler and William Paley. Butler’s 
Analogy (1736) and Paley’s Natural Theology (1802) were standard reading in 
Harvard’s undergraduate curriculum during Emerson’s time there (Robinson 71; 
Clark 226–227). Butler’s and Paley’s natural observations centred on empirical 
observations of nature’s design but, crucially, the scholars also worked to infer 
God’s existence and character from these observations and to relate them to God 
as revealed in scripture (Robinson 71). This kind of natural theology is not entirely 
at odds with the beliefs of nineteenth century New England Unitarians, beliefs that 
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tended toward rationalism (Robinson 72–73). That is to say, New England 
Unitarians believed in the idea of Natural Religion but deemed it inadequate, 
requiring supplementation from Christian doctrine (Robinson 73). 
What Greenham traces in the first chapter of his transatlantic exploration, 
however, is not Emerson’s gravitation toward natural theology, but his gravitation 
toward the empirical consideration of the natural world without the confirmation 
and supplementation of scripture. That is to say, Greenham traces the changes that 
lead Emerson to his declaration in a journal entry from 1833: ‘I will be a naturalist’ 
(JMN 4:200). Greenham, like Robinson before him, identifies a period in which 
Emerson considers taking up scientific classification vocationally, if only for a short 
time (Greenham 32; Robinson 80). This period is  brief and it is important to note 
that it is not one in which Emerson abandoned his desire to develop that ‘species of 
moral truth’ he called his first philosophy.  
The journal entry in which we find Emerson’s emphatic declaration, ‘I will be 
a naturalist,’ is part of a larger passage in which he records his impression of an 
encounter that Elizabeth Dant describes accurately as having achieved ‘the mythic 
inevitability of Newton and the apple’ (18). The encounter upon which Emerson 
reflects is that with visual representations of scientific classification in the cabinet 
of natural history at the Muséum d’Histoire Naturelle in Paris. Emerson visited the 
museum and the Jardin des Plantes on the same day in 1833 on his European tour. 
During his travels, he also visited the Museum of Anatomy in Glasgow, which had 
been established and designed by the evolutionist John Hunter (Dant 21). The 
collection was arranged to imitate nature’s ascending movement, as described by 
Elizabeth Dant in her essay entitled “Emerson and Natural History” (1989): ‘the first 
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floor housed the remains of the lowest animal forms, with each ascending floor 
representing different strata and life forms, until the top floor, which housed man’ 
(Ibid). It was the cabinet of natural history and the Jardin des Plantes that had the 
most profound effect on Emerson, however, and he records these effects in the 
journal entry noted above: 
Here we are impressed with the inexhaustible riches of nature. The universe 
is a more amazing puzzle than ever, as you glance along this bewildering 
series of animated forms, -- the hazy butterflies, the carved shells, the birds, 
beasts, fishes, insects, snakes, and the upheaving principle of life 
everywhere incipient, in the very rock aping organized forms. Not a form so 
grotesque, so savage, nor so beautiful but is an expression of some property 
inherent in man the observer, -- an occult relation between the very 
scorpions and man. I feel the centipede in me, -- cayman, carp, eagle, and 
fox. I am moved by strange sympathies I say continually “I will be a 
naturalist.” (JMN 4:199–200) 
What this journal entry records is the difference between exposure to scientific 
classification in books, and exposure to such classification visually and first-hand. 
Although this visual representation of scientific classification prompts the 
declaration of Emerson’s intent to become a naturalist, his statement is founded 
upon Emerson’s belief that there is potential for the revelation of something 
beyond what can be empirically observed in the classification of the natural world: 
‘some property inherent in man the observer.’ 
 Upon his return to America, Emerson would cannibalise this journal entry 
for use in the first of four lectures he delivered to the Boston Society of Natural 
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History between November 1833 and May 1834. In the first three lectures, Emerson 
is enthusiastic about science and its potential to reveal the secret or ’occult’ 
properties of natural world (Robinson 83–88). In these three instances, Emerson’s 
enthusiasm coexists with his understanding of the natural world as revelatory of 
something within man himself, a property that, by this time, Emerson has begun to 
explicitly associate with the individual’s moral properties. As he states in the first of 
his lectures, “The Uses of Natural History”: ‘The laws of moral nature answer to 
those of matter as face to face in a glass’ (EL 1:24). Emerson will go on to use this 
phrase in Nature, incorporating it into his discussion of the symbolic power of 
language. However, as noted several times previously, a conception of nature as 
morally revelatory without the confirmation and supplementation of scripture 
presents difficulties. While Emerson repeats this phrase from “The Uses of Natural 
History” in his 1836 essay, before he can arrive at the conception of the triad that 
he expounds in Nature, Emerson must refine his understanding of the natural world 
and its reflective qualities. Namely, he must abandon the notion that empirical 
observation of the natural world is sufficient for the revelation of man’s moral 
nature. In only a matter of months, the time between the delivery of his first 
natural history lecture in November 1833 and 7 May, 1834, the date on which 
Emerson delivers the fourth and final lecture of the natural history series, he does 
exactly that.  
In his extensive exploration of Emerson’s natural history lectures, David 
Robinson notes a significant tonal shift in the final lecture, “The Naturalist,” 
coincident with a new portrayal of the potentials of empirical observation 
(Robinson 83–88). In “The Naturalist,” Emerson concludes that science is in fact 
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insufficient to bridge the moral gap that emerges when one rejects revealed 
religion. Specifically, science is insufficient for Emerson because it is not 
appropriately dynamic, and Emerson’s theory has developed into one that rests on 
dynamism, what he refers to in “The Naturalist” as a theory of animated nature: 
We are born in an age which to its immense inheritance of natural 
knowledge has added great discoveries of its own. We should not be citizens 
of our own time, not faithful to our trust, if we neglected to avail ourselves 
of their light. The eternal beauty which led the early Greeks to call the 
globe…Beauty pleads ever with us, shines from the stars, glows in the 
flower, moves in the animal, crystallizes in the stone. No truth can be more 
self evident than that the highest state of man, physical, intellectual, and 
moral, can only coexist with a perfect Theory of Animated Nature. (EL 1:24) 
As in the passage from his 1827 journal discussed extensively above, Emerson again 
appeals to history to show man’s progress. In this instance, the progress to which 
Emerson refers is intellectual rather than spiritual, and he refers specifically to 
knowledge of the natural world. Although man has admittedly added to historical 
discoveries in the realm of natural knowledge, Emerson insists that we must 
continue to strive for a theory of nature that fully and truly reflects its dynamism. 
Empirical observation alone cannot achieve that theory, however, and he states 
elsewhere in the lecture that ‘We are not only to have the aids of Science but we 
are to recur to Nature to guard us from the evils of Science’ (EL 1:76). 
 Exploring Emerson’s journal entries in the period leading up to his delivery 
of “The Naturalist” in May of 1834, Robinson notes Emerson’s increasingly frequent 
remarks regarding the limitations of scientific classification (85). One of the journal 
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entries to which Robinson turns in demonstration of such increasingly frequent and 
emphatic observations was written on 5 May, and Robinson refers to the following 
passage in particular: 
The true classification will not present itself to us in a catalogue of a 
hundred classes, but as an idea of which the flying wasp & the grazing ox are 
developments. Natural History is to be studied not with any pretention that 
its theory is attained, that its classification is permanent, but merely is full of 
tendency. (JMN 4:290) (quoted Robinson 85) 
Robinson notes the significance of the word ‘tendency’ in the passage and its 
suggestion of dynamism, concluding that, for Emerson, ‘No system of 
classification…can pretend to final truth because of this fluidity of nature’ (85). I do 
not dispute Robinson’s interpretation, and am in fact in agreement with his reading 
of the passage. Rather, I wish to supplement Robinson’s association of this journal 
entry with Emerson’s newfound scepticism of empiricism by noting that, directly 
preceding this passage Emerson identifies a significant source of his newfound 
understanding of a dynamic theory of nature: 
Mr Coleridge has written well on this matter of Theory in his Friend. A 
lecture may be given upon insects or plants, that, when it is closed 
irresistibly suggests the question, “Well what of that?” An enumeration of 
facts without method. A true method has no more need of firstly, secondly, 
&c. than a perfect sentence has of punctuation. It tells its own story, makes 
its own feet, creates its own form. It is its own apology. The best argument 
of the lawyer is a skilful telling of the story. The true classification will not 
present itself to…. (JMN 4:290) 
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The significance of Coleridge’s method, both as it is outlined in The Friend and as it 
is demonstrated in Aids to Reflection, will be discussed at length in the forthcoming 
discussion of Emerson’s use of this method in Nature. However, at this juncture it is 
important to note at least in passing that Emerson’s abandonment of science as a 
credible path toward the discovery and expression of nature’s dynamism is directly 
tied to his exposure to Coleridge’s method.  
Coleridge’s method insists not only on dynamism, but also on progress and 
on process (Harvey 70). As early as 1827, Emerson illustrated his own insistence on 
both qualities in his 1827 letter to Mary Moody Emerson when he insisted that ‘To 
ask questions, is what this life is for – to answer them the next’ (L 1:208). What 
Coleridge’s method offers Emerson is a sanction for this questioning as well as the 
support of a developed conceptual framework, both of which Emerson values more 
highly as he begins to develop his Romantic philosophy in earnest. 
 As he is preparing to leave Europe and return to New England that Emerson 
records for the first time his intention to write ‘a book about nature,’ marking a 
transition in the seriousness with which he develops his first philosophy and a 
development in the intellectual rigour with which he engages with Coleridge’s ideas 
(JMN 4:237). The concurrence of these events is not coincidental, and Emerson 
deliberately turns to Coleridge’s works for guidance as he more seriously develops 
his own ideas.  
In the period between 1833 and 1836, between his return to America and 
the publication of Nature, Emerson also discovers a newfound appreciation for two 
further aspects of Coleridge’s thought, both of which have been noted previously: 
the idea of divine mystery, and the distinction between the reason and the 
  
60 | P a g e  
 
understanding. The latter, like method, will be discussed in greater detail in the 
following section dedicated to Emerson’s use of Aids to Reflection in Nature. As 
such, I will not speak at length regarding its increased significance to Emerson upon 
his return to America and his attendant development of the first philosophy, except 
to echo David Greenham’s observation: 
In 1834, after Coleridge, the understanding is restricted [for Emerson] to the 
ordinary objects and concerns of time and space – mere phenomena. 
Reason as an abstract noun, which he detaches from its verbal form, 
belongs to the understanding’s “reasonings,” is “eternal”. (Greenham 38) 
As I begin to conclude this initial discussion of Emerson’s reception of Coleridge’s 
ideas, I will, however, speak in greater detail about Coleridge, Emerson, and the 
notion of divine mystery. 
 Emerson would have encountered Coleridge’s conception of divine mystery 
both in The Friend and in Aids to Reflection. In the former, Coleridge writes that 
‘The solution of Phaenomena can never be derived from Phaenomena’ and in the 
latter declares that ‘There is nothing the absolute ground of which is not a mystery’ 
(F 1:500; AR 139; original emphasis). If the cabinet of natural history at the Jardin 
des Plantes was significant for its visual representation of the mystery beneath the 
natural world – ‘occult relations’ and ‘strange sympathies’ between varied natural 
objects – then Coleridge’s spiritual thought presented Emerson with a philosophical 
sanction for that mystery which Emerson had only recently decided – with 
Coleridge’s help again – could not be comprehended through empirical observation 
alone. ‘What Emerson will take from [these statements],’ writes Greenham, ‘is that 
the Enlightened naturalist or metaphysician can only work with phenomena, 
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usefully generalizing, hypothesizing, and taxonomizing them; this is not enough’ 
(32). Emerson’s declaration in “The Naturalist” that ‘We are possessed with a 
conviction that Nature means something, that the flower, the animals, the sea, the 
rock have some relation to us which is not understood which if known could make 
them more significant,’ does the work of Coleridge’s aforementioned statements in 
Aids to Reflection and The Friend (EL 1:78). As Greenham notes, ‘Emerson is not 
merely noting the limits of nineteenth century science, rather he, like Coleridge, is 
protecting a mystery that draws onward, and withdraws from, the inquiring spirit’ 
(33).  
 
In defining Emerson’s reception of Coleridge’s spiritual philosophy, 
specifically the theological speculations found in Aids to Reflection, it is possible to 
distinguish between two distinct periods. In the first period, which spans Emerson’s 
first encounter with Aids to Reflection in 1829 up to the later months of 1833, 
Emerson recognises the significance of Coleridge’s ideas; however, he has yet to 
engage thoroughly and rigorously with Coleridge’s philosophy. In the second 
period, that from the later months of 1833 to the publication of Nature in August 
1836, Emerson engages most rigorously with Coleridge’s philosophical works and 
with Aids to Reflection specifically. Informing the newfound intensity of Emerson’s 
engagements is his decision in 1833 to take up literary pursuits, specifically, his 
decision to write ‘a book about Nature’ in which he would for the first and only 
time, present his first philosophy as a unified philosophical treatise. In taking up 
philosophical pursuits seriously and, for the first time, as a self-described writer, 
Emerson turns to who he considered to be the most significant contemporaneous 
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spiritual philosopher – Coleridge – and to the text most representative of 
Coleridge’s philosophical genius – Aids to Reflection. 
 Recognising the significance of Coleridge’s thought to his task, however, is 
also anxiety-inducing in its incursions on Emerson’s self-reliance. In asserting his 
unique philosophical system, he must also distinguish himself from the ideas to 
which he is indebted. The following comparative study explores this transition. 
 
Emerson’s Coleridgean Assimilations: Philosophical 
Distinctions and Method 
 
The previous section outlined the significance to Emerson of Coleridge’s 
ideas regarding the power of the subjective enquiry – that encapsulated in the Latin 
axiom Quantum sumus scimus, found in Aids to Reflection – as well as the 
importance of Coleridge’s emphasis on an underlying divine mystery to the world 
reiterated in both The Friend and Aids to Reflection. One can understand Nature as 
Emerson’s attempt to outline a first philosophy that preserves mystery – that is to 
say divinity – in the world, but also one that suggests we might have access to this 
mystery; that we might be able to behold God ‘face to face’ (CW 1:7). In outlining 
his argument for this spiritual prospect in Nature, Emerson turns to Aids to 
Reflection, Coleridge’s philosophical expression of this very same idea.  
In Aids to Reflection, Coleridge outlines the potential inherent within each 
individual to ‘form the mind anew after the DIVINE IMAGE’ (AR 25). At the foundation 
of Coleridge’s spiritual philosophy is the distinction between two universal 
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categories, the natural and the spiritual, thus maintaining he crucial notion that 
‘There is nothing the absolute ground of which is not a mystery’ (AR 139). 
 James Marsh’s “Preliminary Essay” to Aids to Reflection, included in his 1829 
American edition of Coleridge’s text, pointed explicitly to the significance of this 
distinction to the spiritual thought in Coleridge’s text. In his essay, Marsh also 
identified a second significant distinction: that between the faculties of the reason 
and the understanding. Perhaps because of Marsh’s insistence on their significance, 
Emerson integrated both of these central distinctions in this expression of his first 
philosophy comprising Nature.10 For Emerson, as for Coleridge in Aids to Reflection, 
there is an underlying divine mystery in the world, but it is also one to which we 
have access if we would only harness the full potential of our divine mind and, in 
doing so, pass from a state of unconscious thought to consciousness. Significantly, 
for both writers, this passage to consciousness and its attendant access to the 
divine mystery underlying the world, is a matter of Atonement (at-one-ment). 
Emerson describes this in Nature as beholding God face to face; for Coleridge in 
Aids to Reflection, it is a progress toward godlikeness. 
 In sketching his philosophical system in Nature, Emerson is also indebted to 
Coleridge’s method as outlined in The Friend and demonstrated by Aids to 
Reflection. In Nature, Emerson illustrates the possibility of at-one-ment and 
delineates the general manner by which one might achieve it. In Nature, Emerson 
provides a ‘manual for the rules of architecture’ rather than ‘a plan of the palace’ 
(AR xi). Integral to Coleridge’s method, which is to be outlined in detail in 
                                                     
10 Both David Greenham and Patrick Keane argue that too much has been made of the significance of Marsh’s 
essay in regard to its guidance of Emerson’s thought (Greenham 43; Keane 65n). 
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forthcoming pages, is intellectual ascent, which begins with the ‘facts of hourly 
experience’ and moves upward to sublime heights (F 1:446). The spiritual enquiry 
outlined in Aids to Reflection follows this pattern, as does Emerson’s spiritual first 
philosophy in Nature; in both instances, the writers incorporate numbered 
sequences to structure their expression of this spiritual ascent. 
 In assimilating Coleridge’s method, Emerson also adopts its central notion of 
progress. In doing so, Emerson utilises the very ideas to which he is indebted to 
depart to new intellectual circumferences, moving past or detaching from ideas 
while necessarily containing them within his new circle of thought. The key to 
Emerson’s detachment is the strict distinction between the natural and the spiritual 
found in Aids to Reflection. More specifically, Emerson departs from Coleridge 
regarding the manner by which man achieves the sublime heights from which one 
beholds God face to face.  
For Coleridge, the mind’s achievement of the divine image follows a process 
in which nature is left out entirely, and he maintains nature’s antithetical distinction 
from spirit throughout Aids to Reflection.  It is important to note that Coleridge’s 
definition of polarity, central to his philosophical thinking, states that all opposition 
in the universe tends toward reunion. As such, one must assume that in Coleridge’s 
understanding, at some point the natural and the spiritual are unified. However, 
the fact that no reunion of these categories is alluded to in Aids to Reflection 
renders it somewhat anomalous in Coleridge’s oeuvre, a fact that James Boulger 
relates to Coleridge’s increasingly dogmatic Christian thinking in the later years of 
his life (Coleridge as a Religious Thinker 206). Conceivably, Coleridge is able to 
maintain this antithesis because he has the support of revealed religion, and James 
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Marsh identifies as part of Coleridge’s aim in Aids to Reflection to be ‘prov[ing] the 
doctrines of the Christian Faith to be rational, and exhbit[ing] philosophical grounds 
for the possibility of a truly spiritual religion’ (AR 501). 
As traced in the previous discussion, however, Emerson’s first philosophy 
did not have the support of revealed religion, and he was required to supplement 
the revelations of the Bible with those of a new text, one that offered unmediated 
and immediate access to divine presence. In replacing the book of God with the 
book of nature, Emerson revised Coleridge’s account of spiritual atonement to one 
in which man’s moral relationship to the natural world was a central feature. 
For Coleridge, atonement is a process of reflecting inward using the 
reasoning faculty to contemplate the divinity that resides within. As such, Coleridge 
confines the process entirely to the self in Aids to Reflection. Like Coleridge, 
Emerson posits atonement in Nature as a process of reflection, but the direction to 
which one turns the eye of reason is not inward. Rather, in the final two chapters of 
his essay, Emerson presents an argument for nature’s necessity in the process of its 
own transcendence. It is only in turning the eye of reason outward that we can 
achieve the sublime heights of atonement because, for Emerson, ‘The laws of moral 
nature mirror those of matter like face to face in a glass’ (CW 1:21). The following 
discussion explores Emerson’s use of and detachment from Aids to Reflection, 
focusing on the elements outlined above and prefacing a discussion of the original 
creation that this engagement facilitates and empowers. 
 
Both Aids to Reflection and Nature hope to preserve divine mystery, the 
idea that something universal and unifying lies beneath all phenomenon. However, 
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both texts also present accounts of the potential to know and to access the divine 
fabric of the universe. In maintaining mystery, a central parallel between the texts 
and one of Emerson’s pivotal assimilations from Coleridge is a distinction between 
that which is natural and that which is spiritual, or between what Emerson calls 
nature and soul. This is the common starting point for both Coleridge in Aids to 
Reflection and Emerson in Nature (Greenham 71). 
As noted above, the distinction between the natural and the spiritual is one 
of two to which James Marsh drew readers’ attention as a ‘key’ to understanding 
Coleridge’s spiritual system in Aids to Reflection (AR 497). In that essay, Marsh 
describes the distinction as that ‘between nature and free-will,’ a characterisation 
that speaks to Coleridge’s idea of origination as found in Aids to Reflection (AR 497). 
Coleridge defines Spirit in the text as ‘that which has its principle in itself, so far as 
to originate its own actions’ (AR 80). Nature, by way of contrast, ‘forever [has] its 
necessity in some other thing, antecedent or concurrent’ (AR 78n). As such nature 
participates in what Coleridge calls the ‘Mechanism of Cause and Effect,’ which he 
defines in a footnote to the text as follows: 
Whatever is comprised in the Chain and Mechanism of Cause and Effect, of 
course necessitated, and having its necessity in some other thing, 
antecedent or concurrent—this is said to be Natural; and the Aggregate and 
System of all such things is Nature. It is, therefore, a contradiction in terms 
to include in this the Free-will, of which the verbal definition is—that 
which originates an act or state of Being. In this sense, therefore, which is 
the sense of St. Paul, and indeed of the New Testament throughout, 
Spiritual and Supernatural are synonymous. (AR 80; 78n) 
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The notion of origination rests, then, on the notion of free will, and it is the 
possession of this quality that constitutes at least in part Coleridge’s argument for 
man’s inclusion in the category of spirit rather than nature. Man’s spiritual will does 
not work on man from a divine source without, but works with the divine Spirit:  
It is sufficient, in short, to prove, that some distinct and consistent meaning 
may be attached to the assertion of the learned and philosophic Apostle, 
that “the Spirit beareth witness with our spirit” – i.e. with the Will, as the 
Supernatural in Man and the Principle of our Personality – of that, I mean, 
by which we are responsible Agents; Persons, and not merely living Things. 
(AR 77–78)  
Distinguishing us as beings, rather than things, the human will is ‘the true and only 
strict synonime of the word, I, or the intelligent self’ (AR 139–140). It endows us 
with the ‘power of originating an act or state,’ in antithesis to nature, which is 
‘always becoming’ or ‘about to be born (AR 268n; AR 251).12 
Emerson uses language similar to that found in Aids to Reflection to 
distinguish between the natural and the spiritual in Nature. In the penultimate 
“Spirit” chapter of his essay, Emerson defines nature as that which is ‘faithful to the 
cause whence it had its origin’ and as a ‘perpetual effect’ (CW 1:37). However, it is 
the definition from the “Introduction” to Emerson’s essay that betrays the extent of 
his indebtedness to Coleridge’s thought: 
                                                     
12 Coleridge’s attributes his idea of the originating self to Fichte’s Wissenschaftslere (1794), writing in the 
Biographia Literaria that ‘by commencing with an act, instead of a thing or substance, Fichte assuredly gave the 
first mortal blow to Spinozism’ (quoted Greenham p. 71). For more information on the Fichtean origins of 
Coleridge’s self-originating act, see Greenham pp. 71–78. 
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Philosophically considered, the universe is composed of Nature and the 
Soul. Strictly speaking, therefore, all that is separate from us, all which 
Philosophy distinguishes as the not me, that is both nature and art, all other 
men, and my own body, must be ranked under this name, nature. (CW 1:8) 
13 
Emerson’s definition presents an antithetical relationship between Nature and Soul 
like that between Nature and Spirit in Aids to Reflection, and one in which man is 
firmly located in the spiritual realm. However, there is a significant caveat insofar as 
Emerson distinguishes between one’s soul and one’s corporeal being. This 
distinction between the body and the soul is connected to the notion of the 
possession of free will – a body is only a vessel for the acts originated by the will, 
which exists entirely separately from the corporeal form. In addition, there is a 
second quality to which man’s spiritual nature is tied, and one that is again entirely 
separate from physical being, a faculty ‘by which a knowledge of spiritual truth, or 
of any truths not abstracted from nature, is rendered possible’: the faculty of 
reason (AR 252). 
 Coleridge aligns reason directly with the spiritual and, more specifically, with 
Christian theology in Aids to Reflection, defining it as ‘an influence from the Glory of 
the almighty’ and as man’s ‘nourish[ment] by the one DIVINE WORD’ (AR 219; original 
emphasis). For Coleridge, reason is a faculty of the mind that allows for our 
perception of truth and is distinct from the understanding. Reason is that which 
                                                     
13 Patrick Keane has also noted the Cartesian distinction between res cogitans and res extens at work in 
Emerson’s definition, as well as the Fichtean distinction between Ich and Nicht-Ich mentioned earlier in relation 
to Biographia. Such a distinction can also be found in the work of Schelling and Novalis (171). There is no 
indication, however, that Emerson read the works of these writers before or during the period in which he 
composed Nature. 
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apprehends spiritual truths and has ‘the Power of the universal and necessary 
Convictions, the source and substance of Truths above Sense, and having evidence 
in themselves’ (AR 216). The understanding, by way of contrast, is the faculty of the 
mind confined to truths abstracted from nature and in relation to the ‘objects of 
our senses’ (Ibid). 
 For Emerson, as for Coleridge, reason is distinguished from the 
understanding on the basis of what it is applied to and what it is capable of 
revealing. Crucially, understanding is the faculty that corresponds to ‘[o]ur dealing 
with sensible objects’ (CW1:24). As Emerson defines it in the “Discipline” chapter of 
his essay, 
Every property of matter is a school for the understanding, -- its solidity or 
resistance, its inertia, its extension, its figure, its divisibility. The 
understanding adds, divides, combines, measures, and finds everlasting 
nutriment and room for its activity in this worthy scene. (CW 1:23) 
Reason, on the other hand, is a divine faculty that Emerson defines early in the 
“Language” chapter of his essay, without any reference to the related but distinct 
faculty of the understanding: 
Who looks upon a river in a meditative hour and is not reminded of the flux 
of all things? Throw a stone into the stream, and the circles that propagate 
themselves are the beautiful type of all influence. Man is conscious of a 
universal soul within or behind his individual life, wherein, as in a 
firmament, the natures of Justice, Truth, Love, Freedom, arise and shine. 
This universal soul, he calls Reason: it is not mine or thine or his, but we are 
its; we are its property and men. (CW 1:18) 
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Greenham notes of Emerson’s language in these instances that he appears to have 
little time for Coleridge’s ‘abstract terminology’ in Aids to Reflection, preferring 
instead to use language that offer a ‘more immediate rendering’ of the capabilities 
of each of the faculties (43). For instance, whereas Coleridge’s definition of reason 
refers abstractly to ‘the Power of the universal and necessary Convictions’ and to 
‘the source and substance of Truths above Sense,’ in Greenham’s words, ‘Emerson 
goes directly to things his reader would understand: “Justice, Truth, Love, 
Freedom”, which comprises his universal soul’ (Ibid).  
Emerson is also prone in Nature to use metaphorical language, a habit that 
Greenham associates with Emerson’s exposure to Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus.14 
Greenham associates one turn of phrase in particular to Sartor Resartus and 
Thomas Carlyle: the ‘eye of pure reason’ (46). As Keane notes, however, ocular 
metaphors in relation to the powers of the mind are also a feature in the writing of 
the other two major Romantic writers to whom Emerson turned throughout his life 
and on whom this study focuses: Wordsworth and Coleridge (356). In “Tintern 
Abbey,” for example, Wordsworth describes moments of visionary power as 
moments in which ‘we see into the life of things,’ and the image recurs throughout 
Wordsworth’s Intimations Ode, as well as Aids to Reflection where Coleridge refers 
to reason as a ‘seeing light’ and an ‘enlightening eye,’ among other references 
(Keane 356; AR 15). However, such imagery, suggests Keane, ‘may be said to 
culminate in Nature’ (Ibid).  
                                                     
14 For a detailed exploration of the rhetorical links between Sartor Resartus and Nature, c.f. Greenham, pp. 45–
46. 
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It is in the perhaps the most infamous passage of Emerson’s essay that we 
find his first correlation between sight and the reasoning faculty that, albeit 
oblique, is one of the most significant in the texts: 
Standing on the bare ground, -- my head bathed by the blithe air, and 
uplifted into infinite space, all mean egotism vanishes. I become a 
transparent eye-ball. I am nothing. I see all. The currents of the Universal 
Being circulate through me; I am part or particle of God. (CW 1:10) 
The passage gives readers a sense of the process by which Emerson understands 
reason to allow for the comprehension of divine mystery in the world, one 
presented as an ascension to sublime heights. We begin the passage firmly rooted 
in nature, standing on the bare ground of the earth, and therefore we begin firmly 
within the realm of the understanding, which exists to add, divide, combine, and 
measure the properties of matter. As one looks toward sublime heights with head 
uplifted into infinite space, the reasoning faculty is engaged and the eye of reason 
opens. However, there is not only one transition in this passage, but two. The first is 
a passage from the natural world and our comprehension of it through the 
application of the understanding, to ‘the I and the “eye” [that] are the me as 
consciousness’ (Greenham 86). The second and most meaningful transition in 
regard to atonement is represented in the passage by the transparency of the eye 
(of reason) Emerson describes, and it details the individual’s passage from 
consciousness to transcendence (Ibid). In becoming ‘part or particle of God,’ having 
the ‘currents of the Universal Being circulate through’ one’s self, all things rooted in 
the bare ground of nature disappear, including the body itself – we become only a 
transparent eye. In this moment, the NOT ME of nature fully recedes, leaving only 
  
72 | P a g e  
 
the divine ME that is capable of unity with God. Thus, in its ‘highest moments’ 
reason becomes a ‘form of pure seeing’ (Chai Romantic Foundations 333). 
 In addition to associating reason with sight in Aids to Reflection, Coleridge’s 
account of the reasoning faculty also incorporates central notions of ascension and 
progress. The process that Coleridge describes in Aids follows an ascending pattern 
of ‘moral architecture’ from prudence to morality to religion (AR 6). Echoing his 
description of the text’s sublime task as the formation of the mind after the divine 
‘image,’ Coleridge defines these three elements in terms of divine likeness. 
Prudence aids the mind in preparing the ‘shrine and framework’ for God’s image 
(AR 27); morality is ‘the body, of which faith in Christ is the soul’ (AR 31); and 
spirituality or religion comprises 
...all truths, acts and duties that have an especial reference to the Timeless, 
the Permanent, the Eternal…. It comprehends the whole ascent from 
uprightness (morality, virtue, inward rectitude) to godlikeness, with all the 
acts, exercises, and disciplines of mind, will, and affection…. (AR 42) 
Additionally, with each step upward from prudence to morality and, finally, to 
spirituality, another faculty of the mind or soul is engaged. The prudential engages 
the senses and the understanding, morality engages the conscience, and spirit 
engages the faculty of reason, facilitating a passage from consciousness to 
unconsciousness. The ascending nature of Coleridge’s spiritual enquiry is also 
reflected in the structure of his text, which scales these three categories in a series 
of sequentially ordered and numbered aphorisms. 
An ascending structure is also found in Nature, which opens, like the 
transparent eye-ball passage, on bare ground in the “Nature” chapter, and outlines 
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the larger task of the essay. Subsequently, the essays proceeds through a number 
of discussions regarding man’s relationship to the sensible world (“Commodity,” 
“Beauty,” “Language,” and “Discipline”). Each of these chapters builds upon the 
last, in what Robert Lee Francis terms ‘definitional escalation,’ allowing Emerson to 
move from ‘minutiae which are principally the concern of the scientific naturalist’ 
toward the spiritual heights of the essay’s closing three chapters –“Idealism,” 
“Spirit” and “Prospects” – which reveal the nature of transcendence (45).  
Like Coleridge’s progressive movement through the prudential, moral, and 
religious in Aids to Reflection, Emerson’s text proceeds in an ascending structure, 
and each chapter presents ideas of increasing or ascending complexity. In 
“Commodity,” Emerson states his intention to outline the tangible and obvious uses 
of the natural world – ‘those advantages which our senses owe to nature’ (CW 
1:15). In the succeeding chapter, “Beauty,” Emerson ascends through a tripartite 
discussion of ‘the nobler wants of man’ served by nature (CW 1:19). In short, these 
three aspects of beauty are delight, virtue, and intellect, arranged in order of their 
increasing complexity. Delight is elicited by ‘the simple perception of natural forms,’ 
while virtuous actions are beautiful in their combined stimulation of sensuous 
response and the will: ‘A virtuous man, is in using with [nature’s] works, and makes 
the central figure of the visible sphere’ (CW 1:20, 27). Lastly, beauty in relation to 
the intellect is described as the mind’s conscious (willed) attempt to search for ‘the 
absolute order of things’ (N 28). Following “Beauty,” in the chapter entitled 
“Language,” Emerson explores nature’s symbolic meaning, or its value as ‘the 
vehicle of thought’ (CW 1:32). Again the chapter presents a threefold ascending 
discussion, moving from lower to higher aspects of natural symbolism. “Discipline” 
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is a twofold discussion of the natural world as, firstly, a ‘discipline of the 
understanding’ and, secondly, a conformation to the ‘premonitions of Reason’ (CW 
1:47, 51).  
However, the final three chapters of Nature are unique and a large portion 
of my concluding thoughts are dedicated to this section of Emerson’s essay. In 
precis, these chapters outline the spirit portion of Emerson’s essay. “Idealism” 
outlines in five numbered sections the mind’s transcendence of the spiritual world 
and the ‘reverential withdrawing of nature before its God’ (CW 1:62). “Spirit” 
returns briefly to the natural world, and “Prospects” looks into the future toward 
man’s prospective union with God, accomplishing this somewhat paradoxically by 
looking to the past and imagining an account of man’s fall from grace. 
The structure of Emerson’s essay and its use of numbered sequences 
throughout the first six chapters has been linked to Emerson’s emulation of 
scientific method, correspondent with an emphasis in these chapters on the value 
of nature’s adaptation to man’s physical wants, love of beauty, and moral sense – 
to use Francis Bowen’s description once again.15 Equally plausible is that this is not 
an imitation of empirical method (or at least not only an imitation of empirical 
method), but rather an imitation of Coleridge’s philosophical method and voice. 
Emerson abandons these sequences only in those chapters that coincide with his 
detachment from Coleridge’s ideas regarding man’s spiritual journey to God. In 
place of such sequences, “Spirit” and “Prospects” embrace a new, less structured 
                                                     
15 Julie Ellison presents an account of the numerical sequences in Nature as an imitation of the scientific 
method in Emerson’s Romantic Style (87). More comprehensive is Eric Wilson’s discussion of Emerson’s essay 
throughout Emerson’s Sublime Science (1999), in which he also considers what I have referred to as Emerson’s 
leading thought in Nature to be the ‘hypothesis’ of the text (42). 
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style that is to be discussed in detail in the portion of this chapter dedicated to the 
creative issuances resultant from Emerson’s antagonistic reading of Aids to 
Reflection. 
In both Aids to Reflection and Nature, structure and the ascending nature of 
the spiritual enquiries themselves are dictated by Coleridge’s principles of method. 
Coleridge’s “Essays on the Principles of Method” are found in The Friend and their 
significance to Emerson is illustrated by the copious marginal annotations that can 
be found in his personal copy of the text (Harvey 67). Coleridge’s method is also 
demonstrated in the nature of his philosophical enquiries in both The Friend and 
Aids to Reflection, and the manner in which these enquiries are presented in these 
texts. 
In discussing Coleridge’s method it is important to distinguish, as Trevor 
Levere does, between a method and a system. While a method guides spiritual and 
intellectual enquiry, a system organises it, and the more complete that organisation 
or classification, the less it encourages progress and further enquiry (221). 
‘Coleridge, seeking a system, had a method,’ writes Levere, and this method 
actively avoided ossification; Coleridge’s method was  
like that of science itself; [it] was living, generative, and far from abstract. 
His method, transcending the abstraction of his philosophy, was a major 
constituent of his intellectual vitality and of his continuing and major 
importance in our own imaginative life of the mind. (Ibid) 
Emerson, who writes in 1850 that ‘[t]he more coherent and elaborate a 
system, the less I like it,’ was certainly not only drawn to but also influenced by 
Coleridge’s method (CW 4:76). A staunch believer in active engagement rather than 
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passive perception, a coherent system was too proscriptive for Emerson, as his 
nebulous philosophy and his writing about that philosophy attest. A style that 
‘suggests rather than tells,’ is more congenial to the American writer (Packer 7). The 
two defining features of Coleridge’s method are its progressive nature and its 
commencement with a leading thought (Hipolito “Coleridge’s Lectures” 259). 
In its goal of aiding each individual in the ‘formation for itself of 
sound…principles in regard to the investigation, perception, and retention of truth,’ 
The Friend embraces a Method that is intellectually progressive method. Coleridge’s 
method commences with ‘most familiar’ truths – the ‘facts of hourly experience’ – 
until a leading thought has been established, after which it ‘gradually [wins] its way 
to positions the most comprehensive and sublime’ (F 1:446). Coleridge’s ‘leading 
Thought’ or ‘initiative’ provides direction and guidance for further intellectual 
enquiry. As Tim Milnes notes, however, the leading thought, is not a ‘truth of 
formal logic’ or an ‘empirical fact,’ but rather it ‘must be an Idea embedded in 
“life,” capable of growing and seeding further thought’ (The Truth about 
Romanticism 169). The validity of this Idea is determined by the efficacy of the 
thoughts and conclusions that follow (Jackson 39).  
The necessarily progressive nature of Coleridge’s method is a quality he 
describes and defines in relation to the Greek word Μεθοδος, ‘a way or path of 
Transit’ (F 1:457; original emphasis). This word is apt not simply for its description 
of the guiding rather than didactic nature of the method Coleridge proposes, but 
also because it evokes the image of thought as a journey. Without continuous 
transition and progress on this intellectual journey, ‘there can be no Method,’ only 
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‘a mere dead arrangement, containing in itself no principle of progression’ (F 
1:457). 
Coleridge’s emphasis on subjective enquiry and intellectual progress is also 
reflected in formal elements of The Friend, namely the fact that the text is 
interspersed with interstitial essays, portions of the text that he called ‘Landing 
Places’ (F 1:148–149). These landing places are collections of essays ‘in some 
degree miscellaneous,’ and are meant for the reader’s ‘amusement, retrospect, and 
preparation’ (xiii). These spaces provide at once a view of those subjects and ideas 
the individual has passed in his or her intellectual ascent, as well as a vision of ideas 
yet to come in their intellectual enquiry. As Samantha Harvey describes it, ‘The 
landing place was a place to pause, reflect, and gaze around, simultaneously 
engaging different perspectives of high and low, near and far, subsequently 
exercising various powers of vision’ (55). 
Although there are no specified landing places in Aids to Reflection as there 
are in The Friend, there are a number of reflective “Comments” in Coleridge’s later 
philosophical work that function similarly. Interspersed variously between 
aphorisms, these comments to explore more thoroughly ideas presented in various 
preceding aphorisms, and often anticipate ideas introduced in subsequent sections. 
The aphorisms themselves also often require the reader to have fully considered 
and understood ideas previously presented, compelling the reader to reflect back 
on previous concepts in order to fully comprehend Coleridge’s meaning and the 
direction of the enquiry. As such, they function much like landing places, compelling 
the reader to reflect on the previous steps in their intellectual journey. At times, 
Coleridge is explicit in asking the reader to reflect, particularly in regard to 
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significant aspects of the text, as is the case with the distinction between reason 
and understanding. In his discussion of this distinction, Coleridge asks that the 
reader ‘[t]urn back for a moment to the Aphorism, and having re-perused the first 
paragraph of this Comment thereon, regard the two following narratives as the 
illustration’ (AR 220). 
 
Having sketched out Emerson’s three greatest assimilations from Coleridge 
in Nature – the distinction between nature and spirit on the basis of will, the 
distinction between the Reason and the Understanding, and Coleridge’s method – 
the following section focuses on Emerson’s detachment from Coleridge’s thought 
coincident with the American writer’s formal and stylistic distancing from Aids to 
Reflection. In exploring this detachment, I will investigate the process by which 
atonement occurs in both Aids to Reflection and Nature. In both instances, 
ascension is a movement closer to a divinity that is already within. Emerson, for 
example, presents this as ‘continual self-recovery’ (CW 1:39) and Coleridge as the 
acquiring of ‘SELF-KNOWLEDGE’ through ‘the art of reflection’ (AR 10). In Coleridge’s 
latter reference to the notion of reflection, however, we find our greatest 
distinction between his system and Emerson’s. Both propose an act of reflection 
through the opening of the eye of reason, but the direction in which Coleridge and 
Emerson imagine this gaze to be turned is reversed. For Coleridge, self-knowledge is 
acquired through acts of reflection directed inward; in Emerson’s understanding, 
self-recovery comes when one turns the gaze outward to the natural world.  
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Coleridge, Emerson, and Reflection 
 
Aids to Reflection and parakupsas 
  
Coleridge’s conception of spiritual atonement in Aids to Reflection centres 
on the notion that we possess divinely-endowed qualities – reason and will – and 
that when used to their full potential, these qualities allow for the possibility of 
achieving godlikeness, whereby one becomes a reflection of God’s image. The title 
of Coleridge’s work contains several layers of meaning, however, and the process 
by which the divine image is achieved is also a process of reflection. 
 In the previous discussion of Emerson’s reception of and receptivity to 
Coleridge’s ideas, the significance of the Latin axiom Quantum sumus scimus was 
discussed in some detail, but I would like to return again to the passage in which 
the axiom is found. In describing the significance of this Latin phrase, Coleridge 
qualifies his understanding of the idea that ‘we are what we know,’ by specifying 
the location of this knowledge: 
Quantum sumus scimus. That which we find within ourselves, which is more 
than ourselves, and yet the ground of whatever is good and permanent 
therein, is the substance and life of all other knowledge. (AR 30n) 
 This inwardly residing knowledge to which Coleridge refers is an inner divinity that, 
as we have seen above, corresponds both to the Reason and the Will, our spiritual 
endowments and the qualities that distinguish us as beings from mere things. 
Achieving godlikeness, then, is a matter of accessing that which exists already 
within ourselves, that enlightening eye or seeing light within, and of reflecting that 
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quality outward. In Douglas Hedley’s words, ‘The soul’s end is to see the light by 
which it is enlightened…’ (225). 
 The manner in which Coleridge understands the individual to access this 
inner light introduces still one further layer of meaning to the title of his spiritual 
work. The process of seeing this inner light requires that one turn their eye of 
reason inward in a process of self-reflection or ‘parakupsas’:  
The Greek word, parakupsas, signifies the incurvation or bending of the 
body in the act of looking down into; as for instance, in the endeavour to see 
the reflected image of the star in the water at the bottom of a well. A more 
happy or forcible word could not have been chosen to express the nature 
and ultimate object of reflection, and to enforce the necessity of it, in order 
to discover the living fountain and spring-head of the evidence of the 
Christian faith in the believer himself, and at the same time to point out the 
seat and region where alone it is to be found. (AR 30n; original emphasis) 
The path toward godlikeness, toward forming the mind after the divine image, is a 
matter of looking inward at the light within. To turn again and a final time to 
Hedley’s words, ‘the object of the soul’s longing is itself at a deeper level’ (160; 
original emphasis). As such, Coleridge’s spiritual system in Aids to Reflection 
maintains in no uncertain terms the antithetical distinction between the natural 
and the spiritual and, as such, between nature and man, in its understanding of the 
individual’s ascent toward ‘inter-communion with the Divine Spirit’ (AR 217). The 
only eternal qualities in Coleridge’s system are those that we find within ourselves; 
all else, including the world in which we live, is impermanent. 
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‘As face to face in glass’: Emerson, Nature, and reflection 
 
 Throughout the first five chapters of Nature, Emerson enumerates a 
mounting list of nature’s assets in the realms of commodity, beauty, language, and 
in discipline, but in the chapter entitled “Idealism,” Emerson finally establishes in 
detail his philosophical argument for the antithesis between Nature and Soul that 
he defined in the essay’s “Introduction.” In “Idealism,” Emerson mounts an 
argument for nature’s impermanence; he demonstrates that nature is not ‘the Final 
Cause of the Universe’ but an ‘Appearance we call the World’ (CW 1:29). Some, he 
says, cling to the notion that the former is true out of fear, because ‘Any distrust of 
the permanence of laws, would paralyze the faculties of man’ (CW 1:29–30). 
Relating this more explicitly to the distinction between the reasoning faculties and 
those of the understanding, Emerson uses the phrase ‘reflective powers’ as a 
euphemism for Reason, a decision almost certainly inspired by Coleridge’s language 
of reflection in Aids to Reflection: ‘…so long as the active powers predominate over 
the reflective, we resist with indignation any hint that nature is more short-lived or 
mutable than spirit’ (CW 1:30). Making explicit the association between what he 
refers to as reflective powers and man’s power of reason, in “Idealism” Emerson 
provides readers with perhaps his most explicit description of the reason’s 
revelatory abilities: 
When the eye of Reason opens, to outline and surface are at once added, 
grace and expression. These proceed from imagination and affection, and 
abate somewhat of the angular distinctness of objects. If the Reason be 
stimulated to more earnest vision, outlines and surfaces become 
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transparent, and are no longer seen; causes and spirits are seen through 
them. The best, the happiest moments of life, are these delicious 
awakenings of the highest powers, and the reverential withdrawing of 
nature before its God. (CW 1.30) 
In terms similar to Coleridge’s, Emerson again emphasises the visionary qualities of 
the reasoning faculty and identifies it as a divine endowment. Furthermore, his 
reference to nature’s withdrawal before ‘its God’ demonstrates in more poetic 
terms a central element in Coleridge’s spiritual system: our access to and use of the 
eye of reason reveals our own divine, permanent nature. At the same time, the 
application of reason reveals the impermanence of the natural world as it 
withdraws before us. 
 Having established his philosophical foundations not only for the chapter 
“Idealism,” but for the philosophical concept of idealism on which the chapter is 
based – the permanent, spiritual nature of man’s reasoning faculty and the 
impermanence of the natural world – Emerson’s chapter proceeds through five 
areas of culture that ‘affect our convictions of the reality of the external world’ (CW 
1:35). Using numbered sequences like those that characterise preceding chapters, 
Emerson identifies these five areas – motion, poetry, philosophical science, 
intellectual science, and religion – as those that ‘imbue us with idealism’ and he 
outlines the manner by which they achieve their increasing or ascending 
effectiveness (Ibid). 
 Although Francis Bowen is not explicit in his aforementioned review of  
Nature regarding exactly where he identifies the earth having cracked beneath his 
feet while reading it, I imagine that Bowen’s description refers to “Idealism.” 
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Admittedly, it is in this chapter that Emerson appears to singlehandedly undo the 
work of the previous chapters, declaring nature nothing more than an 
impermanent element, one that is rendered transparent if we would only apply the 
full powers of our divine minds. Conceptually, however, “Idealism” is in keeping 
with the antithesis that Emerson established in the opening pages of his essay 
between the natural and the spiritual, the realm of the understanding and that of 
reason. Structurally, too, the chapter maintains the numerical sequences, arranged 
in ascending order, that characterise “Beauty,” “Language,” and “Discipline.”  
“Idealism” is ostensibly the apex of the ascending spiritual enquiry Emerson traces 
in Nature, and almost certainly was meant as the conclusion to the “Nature” essay, 
originally intended to accompany a separate essay on the subject of “Spirit” (Packer 
27). The greatest shift in Nature is not found in “Idealism” but in the chapters that 
follow, “Spirit” and “Prospects.” This shift is both an ideological detachment from 
Coleridge and from Aids to Reflection as well as an expression of the original, self-
reliant ideological creation that this detachment empowers.  
Emerson’s ideological detachment in “Spirit” and “Prospects” is presaged by 
Emerson’s comments in the closing paragraphs of “Idealism” that, despite his 
understanding of its impermanence, he has ‘no hostility to nature, but a child’s love 
to it’ (CW 1:35). ‘Children, it is true,’ he writes some sentences later, ‘believe in the 
external world’ (CW 1:36). It is in Emerson’s description of idealism in the final 
sentences of the chapter, however, that give the greatest hint as to the thematic 
shift about to occur in the forthcoming two chapters: 
Idealism sees the world in God. It beholds the whole circle of persons and 
things, of actions and events, of country and religion, not as painfully 
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accumulated, atom after atom, act after act, in an aged creeping Past, but as 
one vast picture, which God paints on the instant eternity, for the 
contemplation of the soul. Therefore the soul holds itself off from a too 
trivial and microscopic study of the universal tablet. It respects the end too 
much, to immerse itself in the means. It sees something more important in 
Christianity, than the scandals of ecclesiastical history or the niceties of 
criticism; and, ever incurious concerning persons or miracles, and not at all 
disturbed by chasms of historical evidence, it accepts from God the 
phenomenon, as it finds it, as the pure and awful form of religion in the 
world. It is not hot and passionate at the appearance of what it calls its own 
good or bad fortune, at the union or opposition of other persons. No man is 
its enemy. It accepts whatsoever befals [sic], as part of its lesson. It is a 
watcher more than a doer, and it is a doer, only that it may better watch. 
(CW 1:36) 
These concluding thoughts to “Idealism” begin seemingly positively regarding 
idealism as a philosophical theory. Idealism sees the world in God, and it sees unity 
in the world – both are positive attributes. From here, Emerson appears to list only 
innocuous consequences of the otherwise rewarding nature of the comprehensive 
unity of which idealism makes us aware. With access to a conception of universal 
unity, one tends to avoid ‘microscopic unity of the universal tablet,’ and an 
ostensibly positive ‘respect for the ends’ results in an inattention to the means. By 
the time one arrives at Emerson’s thoughts on Christianity and the relationship 
between revealed religion and an unchallenged acceptance of the ideal theory, 
however, the tone is markedly more negative. Emerson’s references to the 
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‘scandals of ecclesiastical history,’ ‘chasms of historical evidence,’ and ‘the niceties 
of criticism’ echo earlier criticism of revealed religion in the 1827 journal entry 
noted some pages ago, in which he describes the need to abandon a religion bound 
by the ‘altercations of novices’ and the ‘absurd & monstrous errors’ of scriptural 
interpretation (JMN 3:61–62).  
Emerson’s final statements in this passage are the most damning. In these 
concluding sentences, Emerson suggests that idealism as it stands – as a mode of 
thought that cares only for ends rather than means – runs counter to the 
progressive, active method that he believes must necessarily govern all legitimate 
enquiries, the method he assimilated from Coleridge. Idealism is a watcher, not a 
doer; it is passive and static rather than progressive and active. Emerson’s implied 
critique at the end of “Idealism” is made more explicit in the opening statements of 
the following chapter that directly follow: 
It is essential to a true theory of nature and of man, that it should contain 
somewhat progressive. Uses that are exhausted or that may be, and facts 
that end in the statement, cannot be all that is true of this brave lodging 
wherein man is harbored, and wherein all his faculties find appropriate and 
endless exercise. (CW 1:37) 
So begins Emerson’s argument for the insufficiency of idealism contained in 
“Spirit,” and as such, so begins his revision of a central tenet of Coleridge’s spiritual 
system in Aids to Reflection: the distinction between the natural and the spiritual. 
 In an attempt to fix the problem of idealism’s stasis and subsequent 
stagnancy, Emerson redefines its parameters entirely, declaring that the views 
sketched throughout the first six chapters of the essay ‘do not include the whole 
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circumference of man.’ Using language that, although indebted to empiricism, veils 
a reference to Coleridge’s concept of the leading thought, Emerson twice declares 
idealism a ‘hypothesis,’ an ‘introductory’ thought that ‘account[s] for nature by 
other principles than those of carpentry and chemistry,’ and which ‘apprize[s] us of 
the eternal distinction between the soul and the world’ (CW 1:37, 38). In Barbara 
Packer’s words, however, “Spirit” renders idealism nothing more than a ‘temporary 
landing-place in a larger dialectic’; in widening the parameters of idealism to 
include the whole circumference of man, Emerson also widens the circumference of 
Coleridge’s thought, surpassing the intellectual boundaries presented in Aids to 
Reflection while also necessarily incorporating them into his own thought (Packer 
57).  
The key to Emerson’s redefinition of idealism is found early in “Spirit” and 
presented in terms of hypothetical questions. Idealism as it is presently understood, 
says Emerson, answers the question ‘What is matter?’ – ‘matter is a phenomenon, 
not a substance’ (CW 1:37). Its stagnancy is explained, however, by its inattention 
to two further and, in Emerson’s understanding, equally significant questions: 
‘Whence is [matter]? and Whereto?’ (Ibid). That is to say, Emerson believes 
idealism should provide an answer regarding the origins of matter as well as its 
ultimate ends. Although earlier in the essay Emerson had stated that idealism ‘sees 
God in the world,’ in “Spirit,” he clarifies that this is only a small portion of what is 
required of idealism as a spiritual and philosophical theory. ‘Yet, if it [idealism] only 
deny [sic] the existence of matter,’ he writes, ‘it does not satisfy the demands of 
the spirit. It leaves God out of me’ (CW 1:37; emphasis afdded). Emerson hopes 
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that, in exploring the two aforementioned questions, he will correct the major 
failing of idealism: its inability to unite us with God’s divine presence.  
The second question Emerson poses, that regarding nature’s ultimate ends, 
has been answered already in his earlier accounts of reason – nature’s ultimate end 
is prospective transparency before a fully and permanently opened eye of reason. 
In “Prospects,” Emerson will offer a vision of that future for the first time and will 
present a far more comprehensive picture of the pivotal role that nature plays in 
the very process by which it is ultimately transcended. It is in “Spirit,” however that 
Emerson proposes an answer to the first question, ‘Whence is matter?’: 
The world proceeds from the same spirit as the body of man. It is a remoter 
and inferior incarnation of God, a projection of God in the unconscious. But 
it differs from the body in one important respect. It is not, like that, now 
subjected to the human will. Its serene order is inviolable by us. It is 
therefore, to us, the present expositor of the divine mind. It is a fixed point 
whereby we may measure our departure. (CW 1:38–39). 
Although nature is for Emerson, as for Coleridge, bound by the mechanism of cause 
and effect and thus defined in opposition to spirit which is its origin, Emerson’s 
reference to the will in this instance points to a significant departure from 
Coleridge’s thought. Emerson asserts not only nature’s inviolability by man but also, 
by extension, man’s spiritual weakness – his inability to assert over the natural 
world his spiritual endowment of free will. Emerson provides an explanation for this 
impotence in a statement that follows: ‘We are as much strangers in nature, as we 
are aliens from God’ (CW 1:39).  
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Alienation from God is a function of man’s fallenness, and one that 
Coleridge acknowledges, too, in Aids to Reflection: 
…I profess a deep conviction that man was and is a fallen creature, not by 
accidents of bodily constitution, or any other cause, which human wisdom in 
a course of ages might be supposed capable of removing; but as diseased in 
his Will, in that Will which is the true and only strict synonime of the word, I, 
or the intelligent Self. (AR 139; original emphasis) 
A crucial distinction, however, between Emerson’s account of fallenness in Nature 
and that which is found in Aids to Reflection is the fact that man is not only fallen, 
but has continued to fall throughout history. History, writes Emerson, is nothing 
more than ‘the epoch of one degradation,’ increasing our distance from both 
nature and God (CW 1:42). Emerson’s answer to this increasing estrangement is, 
quite simply, a renewed appreciation for the natural world that is ‘beautiful 
mother’ and ‘gentle nest’ (CW 1:36). His reconceptualization of idealism centres on 
an acknowledgement that it is only from the platform of nature’s bare ground that 
one can ascend to the sublime heights in which we become part or particle of God.  
Emerson defines the problem of our alienation from nature, that which in 
turn leads us to estrangement from the divine image, as a problem of the soul, but 
one both caused and cured by modifications to our vision: 
The problem of restoring to the world original and eternal beauty, is solved 
by the redemption of the soul. The ruin or blank, that we see when we look 
at nature, is in our own eye. The axis of vision is not coincident with the axis 
of things, and so they appear not transparent but opake. The reason why 
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the world lacks unity, and lies broken in heaps, is, because man is disunited 
with himself. (CW 1:43) 
To correct our spiritual vision is to correct the way that we look at the objects 
around us. In Emerson’s understanding, to see matter simply as ‘a phenomenon, 
not a substance’ is to see the world around us only by ‘the wintry light of the 
understanding’ (CW 1:44). To look at nature and see ‘that every phenomenon has 
its roots in the faculties and the affections of the mind’ – to understand that the 
laws of moral nature answer to those as face to face in a glass, as Emerson 
proposed in “Language” – however, is to ‘look at the world with new eyes' (CW 
1:44). 
In “Spirit” and “Prospects,” Emerson maintains the distinction between the 
spiritual and the natural. We are not only fallen beings but ones whose continued 
degradation has led to our alienation both from God and from nature. The process 
of ascension toward sublime, divine heights always results in the transcendence of 
the natural world, which is phenomenal, and as such Emerson maintains the 
distinction between the natural and the spiritual that also defines Coleridge’s 
account of atonement. The distinction between Emerson’s and Coleridge’s systems, 
however, is that Emerson refuses to submit to what he perceives as the limiting and 
stagnating notion that matter is only a phenomenon. In Emerson’s understanding, 
that nature has its origins in spirit renders it the ‘present expositor of the divine 
mind,’ and thus the necessary foundation for the individual’s ascent to divine 
heights. 
In “Spirit” and “Prospects,” Emerson abandons the numbered sequences 
that characterise the essay’s previous chapters. Julie Ellison has previously read this 
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structural shift in Emerson’s essay in a similar manner to that explored in the 
following pages, that is to say, in relation to ideas of self-reliance and Emerson’s 
assertion of independence from incursive texts. However, Ellison and I differ in our 
interpretation of the nature of this shift and its significance in regard to the 
assertion of self-reliance. Ellison interprets Emerson’s use of the numbered 
sequences throughout the first six chapters of Nature as 
…an awkward version of the later essays’ sudden metamorphoses from a 
tone of realistic humility to one of aggressive self-reliance. Nature should 
therefore be read and taught not as Emerson’s quintessential utterance but 
rather as an unrepresentative work in which he imitates “scientific” method. 
If it is so read, his essays can be seen developmentally as texts in which the 
constraints of a more naïve phase have relaxed and Emerson’s paradigmatic 
structure has come into its own. In them, he collapses step-by-step 
demonstrations into large, rapid transitions from one level to another. (87) 
I agree with Ellison that the numerical sequences are representative of an awkward 
or rather undeveloped form of tonal metamorphoses found in later works, 
transformations that correspond to assertions of self-reliance via symbolic 
detachment. However, I understand the numerical sequences not as an early form 
of ‘large, rapid transitions from one level to another’ that constitute the conscious 
struggle of the author’s will, what Ellison refers to elsewhere in Emerson’s Romantic 
Style as the ‘contest between reader and writer, Jacob and angel’ (79). In this 
instance, these numerical sequences do correspond to a conscious struggle 
between reader and writer, but it is not the transitions within the sequences 
themselves that are of note, rather the transition away from the use of these 
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sequences at all. In this shift we find not only the expression of a general struggle 
between reader and writer, influence and expression, but the expression of a 
struggle between Emerson as a reader of Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection specifically, 
and as a writer of a new, original spiritual philosophy distinct from but also greatly 
indebted to that found in Coleridge’s text.  
In abandoning the sequentially ordered patterns of his first six chapters in 
“Spirit” and “Prospects,” Emerson embraces a distinct and more fluid structure that 
corresponds with a more Emersonian style, particularly in “Prospects.” In the final 
chapter of his essay, rather than outline the philosophical tenets of his system as he 
had done previously, Emerson instead offers an imaginative vision of prospective 
atonement. In doing so, Emerson returns to the moment where man’s degradation 
began: the Fall. 
Elsewhere in his essay, Emerson suggested that one achieves transcendence 
fitfully, in brief but happy moments when the eye of reason opens. In “Prospects,” 
Emerson presents a vision or fable of one’s permanent transcendence achieved 
upon the resumption of our power and the kingdom of man over nature: 
Man is the dwarf of himself. Once he was permeated and dissolved by spirit. 
He filled nature with overflowing currents. Out from him sprang the sun and 
moon; from man, the sun; from woman, the moon. The laws of his mind, 
the periods of his actions externized themselves into day and night, into the 
year and the season. But, having made for himself this huge shell, his waters 
retired; he no longer fills the veins and veinlets; he is shrunk to a drop. He 
sees, that the structure still fits him, but fits him colossally. Say, rather, once 
it fitted him, now it corresponds to him from far and on high. (CW 1:42) 
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In offering a fable of the fall and, by extension, a vision of future prospects, 
Emerson distinguishes his essay from Aids to Reflection which, in its complete 
embrace of the principles of method, necessarily lacks ‘beatific consummation’ 
(Hipolito “Coleridge’s Essays” 259). We might think of Emerson’s fable as a kind of 
consummation by mirror image (reflection), an account of the future through a 
vision of the past; or, as Emerson phrases it, a vision that is ‘both history and 
prophecy’ (CW 1:42).  
In his account of this vision, Emerson also distinguishes himself stylistically 
from the essay’s preceding chapters, embracing an interplay of voices throughout 
“Prospects,” namely that of the essayist and of the newly introduced Orphic Poet. It 
is this stylistic decision by which Barbara Packer understands Emerson to ‘first really 
[become] “Emerson”’ (63). That Emerson includes the voice of an Orphic Poet 
specifically underscores the creative implications of this final chapter. Throughout 
“Prospects,” it is clear that Emerson is deeply concerned with what it means to be a 
poet and, more specifically, a poet of original vision and talent. In introducing his 
Orphic Poet to the reader, for example, Emerson establishes a definition of a 
writer’s visionary goals: ‘A wise writer will feel that the ends of study and 
composition are best answered by announcing undiscovered regions of thought, 
and so communicating, through hope, new activity to the torpid spirit’ (CW 1: 41; 
emphasis added).  
Most significant, however, is the fact that the fable presented by the Orphic 
Poet as an account of history and prophecy can be read as a metaphor for the 
creative process itself. ‘Every spirit builds itself a house,’ the Orphic Poet states 
toward the conclusion of his second and final interlude,  
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…and beyond its house, a world, and beyond its world, a heaven. Know 
then, that the world exists for you. For you is the phenomenon perfect. 
What we are, that only can we see. All that Adam had, all that Caesar could, 
you have and can do. Adam called his house, heaven and earth; Caesar 
called his house, Rome; you perhaps call yours, a cobler’s [sic] trade; a 
hundred acres of ploughed land; or a scholar’s garret. Yet line for line and 
point for point, your dominion is as great as theirs, though without fine 
names. Build, therefore, your own world. As fast as you conform your life to 
the pure idea in your mind, that will unfold its great proportions. (CW 1:44–
45) 
What else is a writer’s task, especially as Emerson will go on to define it in works 
like “Quotation and Originality,” but to build one’s self one’s own world. The poet’s 
mission, in Emerson’s understanding is transcendent, a process by which one takes 
thought and expression – that which, like phenomenon, exists for our personal 
growth – into one’s self, and expresses in verse or prose, as one would in action (in 
‘conforming your life’), the pure idea in your mind.  
The Poet’s reference to Adam, too, has creative implications. Only three years later, 
Emerson will forge an explicit connection in his journals between the figure of 
Adam and the creative – that is to say generative –naming that is the task of the 
poet. ‘Adam in the garden,’ writes Emerson, ‘I am new to name all the beasts in the 
field and all the gods in the sky. I am to invite men drenched in Time to recover 
themselves and come out of time, and taste their native, immortal air’ (JMN 5:288). 
Emerson delights in “Prospects” as he does in his journals in his apparent originality 
of position and the creative implication of that originality. He does not like the 
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Orphic Poet look prospectively at a time when he will name the beasts in the field 
and the gods in the sky; having detached from Coleridge’s thought, he is already in 
a world of his own making. As such, the naming of the beasts and of the gods is 
both his task and his accomplishment in Nature generally and in “Spirit” and 
“Prospects” specifically. Emerson’s first philosophy is a corrective to the deficient 
moral and spiritual insights not only of Coleridge but of all thinkers, and in 
expressing that philosophy Emerson has reached a new circle of thought. 
Specifically, Emerson has achieved this through antagonistic engagement with Aids 
to Reflection. In “Spirit” and “Prospects,” Emerson ascends past the circumference 
to which Coleridge and his restrictive ideas specifically are confined and in doing so 
reaches new uncharted territory – an original vision of the world untouched like the 
Garden of Eden. 
 
“Prospects”: Emerson’s Orphic Poet, Creative Metaphor, and 
Temporal Reimagining 
 
In addition to providing a myth or ‘dream’ of man’s original relation to the 
universe through the Orphic Poet’s visionary prose, the second voice in the chapter, 
what I will call the voice of the essayist, defines the nature of that vision and our 
access to it. In doing so, in the opening paragraphs of the chapter the essayist turns 
to both natural and cultural examples:  
In a cabinet of natural history, we become sensible of a certain occult 
recognition and sympathy in regard to the most bizarre forms of beast, fish, 
and insect. The American who has been confined, in his own country, to the 
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sight of buildings designed after foreign models, is surprised on entering 
York Minster or St. Peter’s at Rome, by the feeling that these structures are 
imitations also, - faint copies of an invisible archetype. (CW 1:40) 
Ellison notes the conflation of nature and culture as a theme throughout Nature, 
with Emerson repeatedly using cultural allusions to describe the natural world, 
subsequently breaking down the distinction between the two (88). As a result, 
Emerson reinforces an additional and more fundamental distinction – that between 
the natural and the spiritual – reiterating his expanded definition of Nature from 
the “Introduction” to his essay: ‘Nature, in the common sense, refers to essences 
unchanged by man; space, the air, the river, the leaf. Art is applied to the mixture of 
his will with the same things, as in a house, a canal, a statue, a picture’ (CW 1:8; 
original emphasis).  
In this emphasis on the subjective versus the objective – the primacy of the 
relationship between the divine mind and God over all aspects of the NOT ME, 
‘nature and art, all other men and my own body’ – Emerson embraces a 
subjectivism that Stephen Spender links to ideas of nation (Ibid). In his seminal and 
early work on the complex relationship between English and American writers, 
Love-Hate Relations (1974), Spender notes in American writers a division ‘between 
history – [their] roots within England and European tradition – and geography – the 
immensity of America and sense of [their] own being expanding to embrace that 
immensity’ (12). Such a division, I argue, in part dictates Emerson’s engagement 
with Aids to Reflection and, more fundamentally, his conception of creative reading.  
Elsewhere in Love-Hate Relations, Spender links this division or antithesis to 
the accounts of the natural world found in a variety of American literary works: 
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This division was between objective Europe and subjective America. 
Objective Europe was the historical, reaching back to the past within which 
the individual could escape from his personality into the tradition 
crystallized in libraries, museums and architecture, greater than the life of 
any single living generation. Subjective America was geographical, the 
identification of the single separate American with other Americans and the 
whole continent and beyond the continent, the whole earth and nature, and 
the universe. This sense of individual consciousness reaching to surrounding 
objects and lives was more intensely felt by Americans than by Europeans, 
because of the lack of an American past. The unexplored continent spoke in 
the present tense. Europe spoke in the past tense. (12) 
Although in “Prospects” and in Nature generally, Emerson proposes that the 
individual reaches not only to surrounding objects but, in essence, past them, to 
something that lies beyond or beneath, it is possible to see the applicability of 
Spender’s definition. The landscape to which Emerson refers when he points the 
individual toward the natural world in Nature is not inherently or explicitly 
American. However, the very fact that Emerson locates the foundation for one’s 
spiritual ascent – that is, the foundation for the total assumption of divine 
consciousness – in the natural world is an act of national significance. Furthermore, 
it is an act enabled by the fact that nineteenth century Americans possessed, in the 
possibilities of the untouched Western landscape, a subjective Eden in which the 
prospects of objective truth could be located.17 
                                                     
17 While “‘untouched,’ the American West was, of course, inhabited by indigenous peoples. 
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 In proposing this future as a return to the past, that is to say, in presenting 
an account that is both history and prophecy, Emerson and his Orphic Poet 
embrace an account of time that Robert Weisbuch calls futurism and which he 
identifies as one of four archetypal accounts of history embraced by nineteenth 
century writers to respond to ‘the British taunt of no history’ (153–154). Futurism is 
a paradoxical striving for ‘a future earlier than the present’ in which American 
literary future – the expression of the divine truth that rests prospectively in the 
American landscape – is originary (170). This productive or originary account of 
prospective poetry is epitomised in the Poet’s references to Adam noted earlier. 
 However, while in “Prospects” the Orphic Poet presents readers with a 
vision of permanent transcendence, throughout Nature the assumption of 
consciousness is defined in transitory, fleeting terms. In brief moments in which the 
eye of reason opens, the individual has access if only momentarily to the unity of 
spirit. As such, the Orphic Poet’s prophetic account of the Fall also incorporates a 
second kind of time identified by Robert Weisbuch in Atlantic Double-Cross: vertical 
time. In “Prospects,” the past collapses ‘into an expanded present inhabited by an 
expansive self. What history can provide, this moment can provide as well, to the 
seer of large vision and perfect empathy’ (171). Again, Spender’s account of the 
national implications of the expanding and potentially expansive American self are 
pertinent, but in this instance, the temporal collapse that Weisbuch describes has 
more immediate national implications. 
 In light of Weisbuch’s notion of vertical time, Emerson’s aforementioned 
reference to the great architectural structures of Europe, assumes new significance 
and begs more detailed analysis. Although in the passage Emerson aligns the 
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natural and the cultural in opposition to the spiritual truth that lies beneath both, 
his treatment of the two examples is markedly different. The cabinet of natural 
history on which he remarks in the first instance is described as providing the 
observer with a sense of the ‘occult recognition and sympathy’ between all natural 
objects. By way of contrast, his second architectural example not only underscores 
Emerson’s distinction between nature and spirit, objective and subjective, it is also 
a defence against accusations of American cultural imitation, what one might 
interpret alternatively as a lack of American past or, in Robert Weisbuch’s words, a 
cultural thinness. The imitative aspects of American structures designed after 
foreign models is excused by the fact that even the originals – York Minster and St 
Peter’s – are imitations themselves of a far more fundamental, spiritual 
archetype.18 
A consequence of Emerson’s universalization of culture – that is to say, his 
location of all cultural symbols in a common, universal origin – is, again, an effective 
collapsing of linear history. If all objects including cultural objects proceed from the 
same universal origin, York Minster and St Peter’s, symbols of European culture and 
thus of European history, are rendered as significant (or as insignificant) as any 
American example. When compared to the eternity of the universal divine, time or 
history becomes something near to irrelevant. Later in the chapter, in declaring ‘the 
element of spirit’ to be ‘eternity,’ the Orphic Poet will declare this more explicitly: 
‘To [spirit], therefore, the longest series of events, the oldest chronologies are 
                                                     
18 Significantly, too, one of these examples is English, specifically. 
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young and recent’ (CW 1:42). In this emphasis on the individual and on the 
moment, Emerson nullifies all but the ME. 
 
In Nature, Emerson engages antagonistically with one text predominately, 
Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection. This text is the most representative of the British 
writer’s anxiety-inducing creative and intellectual influence. Emerson assimilates 
key aspects of Coleridge’s thought and methodology into his own philosophical 
thought in Nature while also departing from Coleridge in several key ways. Where 
Coleridge maintains the rigidly defined distinction between spirit and nature in his 
account of atonement, locating the possibility of divine transcendence entirely in 
the divine self, comprised of the will and the reason, Emerson conceptualises a 
more interdependent relationship between all three categories of the Romantic 
triad. Reimagining the account of reflection that Coleridge presents in Aids to 
Reflection as an outward gaze to nature, rather than one solely inward to the self, 
Emerson establishes a first philosophy at once distinct from and indebted to 
Coleridge’s own. In his assertion of this self-reliance, Emerson demonstrates the 
simultaneous significance of both the national or extrapersonal, and the creative or 
personal influence that Coleridge wields, presenting a vision of transcendence in 
the final chapter of his essay that weaves together metaphors of personal creative 
and national independence. 
 In the following chapter, that which centres on Emerson’s engagement in 
the “Woodnotes” poems with Wordsworth’s The Excursion, the same pattern 
emerges. Again, Emerson engages with Wordsworth’s poem for its representative 
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quality. In this instance, however, it is Wordsworth’s genius as a philosophic poet to 
which Emerson is attracted and that he identifies as being incursive.    
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Emerson’s “Woodnotes” Poems 
and Wordsworth’s The Excursion 
 
In a lecture entitled “Doctrine of the Soul,” delivered in 1838, Emerson 
defines Wordsworth’s value as a philosophic poet as his incorporation of and 
expression of ‘the music of humanity’ in his poetry (EL 3:8). Emerson elaborates his 
use of the phrase, itself taken from Wordsworth’s “Tintern Abbey,” describing the 
music as the ‘Idea or principle’ behind life – that which is ‘…the human soul in these 
last ages striving for a just publication of itself through priest and legislator and 
poet which is the subject of history and the author of revolutions’ (EL 3:9). Given his 
high praise for the poet on the grounds of his philosophical expression in the period 
during which he was composing his “Woodnotes” poems, it is no wonder that a 
number of scholars have noted various Wordsworthian parallels and echoes in 
Emerson’s two works. 
Perhaps the most recent scholar to explore these connections is Patrick 
Keane. In the “Woodnotes” poems, Keane reads three central Wordsworthian 
inheritances that are both formal and thematic. Firstly, Keane identifies that the 
“Woodnotes” poems fall into a structural pattern associated with the Petrarchan 
sonnet and with Wordsworth, namely ‘the immediate presentation of a scene 
followed by an explicit interpretation of that presentation’ (243). Keane also notes a 
parallel to the Lyrical Ballads in the first “Woodnotes” poem’s ‘jaunty tetrameters 
2 
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and the imperative to “leave…pedant lore apart,”’ and a connection to the 
‘Wordsworthian apotheosis of the Child’ found in the Intimations Ode (244).  
Keane’s discussion of the “Woodnotes” poems in Emerson, Romanticism, 
and Intuitive Reason augments earlier scholarship like that of Frank Thompson. In 
his 1928 essay, “Emerson’s Theory and Practice of Poetry,” Thompson explored at 
length the links between Emerson’s two “Woodnotes” poems and Wordsworth’s 
Intimations Ode, focusing predominantly on Wordsworth’s creative and formal 
influence. Relatively more recently, 
Joseph Warren Beach and Carl Strauch focused on the ideological parallels between 
Emerson’s account of the Romantic triad in the “Woodnotes” poems and 
Wordsworth’s in The Excursion in The Concept of Nature in Nineteenth-Century 
English Poetry (1936) and in “Emerson and the Doctrine of Sympathy” (1967) 
respectively. Beach’s assessment of the “Woodnotes” poems, to which he refers as 
a single entity, “Woodnotes,” most concisely conveys the general Wordsworthian 
echoes in the ascending conception of the Romantic triad found in Emerson’s two 
texts: 
Nearly every aspect of Emerson’s feeling for nature is here represented [in 
“Woodnotes”]; and here is shown particularly well the connection there is in 
Emerson’s mind between nature-lore, the esthetic beauties of the 
woodland, the wholesomeness of rustic life, on the one hand, and on the 
other hand, the philosophical concept of universal nature and the religious 
concept of “the eternal Pan.” In his way of assuming this connection 
between two complex sets of ideas Emerson is following in the tradition of 
Wordsworth and the great romantic poets. (348) 
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R.A. Yoder’s analysis of the “Woodnotes” poems in Emerson and the Orphic 
Poet in America is unique among the aforementioned scholarship insofar as it 
focuses on the apparent influence of Wordsworth’s ideas regarding imaginative 
development. Specifically, Yoder notes the overt echo of Wordsworth’s Prelude in 
the image of the shore found in “Woodnotes II” (When thou shalt climb the 
mountain cliff, / Or see the wide shore from thy skiff, / To see the horizon shall 
express / But emptiness on emptiness (ll.252–255)). Of this image in the second 
“Woodnotes” poem, Yoder writes that ‘…similar to the classic Wordsworthian 
episodes, it shows the uninitiated poet looking on a precipice or at the shore from 
his skiff’ (122). Emerson’s account is distinguished from Wordsworth’s, however, 
insofar as nature in Emerson’s poem ‘holds no drama, nor even a moral nudge,’ but 
only emptiness (Ibid). 
In each of these instances, connections identified in the Woodnotes poems 
to Wordsworth’s works are either highly specific, observing Wordsworthian echoes 
in particular phrases or scenes, or they are general and broad, noting the poems’ 
overall Wordsworthian tone or even more broadly, its Romantic genealogy. In 
several instances, particularly in the case of Frank Thompson’s analysis and that of 
R.A. Yoder, critical exploration also focuses predominately on the second of 
Emerson’s “Woodnotes” poems. 
The comparative analysis undertaken in the following chapter demonstrates 
that reading the “Woodnotes” poems as expressions of Emerson’s antagonistic 
engagement with The Excursion specifically, rather than (or in addition to) reading 
them as poems that engage more obliquely and generally with Wordsworth’s 
poetry, offers a new perspective on the poems. Firstly, contemplating the poems as 
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engagements with The Excursion brings “Woodnotes I” out of the shadows, 
demonstrating significant Wordsworthian parallels in a poem often disregarded in 
this context. Additionally, this comparative model demonstrates the concomitant 
significance to Emerson of Wordsworth’s philosophic talents and his treatment of 
imaginative development, combining analysis like that of Yoder with the more 
traditionally thematic focus of scholars like Strauch and Beach. 
Emerson, we have seen, is very much interested in what it means to write, 
to create original expression, and Wordsworth’s attention to notions of imaginative 
development was greatly attractive to the American poet. Unlike his 
aforementioned public comments regarding Wordsworth’s philosophic talents, 
however, Emerson does not appear to explicitly acknowledge his attraction to 
Wordsworth’s poetry on these grounds either privately or publicly. That being said, 
when Emerson includes in an 1837 journal entry a ‘small selection’ of poems from 
Wordsworth’s volumes that he believes ‘contain all their poetry,’ Emerson not only 
lists twelve poems comprising some of Wordsworth’s greatest writing regarding the 
music of humanity, but also includes poems like the Intimations Ode that express 
Wordsworth’s understanding of imaginative development (JMN 5:335). The poems 
Emerson catalogues in 1837 as the most representative of Wordsworth’s talents 
are “Fidelity,” “Tintern Abbey,” “The Old Cumberland Beggar,” “Ode to Duty,” 
“September, 1819,” “The Force of Prayer,” “Ode to Lycoris,” “Lines on the Death of 
Fox,” “Dion,” “Character of the Happy Warrior,” “Laodamia,” and the Intimations 
Ode.19 The sustained significance to Emerson of these poems is demonstrated by 
                                                     
19 Frank Thompson has also noted that the verse forms of the poems included in Emerson’s list – ‘blank verse, 
the rimed couplet, the Pindaric measure, the quatrain, and the versification of Laodamia, which is composed of 
  
105 | P a g e  
 
his inclusion of ten of the twelve in his edited anthology of poetry, Parnassus 
(1871), nearly four decades after his original journal entry; Emerson omits only “The 
Old Cumberland Beggar” and “Lycoris” (Thompson “Emerson’s Theory and Practice 
of Poetry” 1174). 
Emerson’s inclusion of “The Old Cumberland Beggar” in his original list is of 
note in its illustration of Emerson’s attraction to a third quality in the British writer’s 
poetry, at least in the period during which Emerson was at work composing the 
“Woodnotes” poems. “The Old Cumberland Beggar” exemplifies the element of 
social critique at work in much of Wordsworth’s poetry, particularly that of the 
1790s. In engaging with social criticism, Wordsworth centres “The Old Cumberland 
Beggar” and poems like it (“Michael,” “We Are Seven,” “The Female Vagrant,” etc.) 
on impoverished subjects and on the subject of poverty, a topic that is in turn 
‘linked inextricably with the politics of reform, the war with France, and the steady 
industrial transformation of English social and cultural practices’ (Harrison 16). In its 
various intersecting and peripheral narratives from that of the impoverished 
Margaret to the world-weary Solitary, The Excursion incorporates critiques of all of 
these aforementioned elements. 
As we will see in the next section which briefly discusses Emerson’s 
engagement with Wordsworth’s poetry – his reception of it and receptivity to it – 
Emerson was not always a proponent of the British writer or his poems. Throughout 
the 1820s, Emerson was overtly critical of Wordsworth’s work, and it was only in 
the early 1830s that the tone of his journal entries and letters changed in reference 
                                                     
a quatrain and a couplet’ – include every type of poetry that Emerson practiced as well (“Emerson’s Theory and 
Practice of Poetry” 1175). 
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to the British writer’s poetic and philosophical genius. Throughout this early period, 
however, Emerson remained supportive of the fact that Wordsworth incorporated 
‘things near’ into his poetry, those elements that are ‘not less beautiful and 
wondrous than things remote’; Wordsworth embraces the ‘common,’ the ‘familiar,’ 
and the ‘low’ (CW 1:67). Unlike critics such as Francis Jeffrey and William Hazlitt, 
with whose contemporary criticism of The Excursion Emerson was familiar, Emerson 
held Wordsworth’s poem in high esteem for its ‘choice of persons’ rather than 
critiquing it on this basis (JMN 1:271). Furthermore, critics like Linden Peach have 
noted that several of Emerson’s works appear to be inspired by Wordsworth’s ideas 
regarding ‘humble and rustic life,’ specifically Wordsworth’s emphasis on the 
relationship to nature enjoyed by those whose lifestyle ties them to the land (Peach 
British Influence on the Birth of American Literature 55). Peach notes “The Poet” as 
an example of one of these works, and marks the “Woodnotes” poems as 
Emerson’s only attempt to make the common man the subject of his poetry as 
Wordsworth does (Ibid). 
In precis, The Excursion is of particular significance for Emerson because it 
coalesces three important elements: Wordsworth’s ability to convey the music of 
humanity (and the nature of this music), his attention to notions of imaginative 
development, and his incorporation of the common and the low. We might more 
easily refer to this coalescence as Wordsworth’s genius as a philosophic poet more 
generally, that which enabled him to incorporate each of these important elements 
into his works. Emerson found in The Excursion an epitome of this genius and it 
rendered the poem one of Wordsworth’s most attractive works. Even in the period 
during which Emerson was most critical of the poet and his poems, the American 
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writer referenced The Excursion positively in his journals, even defending it against 
criticism. 
 In an Emersonian system of creative reading, however, the presence of 
congenial and influential elements in a work is as much admirable and attractive as 
it is anxiety-inducing. That The Excursion presented Emerson with an expression of 
three elements most representative of Wordsworth’s genius also rendered the 
poem a potent symbol of Wordsworth’s creative and ideological influence. As such, 
in engaging with The Excursion in the “Woodnotes” poems, Emerson did so 
antagonistically, performing acts of detachment in his poems from Wordsworth’s 
ideas and, as such, from the spectre of Wordsworth’s influence.  
Emerson performs his detachment from two elements of Wordsworth’s 
thought. The first is related to Wordsworth’s conception of the Romantic triad, or 
the nature of the music of humanity he conveys in The Excursion, and the second to 
the peripheral account of imaginative development contained in the Poet’s 
narrative. Emerson’s detachment in both instances centres on the nature of and 
development of the relationship between a poet figure and an itinerant peasant in 
the “Woodnotes” poems which echoes that between the Poet and the Wanderer in 
The Excursion. Additionally, in detaching from Wordsworth’s conception of the 
Romantic triad specifically, Emerson does so through engagement with the 
constitutive dramatic or dialogic element found in The Excursion, that explored by 
scholars like Sally Bushell, Alison Hickey, and John Risinger, to all of whom which 
the following discussion of Wordsworth’s poem is indebted. 
Before embarking on a discussion of Emerson’s assimilations of and 
detachments from elements of Wordsworth’s thought, as in the previous chapter, I 
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will first contextualise Emerson’s engagement with Wordsworth and The Excursion 
with a discussion of the American writer’s reception of and receptivity to 
Wordsworth’s works. In doing so, I would like to look briefly at Emerson’s history of 
engagement with the poet prior to the composition and publication of the 
“Woodnotes” poems. While the value of engaging with Wordsworth’s works and 
Wordsworth’s value more generally eventually became to Emerson the British 
poet’s expression of philosophical poetry, this value was not acknowledged or 
perceived in Emerson’s youth (Thompson “Emerson’s Theory and Practice of 
Poetry” 1170). Throughout the 1820s and in the early years of the 1830s, Emerson’s 
journal entries record a distaste for and, at times, an outright opposition to 
Wordsworth’s poetry, as we will see in the following pages. Emerson’s newfound 
appreciation for Wordsworth’s poetry in the early 1830s coincides with Emerson’s 
newfound intellectual rigour in engaging with Coleridge’s philosophical distinctions, 
and is determined by the same motivating factors: Emerson’s abandonment of 
revealed religion for the book of nature and his decision to embark upon a literary 
career.  
As the previous chapter traced in great detail Emerson’s introduction to the 
ideas noted above, the account of Emerson’s reception of and receptivity to 
Wordsworth’s ideas that follows focuses on tracing Emerson’s changing opinion of 
Wordsworth’s poetry through exploration of his journal entries. In doing so, it also 
demonstrates that both before and after Emerson’s change of heart regarding 
Wordsworth’s talents as a philosophic poet, Emerson speaks positively of The 
Excursion. Wordsworth’s later poem appears to be one of the few in Wordsworth’s 
oeuvre immune to Emerson’s early distaste for the British writer’s work. 
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Wordsworth in Emerson’s Journals 
 
Emerson’s journals reveal that his engagement with Wordsworth’s poetry 
ostensibly commences in 1819, during Emerson’s time at Harvard College. It comes 
as little surprise that Harvard should have been the place where Emerson first 
encountered the Lake Poet; during this period, the university was known as a 
Wordsworthian stronghold (Pace, “Wordsworth and America,” 236). Wordsworth’s 
influence on Harvard College scholarship can be traced at least in part to the 
Unitarian figure Andrews Norton, who was appointed the university’s Dexter 
Professor of Sacred Literature in 1819. Norton admired the spiritual message of 
Wordsworth’s poems and made an effort to acquire as many editions of his works 
as possible for the school’s library (Pace, “Wordsworth and America,” 236). Norton 
would eventually become a vocal opponent of Emerson’s transcendentalism, 
attacking his “Divinity School Address” (1838) on religious grounds in the Boston 
Daily Advertiser and later denouncing Transcendentalism more generally in A 
Discourse on the Latest Form of Infidelity (1839) (Habich, “Emerson’s Reluctant 
Foe,” 210). Due to his part in fostering a pro-Wordsworthian atmosphere at 
Harvard in the early decades of the nineteenth century, Norton ironically helped to 
shape the same transcendental ideology that he would vocally condemn in the 
1830s. 
The volume to which Emerson refers in the 1819 journal entry I will decsribe 
in greater detail shortly is almost certainly the American edition of Lyrical Ballads 
published and printed in two volumes in 1802 by James Humphreys of Philadelphia. 
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Until 1824, this was the only extant American edition of Wordsworth’s poetry, and 
it followed the 1800 London edition of the text closely, differing only in Humphreys’ 
addition of “The Convict” and in a slightly different arrangement of poems in the 
first volume.  
Emerson’s thoughts on Wordsworth’s poetry begin with the disclosure that 
he has ‘thirsted to abuse the poetical character of Mr Wordsworth whose poems 
have lately been read to me’ (JMN 1:162). Emerson’s desire to belittle 
Wordsworth’s poetic talents and his poetry is apparent in the catalogue of 
diminution that his journal records. Emerson refers to Wordsworth as a ‘poet of 
pismires,’ describes his works as ‘dwarfish’ and the ‘poetry of pigmies,’ and likens 
the process of reading his poems to ‘a man creeping about in palaces of Lilliput who 
maugre all the magnificence would fain be on his legs again’ (JMN 1:162). 
Emerson’s objection to Wordsworth’s poems at this time appears to rest not on the 
quality of his writing, as Emerson is willing to admit at the very least ‘the prettiness, 
the exquisite prettiness of his verses,’ but rather Emerson’s objections are a 
comment on the subject matter of Wordsworth’s works (Ibid). Furthermore, even 
the prettiness of the Lake Poet’s verse is ultimately rendered a harmful quality, and 
Emerson suggests that the superficial attractions of the poems serve only to mask 
the disagreeable nature of their content which for Emerson ‘soon becomes 
intolerable’ (Ibid). 
The revelation of Emerson’s early distaste for Wordsworth’s poetry in his 
limited early contact with it reflects the general attitude toward Wordsworth’s 
works in America at the time. Early nineteenth century American readers were 
defined by a general literary conservatism that impacted their opinion of 
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Wordsworth’s poetry (Eckel, “American Encounters with Wordsworth,” 2). 
Accustomed to the neoclassical formalism and the relatively conservative content 
of Enlightenment-era literature, Wordsworth’s poetry, and British Romantic 
literature generally, was too radical for many readers. Joel Pace, for example, 
describes James Humphreys’ decision to publish Lyrical Ballads in Philadelphia as a 
progressive one intended to continue his press’s tradition of radical political 
engagement (Pace, “Wordsworth and America,” 232).   
To suggest, however, that America’s literary conservatism in this period was 
unique ignores the wealth of British criticism that vocalised disapproval of 
Wordsworth’s works and those of other Romantic writers. A lack of independent 
American literary criticism in the early nineteenth century rendered American 
readers and scholars dependent on British periodicals for opinions of the latest 
literary works, and thus they were familiar with negative appraisals of 
Wordsworth’s poetry found within these publications (Eckel, 2). The lack of 
American editions of Wordsworth’s work also played a large role in America’s 
dependence on British critical opinions, as readers had little first-hand knowledge 
of Wordsworth’s texts (Eckel, 2). Evidence of Emerson’s reliance on British opinion 
in his assessments of Wordsworth’s poetry, which remains decidedly negative 
throughout the 1820s, is found in an 1821 journal entry. In this entry, Emerson 
comments on Wordsworth’s ‘noted vulgarism or glaring false taste,’ and the 
‘obtrusive deformity of his ideas’ (JMN 1:282). His language in this instance is 
remarkably similar to that used by Francis Jeffrey in his review of Wordsworth’s 
Excursion for the Edinburgh Review in 1814, which Emerson had added to a list of 
‘Books to be sought’ catalogued in his journal between 1819 and 1821 (JMN 1, 27). 
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Joel Pace has noted that Emerson’s initial readings of Wordsworth’s texts generally 
appear ‘nothing more than a repetition of Jeffrey’s’ (“‘Gems of a Soft and 
Permanent Lustre’”).20  
The publication of an American edition of Wordsworth’s Poetical Works in 
1824 was a particularly significant and transformative event, marking the first 
American edition of Wordsworth’s works since the publication of Lyrical Ballads in 
Philadelphia in 1802 (Eckel, 2–3). The publication of Poetical Works allowed 
American readers the freedom to decide for themselves their opinion of 
Wordsworth’s poetry, offering them a more complete vision of his poetic oeuvre 
than before (Pace “‘Gems of a Soft and Permanent Lustre’”). As such, 1824 marks 
the beginning of a general evolution in American attitudes toward Wordsworth’s 
poetry and a newfound freedom from the influence of British critical opinion (Ibid). 
In relation to Emerson more specifically, Leslie Eckel notes that after he obtained a 
copy of Poetical Works shortly after its publication, Emerson filled the book with 
annotations, becoming a ‘committed student of [Wordsworth’s] philosophy and 
phraseology’ in a new and more complete way than during his time at Harvard 
(Eckel,  4). 
Although 1824 marks a significant turning point in the rigour with which 
Emerson engages with Wordsworth’s poetry, the American maintains his negative 
opinion of the poet in his journals throughout the final years of the 1820s. In a 
journal he kept between 1826 and 1827, for example, he compares and contrasts 
Wordsworth’s ‘mauling’ of nature versus Milton’s and Shakespeare’s approach: 
                                                     
20 As both Pace and Leslie Eckel have noted, Jeffrey’s criticism and British critical opinion more generally played 
a significant role in shaping American opinion of Wordsworth’s poetry in the early decades of the nineteenth 
century (Eckel, pp.2–3). 
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‘[Wordsworth] mauls the moon & the waters & the bulrushes as his main business. 
Milton & Shakespeare touch them gently as illustrations or ornament’ (JMN 3:39). 
Such an entry is in stark contrast to one from 1868 in which Emerson describes the 
experience of reading Wordsworth’s poetry: 
I read with delight a casual notice of Wordsworth in the London Reader, in 
which, with prefect aplomb, his highest merits were affirmed, and his 
unquestionable superiority to all English poets since Milton, and thought 
how long I travelled and talked in England, and found no person, or none 
but one, and that one Clough, sympathetic with him, and admiring him 
aright, in face of Tennyson’s culminating talent, and genius in melodious 
verse. (Emerson in his Journals,  524) 
The shift in Emerson’s opinion arrives in the 1830s and constitutes a reversal of his 
opinion regarding Wordsworth’s philosophic talents – his ability to convey the 
music of humanity. Where earlier Wordsworth was a poet of pismires and a mauler 
of nature, by the mid-1830s he is a poet who ‘[moves] about in worlds not realized,’ 
accessing a side of nature that poets cannot (JMN 5:134–5).  
A passage from one of Emerson’s journal entries from August 1837 perhaps 
best encapsulates his identification of Wordsworth’s newfound philosophic value. 
Describing a catalogue of poets including Burns, Goldsmith, Cowper, Goethe, 
Carlyle and, among them, Wordsworth, Emerson defines their genius as follows: 
The secret of the scholar or intellectual man is that all nature is only the 
foliage, the flowering, & the fruit of the Soul and that every part therefore 
exists as emblem & sign, of some fact in the soul. (JMN 5:366) 
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Frank Thompson notes a link between Emerson’s apparent change of heart 
regarding Wordsworth’s poetry and his embrace of Coleridge’s critical writing on 
Wordsworth’s poetry, which he encountered in the late 1820s and engaged with 
thoroughly throughout the early 1830s, as seen in the previous chapter (“Emerson’s 
Theory and Practice of Poetry” 1173). Linden Peach remarks similarly, noting the 
significance of the literary criticism contained in the Biographia Literaria 
specifically, among which is a defence of Wordsworth’s poetry (54). Equally 
significant certainly is the development of Emerson’s Romantic philosophy 
throughout the late 1820s and early 1830s. As the previous chapter demonstrated, 
the intellectual and spiritual developments in this era that inspired the 
development of Emerson’s Romantic first philosophy also imbued him with a new 
respect for Coleridge’s philosophical works and sparked Emerson’s more rigorous 
engagement with them. The transitions in Emerson’s engagement with and 
descriptions of Wordsworth’s poetry appear to show a similar trend. As Emerson’s 
own conceptualisation of the natural world and its relationship to man and to God 
coalesced into a more coherent and cohesive system throughout the late 1820s and 
the early 1830s, Emerson was better able to find value in Wordsworth’s poetry and 
the philosophy contained within it (Moore 185). 
Emerson’s engagement with The Excursion specifically is an anomaly within 
the larger trends sketched above. Throughout the years in which one finds the most 
negative assessments of Wordsworth’s poetry in Emerson’s journals, the American 
writer nonetheless repeatedly turned to The Excursion. It is Wordsworth’s ‘choice 
of persons’ that Emerson defends in a journal entry written in 1821, for example, a 
defence noted in the opening discussion of this chapter (JMN 1:271). In this journal 
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entry, Emerson acknowledges that Wordsworth’s choice ‘lays him open to ridicule,’ 
but he defends the British poet nonetheless, relating Wordsworth’s choice of 
subjects to the poet’s design ‘to take man where all mankind meet, above the reach 
of arbitrary distinctions of rank or fashion upon the ground of naked human nature’ 
(Ibid). It would have been ‘preposterous,’ he continues, for Wordsworth ‘to have 
introduced for the purposes of his philosophical dialogue the personages of 
heraldry’ (Ibid). Elsewhere, Emerson remarks that ‘there is nothing vulgar in 
Wordsworth’s idea of Man’ (JMN 5:163). In this regard, Emerson’s opinion of The 
Excursion directly conflicts with several of Britain’s prominent critics, and he would 
continue not only to defend Wordsworth’s conception of and expression of 
humanity throughout his life, but would respond to this characteristic of 
Wordsworth’s poetry enthusiastically as in the 1821 journal entry noted above 
(Peach 54).  
Perhaps most enthusiastic is Emerson’s assessment of the poem from May 
1841, which, although it does not address Wordsworth’s choice of persons, 
emphasises the value of the poem as an expression of Wordsworth’s poetic and 
philosophic genius: 
Wordsworth’s Excursion awakened in every lover of nature the right feeling. 
We saw stars shine, we felt the awe of mountains, we heard the rustle of 
the wind in the grass, & knew again the sweet secret of solitude. It was a 
great joy. It was nearer to nature & verse that more commanded nature 
than aught we had before. (JMN 7:362) 
In 1841, directly prior to the publication of his second “Woodnotes” poem, The 
Excursion appears to be not only at the forefront of Emerson’s mind, but Emerson’s 
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appreciation for the poem is at its height. Such esteem is not without its anxieties, 
however, and Emerson again seeks to downplay the potency of an influential text. 
Directly following his assessment above, Emerson continues: ‘But the promise [in 
The Excursion] was not fulfilled. The whole book was dull. There were gleams, the 
poetry ran in veins and did not pervade the man’ (JMN 7:362). 
  It is here in 1841 that I will leave Wordsworth and The Excursion in 
Emerson’s journals. The previous pages have demonstrated a significant shift in the 
American writer’s opinion of Wordsworth’s poetry and of his philosophic genius 
specifically, coinciding both with Emerson’s decision to embark upon literary 
pursuits and consequently to further develop his Romantic first philosophy. 
Emerson’s opinion of Wordsworth and his work changes as Emerson himself begins 
to consider the world through the eyes of a writer. As with the first expression of 
his philosophy in prose, in his first attempts to encapsulate his philosophy in poetry, 
Emerson turns to a model of the philosophical poet, Wordsworth, and to a model of 
philosophic verse, The Excursion. However, as in his engagement with Aids to 
Reflection in Nature, Emerson must detach from the thought and the expression 
with which he engages. The following discussion traces that engagement and 
detachment. 
 
Wordsworthian Assimilations and Engagements in  
“Woodnotes I” 
 
Engagement in the “Woodnotes” poems with Wordsworth’s Excursion is 
most overtly manifest in the first of the two works, published in 1840 in The Dial, a 
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year before “Woodnotes II.” Emerson’s first “Woodnotes” poem is narrated by a 
figure to whom I will refer as the poet, and is a recollection of the poet’s friendship 
with an itinerant ‘musing peasant, lowly great’ (line 117). The first of the poem’s 
four stanzas opens with the poet’s general description of the qualities of the 
modern day ‘bard’ (line 2), twice referred to as a ‘Wonderer’ (lines 38, 39). ‘In the 
wood he travels glad’ (line 23), describes the poet; he is a ‘Planter of celestial 
plants’ (line 25) and one ‘Born out of time’ (line 3). The opening stanza serves to 
establish both the bard’s intimate relationship to the natural world and his status as 
a man outside of time and the society of men. Furthermore, the poet draws a 
connection between the two. The bard makes society of nature, he is the ‘Caesar’ 
of his own ‘leafy Rome’ (line 11) and is ‘at home’ (line 12) in a natural landscape of 
meadows, rivers, and woods. With the society of men, however, he ostensibly has 
little contact: ‘With none he has to do, / And none seeks him’ (lines 17–18). He is a 
man of knowledge, yet ‘What he knows nobody wants’ (lines 22, 27), a fact the 
poet emphasises through repetition of this phrase in this opening stanza. In the 
opening lines of the poem’s second stanza it is revealed that this description is not 
that of a bardic archetype, but of a real and remembered figure; ‘And such I knew, a 
forest seer’ (line 43). As such, the poet locates the bard or seer in a society of a 
different and more personal kind. 
 From only the first stanza, the parallels between Emerson’s first 
“Woodnotes” poem and The Excursion, particularly its opening Book, are almost 
immediately apparent. Most fundamentally, “Woodnotes I” is, like The Excursion, 
the self-conscious expression of a poet cum narrator and more specifically, a 
recollection. Furthermore, “Woodnotes I” is a recollection that centres on the 
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relationship between the poet and a socially nonconformist vagrant – a Wonderer – 
one who enjoys a special relationship to the natural world. This relationship overtly 
echoes that between the Wanderer and the Poet in Wordsworth’s dramatic poem, 
and that of the Wanderer to nature, emphasised by the blatant connection to 
Wordsworth’s character in the title of Wonderer ascribed to this unnamed forest 
seer. 
The Excursion, too, is a recollected narrative that opens with the Poet’s 
introduction of the Wanderer, an itinerant, modest man and former pedlar, one 
with ‘Lowly’ heart who is ‘meek in gratitude’ (1:236). The Poet, however, offers a 
far more detailed description of the Wanderer and of his background than the 
opening account of the forest seer given by Emerson’s poet. After a brief 
description of the Wanderer on the summer day on which the Poet’s recollection 
begins, the reader receives a full account of the Wanderer’s biography and a 
truncated history of the Poet’s relationship to him (1.108–433).  
Like Emerson’s bard, Wordsworth’s Wanderer is a man intimate with 
nature. As a child, it was ‘in the mountains [where] did he “feel” his faith’ (line 226), 
and from a young age he ‘learned / In oft-recurring hours of sober thought / To look 
on Nature with a humble heart’ (1:239–241). The Wanderer’s vagrancy grants him 
knowledge of the ways of men, ‘Their manner, their enjoyments, and pursuits, / 
Their passions, and their feelings…’ (1:342–343), and he is one who turns the 
‘constant disposition of his thoughts / To sympathy with man…’ (1:363–364). The 
Wanderer’s itinerancy places him outside of traditional society, a position from 
which he is knowledgeable of its cruelty – the ‘rough sports / and teasing ways of 
children’ (1:415). However, he is defined throughout these opening stanzas by his 
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relationships to individuals and, like the itinerant figure of Emerson’s poem, 
participates in a society of a more personal kind: ‘Indulgent listener was he to the 
tongue / Of garrulous age; nor did the sick man’s tale, / To his fraternal sympathy 
addressed, / Obtain reluctant hearing’ (1:416–419). 
Returning again to “Woodnotes I,” the second stanza establishes an 
additional parallel between the forest seer and the Wanderer of The Excursion. 
While the poet spoke in general terms in the first stanza, in the second, he reveals 
more about the nature of the relationship of the “Wonderer” to the natural world. 
The first few lines reinforce the visionary qualities of this forest seer, referring to 
the peasant as a ‘foreteller’ (line 45) and a ‘harbinger’ (line 46), and establishing the 
natural quality of his vision. He is a foreteller specifically ‘of the vernal ides’ (line 
45), and a harbinger ‘of spheres and tides’ (line 46). The peasant’s visionary quality 
derives from his intimate knowledge of the natural world, that which in turn issues 
from his fundamental love for and appreciation of nature; it is because he is ‘A lover 
true’ that he knows ‘by heart / Each joy the mountain dales impart’ (line 47–48). 
This knowledge also derives, according to Emerson’s poet, from nature’s active 
revelation of her secrets. Nature yields to the peasant ‘all her shows’ (line 65) in 
order ‘To please and win this pilgrim wise’ (line 66). 
In stark contrast to the solitary portrait painted in the poem’s opening 
stanza, in stanza two of “Woodnotes I,” the peasant’s relationship to yielding 
nature is described as something that involves him in a community. In place of 
fellow man, the peasant enjoys the society of the natural world: 
It seemed that Nature could not raise 
A plant in any secret place,  
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In quaking bog, on snowy hill,  
Beneath the grass that shades the rill 
Under the snow, between the rocks,  
In damp fields known to bird and fox,  
But he would come in the very hour 
It opened up its virgin bower 
As if a sunbeam showed the place,  
And tell its long-descended race. 
It seemed as if the breezes brought him;  
It seemed as if the sparrows taught him; 
As if by secret sight he knew 
Where, in the far fields, the orchis grew. (lines 49–62) 
In the poet’s perception, the natural world plays an active role in the peasant’s 
visionary capabilities, bringing, teaching, and showing him her secrets. The reason 
for this apparent generosity derives from the fact that the peasant is a ‘lover’ of 
nature, and he is a lover not only because he appreciates the world, but also 
because his appreciation is accompanied by an attitude to nature distinguished 
from that of others.  
In the poem’s first stanza, for example, the poet notes that when the 
peasant approaches nature ‘Not hook nor line hath he / He stands in the meadow 
wide, -- / Nor gun nor scythe to see’ (lines 14–16). It is the revelation in the first 
stanza that the peasant approaches nature with respect and reverence, not looking 
to take or profit from it, which enables the active, helpful nature found in stanza 
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two. The poem’s third stanza to which I will now turn, further develops the 
significance of this mutual respect by developing its antithesis. 
 The third stanza of “Woodnotes I” opens with the poet’s recounting of the 
peasant’s previous visit to Maine. ‘[U]nploughed’ (line 75) and ‘unplanted’ (line 77), 
these New England woods are untouched by the visible effects of civilisation and 
traditional society, save for a ‘lumberers’ gang’ (line 75). The poet describes the 
peasant’s journey through the Maine woods evocatively and the stanza is replete 
with the sounds, sights, and smells of the forest. The poet’s engagement of the 
senses and his description of the peasant’s peaceful immersion in the natural world 
are both abruptly interrupted, however, by the introduction of a ‘sudden roar’ (line 
86), revealed to be the ‘death-hymn of the perfect tree’ (line 87).  
Michael Gilmore has noted that the period between 1837 and 1843, into 
which both “Woodnotes” poems fall, marks that in which Emerson was at his most 
outspoken regarding the modern capitalist economy (19). Emerson engaged with 
economic change and its effects on society in various texts throughout this period, 
including “Wealth,” “Man the Reformer,” and “The Transcendentalist.” Emerson’s 
interest in such topics is unsurprising given the coincidence of the American 
Romantic period with the country’s transformation from a mostly local, agrarian 
economy toward new, grander scales of enterprise marked by a drive for ‘gain 
rather than self-sufficiency’ (Gilmore 2). It is a critique of gain, or of what James 
McKusick calls ‘rampant commodity fetishism,’ that we find in stanza three of 
“Woodnotes I” and indeed there is an implicit critique throughout the poem of 
commodifying approaches to the natural world (Green Writing 121). The gun, 
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scythe, and fishing rod of stanza one, for example, are not solely instruments of 
hostility but also of commodity (Strauch 163).  
It is because the peasant is a ‘Lover of all things alive’ (line 37), a peasant 
and a seer, rather than someone who commodifies and takes, that he enjoys 
nature’s ‘resistless friendship’ (line 141). In this way, the peasant’s relationship to 
nature conforms well to James McKusick’s reading of Emerson’s “The 
Transcendentalist,” a lecture Emerson first delivered in 1842, two years following 
the publication of “Woodnotes I.” Of this text, McKusick writes that Emerson 
presents an account of the natural world in which ‘nature does not exist merely for 
the purposes of human consumption,’ but rather, ‘exists for its own purposes’ 
(136). If it is approached, as McKusick describes, ‘in a spirit of humility,’ nature ‘can 
teach us lessons’ (Ibid). For McKucisk, Emerson’s transcendental thought is also ‘a 
mode of ecological thought’ insofar as it ‘beholds the Earth as a community of living 
things’ (Ibid). Such a reading certainly rings true in relation to the social account of 
the relationship between the peasant and the natural world presented in 
“Woodnotes I.”  
In its incorporation of an intertwined critique of economic and ecological 
changes, and in its depiction of the natural world as a kind of community, 
“Woodnotes I” aligns thematically with The Excursion. Wordsworth incorporates 
protoecological thought into the poem through remarks by the Wanderer in the 
poem’s eighth Book, in which he refers to the disappearance of the wild, natural 
landscape as an effect of industrial advancements and urbanisation, the ‘darker 
side / Of this great change’ (8:151–152). His intimate knowledge of the English 
landscape renders him particularly cognizant of change, and he also notes that 
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recently ‘wheresoe’er the traveller turns his steps, / He sees the barren wilderness 
erased, / Or disappearing…’ (8:128 –130). Rather than the similarities between 
ecological or protoecological critiques present in both poems, however, the most 
convincing parallel is the presence of critique at all. I would argue that Emerson 
incorporates this element into “Woodnotes I” in emulation of Wordsworth’s 
example.  
However, Emerson’s critique of economic changes and their effect on the 
landscape is admittedly disparate from the aspects of change presented critically in 
The Excursion and in Wordsworth’s poetry more generally. Wordsworth populates 
The Excursion with the low and common subjects that Emerson defends in 1821 in 
order to facilitate an interrogationg of poverty, that which is in turn linked in early 
nineteenth century England to the politics of reform, war, and the industrial 
revolution (Harrison 16). Although Margaret is a peripheral character in the poem, 
her story constitutes a large part of the poem’s first Book and incorporates all these 
elements of change. The Solitary’s story, too, coalesces many of these themes, 
while the Wanderer’s itinerant nature and rural beginnings combine two 
characteristics typical of Wordsworthian subjects. 
A central feature of the conception of the Romantic triad offered by the 
Wanderer in Wordsworth’s poem, an element of the text about which I have yet to 
speak at length, is the notion of community. The parallels in the conception of the 
triad that the Wanderer presents to the reader in The Excursion, particularly in the 
poem’s fourth and ninth Books, and Emerson’s understanding of nature’s value 
more generally, are several, because Wordsworth held a conception of nature’s 
spiritual value congenial to Emerson’s. In the Preface to The Excursion, for example, 
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Wordsworth’s account of the natural world clearly parallels Emerson’s own 
conception as outlined in his first philosophy. In the Preface to the poem, which 
contains ‘a kind of Prospectus of the design’ of the larger work, The Recluse, of 
which The Excursion was meant to be only a part,’ Wordsworth notes how ‘…the 
individual Mind [ . . . ] to the external World / Is fitted’ and, later, that ‘The external 
world is fitted to the Mind’ (The Excursion iv). Such a definition is reflected in the 
Wanderer’s understanding of the natural world in The Excursion, epitomised in 
declarations such as that made by the Wanderer in Book Nine: ‘To every Form of 
being is assigned … / An active Principle’ (9:1–3; original emphasis). Stephen Gill 
notes, for example, that this declaration recalls lines from “Tintern Abbey” as well 
as the early Prelude (142). These resonances lead Gill to describe the Wanderer as 
the figure in The Excursion ‘through [whom] speaks Wordsworth the Sage,’ echoing 
the interpretations of numerous scholars before and since himself (142).  
The resonances with Emerson’s own conception of nature’s spiritual value 
are also striking. However, while certainly at least in part a Wordsworthian 
inheritance, as Patrick Keane’s Emerson, Romanticism, and Intuitive Reason so 
extensively traces, it is not with the Wanderer’s account of the relationship 
between nature, mind, and spirit – the traditionally conceived Romantic triad – that 
Emerson engages with in the “Woodnotes” poems. Emerson engages in the 
“Woodnotes” poems with the conception of a triad of categories in The Excursion, 
but it is one that Thomas McFarland calls the ‘Wordsworthian triad’ (William 
Wordsworth: Intensity and Achievement 121). What McFarland refers to in these 
terms is the triad of categories that Wordsworth references twice in the Preface to 
The Excursion as ‘Man, Nature, and Society’ in the first instance and later, in slightly 
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revised terms, as man, nature and ‘Human Life’ (The Excursion ii, iii). Wordsworth’s 
substitution of society for God is incomplete in The Excursion and the poem 
maintains the divinity of the human mind and of nature present in other poems in 
Wordsworth’s oeuvre (McFarland 121). Nonetheless, Wordsworth includes in The 
Excursion an emphasis on community and on public life that filters even into the 
descriptions of the natural world presented by the Wanderer.  
Ralph Pite’s essay, “Wordsworth and the Natural World”(2003), observes 
that the Wanderer’s descriptions of the natural world in Book Fourth of the poem 
emphasise community among both inanimate and living natural objects (Ibid). The 
Wanderer describes, for example, how ‘living things, and things inanimate, / Do 
speak, at Heaven’s command, to eye and ear, / And speak to social reason’s inner 
sense, / With inarticulate language’ (4:1204–1207; quoted Pite 188). Of these lines, 
Pite writes: 
The living and the inanimate things of nature all “speak to social reason’s 
inner sense” because they exhibit sociality themselves, at all levels from the 
smallest to the largest from the “craggy regions” to “The tiny creatures 
strong by social league”, to “the mute company of changeful clouds” and as 
high as “The mild assemblage of the starry heavens.” (Ibid)21 
The sociality of natural objects extends, too, to an individual like the Wanderer, 
who communes with nature; in the natural world this individual finds ‘objects of a 
kindred love’ (4:1216). Through an apprehension of nature and its community, the 
individual is incorporated into a larger, spiritual society, as expressed by the 
                                                     
21 All of the lines to which Pite refers are from Book Fourth of The Excursion. 
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Wanderer in his ‘calmly’ spoken but nonetheless emphatic opening lines to the 
poem’s ninth and final Book: 
 ‘To every Form of being is assigned,’ 
 Thus calmly spake the venerable Sage, 
 ‘An “active” Principle: -- howe’er removed 
From sense and observation, it subsists 
In all things, in all natures; in the stars 
Of azure heaven, the unenduring clouds,  
In flower and tree, in every pebbly stone 
That paves the brooks, the stationary rocks,  
The moving waters, and the invisible air.  
Whate’er exists hath properties that spread 
Beyond itself, communicating good 
A simple blessing, or with evil mixed; 
Spirit that knows no insulated spot, 
No chasm, no solitude; from link to link  
It circulates, the Soul of all the worlds.’ (9:1–15; emphasis added) 
In The Excursion, one’s community connection or mental ‘fittedness’ to nature is 
inherently spiritual. However, the narrative comprised of the Solitary’s transition 
from “Despondency” to “Despondency Corrected,” that which is arguably the 
central narrative of the poem, evidences the insufficiency of this aspect of 
community alone (Risinger 440). That is to say, the natural world alone is 
insufficient to sustain the mental stability on which the apprehension of the mind’s 
fittedness to nature and nature’s fittedness to the mind is predicated.  
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The society to which Wordsworth’s revised triad refers, and that which offers an 
answer to nature’s insufficiency, is society between man and fellow man. Playing a 
constitutive role in the delineation of Wordsworth’s revised triad and the 
importance of human life is the dramatic element of The Excursion. It is from 
Wordsworth’s emphasis on human society that Emerson departs, and he does so 
through his engagement with Wordsworth’s dramatic form. Introducing this 
dramatic formal element in the fourth stanza of “Woodnotes I,” Emerson maintains 
it into the second poem, although with a different speaker. It is this shift in speaker 
from that of the peasant in the final stanza of “Woodnotes I” to that of an animate 
pine tree in “Woodnotes II” by which Emerson detaches from Wordsworth and his 
poem and this shift is emphasised by a transition in the conception of the Romantic 
triad found between the two poems.  
 
‘Loss of confidence in social man’: Society Conversation, and 
the Wordsworthian Triad in The Excursion 
 
 Don Bialostosky, writing of Wordsworth’s poems in Lyrical Ballads, defines 
them dialogically in two senses of the word. ‘In the first sense,’ he writes, ‘…they 
report dialogue in narrative diction’ (107). More interesting in Bialostosky’s 
understanding, however, is the second sense of the word: the poems are dialogic  
…because they continue the dialogue they report. The narrators, that is, 
relate these anecdotes in response to the exchange of words in which they 
have been involved and so continue the dialogue after the other party is no 
longer present. (Ibid) 
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Invited to participate in this dialogue is the reader him or herself who, in reading 
the poems, is confronted not only with multiple perspectives but is also tasked with 
judging and interpreting them (Ibid). John Danby identifies a similar element in the 
Lyrical Ballads, expressing it more concisely as a ‘presence of alternatives’ in which 
the reader’s active engagement is necessitated (37). It is the presence of 
alternatives that Sally Bushell’s thorough Re-Reading The Excursion (2002) 
concerns.  
Bushel opens her study of The Excursion with Wordsworth’s claim in the 
Preface to The Excursion that it is not his ‘intention formally to announce a system,’ 
but instead to convey through ‘clear thoughts, lively images, and strong feelings’ a 
message from which that reader ‘will have no difficulty…extracting the system for 
himself’ (The Excursion ii). From this position, Bushell disputes the prevalent 
interpretation of the poem as a theodicy demonstrating how The Excursion instead 
establishes the framework for moral exploration and development in the 
‘relationships between men, the connections created by sharing in others’ lives 
literally, or through narrative’ (Busgell 91).  
 Bialostosky’s, Danby’s, and Bushell’s readings of Wordsworth’s poetry share 
between them an interest in the effects on the reader of the various perspectives 
Wordsworth offers in his embrace of a dialogic or dramatic form. What the 
following exploration of Wordsworth’s poem considers, however, is the fact that 
the poem’s dramatic element also offers an example of the active process of 
interpretative engagement and judgment in which the reader is implicated. The 
Solitary’s biography and his spiritual revival, effected by the conversations in the 
poem, answer the question of how one moves from Despondency to Despondency 
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Corrected when nature is insufficient. The Excursion presents a process that John 
Risinger aptly terms ‘conversion through conversation’ (435). 
That nature is presented in The Excursion as insufficient to sustain mental 
fitness (and therefore fittedness) was noted briefly on page 115. The Solitary has 
lived in isolation in the splendour of the natural world for years, and yet remains 
decidedly despondent. What the Wanderer offers in Book Fourth of the poem, 
“Despondency Corrected,” is a multifaceted account of what the Solitary requires 
to move out of his despondent state. This account opens with an address to his 
friend’s lack of faith. There is only ‘One adequate support / For the calamities of 
mortal life,’ says the Wanderer: 
 …an assured belief  
 That the procession of our fate, howe’er 
 Sad or disturbed, is ordered by a Being 
 Of infinite benevolence and power;  
 Whose everlasting purposes embrace 
 All accidents, converting them to good. (4.10–11; 12–17) 
Having established the primary necessity of faith in God in his opening statements, 
the Wanderer expounds on a secondary requirement: appreciation of and 
immersion in symbolic nature. The Solitary, surrounded by nature, resides in a 
church of God: ‘In such a temple as we now behold / Reared for thy presence: 
therefore, am I bound / To worship, here, and everywhere’ (4.44–46). Both living 
nature and ‘things inanimate,’ according to the Wanderer, ‘Do speak, at Heaven’s 
command, to eye and ear, / And speak to social reason’s inner sense, / With 
inarticulate language’ (4.1204–1207). Through an acknowledgement and 
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appreciation of nature’s symbolic significance, and a foundational faith in God, the 
Solitary will apprehend the universe’s ‘transcendent truths’ (4.96): that ‘thou, thou 
alone / Art everlasting, and the blessed Spirits, / Which thou includest, as the sea 
her waves: / For adoration thou endur’st’ (4.91–94).  
What the Solitary lacks, however, is ‘social reason’; as such, the natural 
world by which he is surrounded has no effect. What he requires for the re-
establishment of faith, according to Wordsworth’s system, is the society of man, 
the presentation of ideas and perspectives that is regenerative and from which he 
can extract his own congenial understanding of the world around him. The 
Wanderer’s speech in “Despondency Corrected” does not cure the Solitary, but is 
the start of the process by which, over the next five books of Wordsworth’s poem, 
he undergoes a conversion through conversation.  
The Solitary shares in a dialogue with the Poet, the Wanderer, and, later, the 
Pastor, throughout which he is presented with numerous peripheral accounts of the 
world through the stories that these men share. In this presentation of varying 
perspectives, no single view takes precedence over the other – a quality highlighted 
by the poem’s dialogic structure (Hickey 14). The Solitary’s despondency and 
subsequent faithlessness were always located centrally in his ‘loss of confidence in 
social man’ (4.261), and through engagement or conversation it is redressed. 
Just as Wordsworth refuses to provide the reader with a single, unified, and 
coherent philosophical system, the varying perspectives offered by the Pastor, 
Poet, and Wanderer allow the Solitary to extract his own spiritual system. And if 
there is any doubt that the Solitary’s conversion, or the ‘re-giving’ of his soul, 
through conversation is successful, one need only turn to the poem’s final lines, 
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where the Poet reassures the reader of the reformatory and renovating qualities of 
the preceding dialogue: 
From this communion with uninjured Minds,  
What renovation had been brought; and what 
Degree of healing to a wounded spirit,  
Dejected, and habitually disposed 
To seek, in degradation of the Kind,  
Excuse and solace for her own defects; 
How far these erring notions were reformed; 
And whether aught, of tendency as good 
And pure, from further intercourse ensued;  
This -- if delightful hopes, as heretofore, 
Inspire the serious song, and gentle Hearts 
Cherish, and lofty Minds approve the past - -  
My future labours may not leave untold. (9.783–796) 
The Solitary’s successful spiritual renovation and character reformation speaks to 
the necessity of a social element in man’s relationship to God, one predicated on a 
spiritual transition from the individual ‘I’ to the collective ‘we’. David Bromwich 
identifies a similar transition in Wordsworth’s Immortality Ode, and one that 
corresponds to a similar grammatical transition in the poem. Bromwich 
demonstrates that this grammatical transition is driven at least in part by the 
poem’s spiritual subject, revealing a ‘progressively unfolding understanding of the 
individual’s mutual attachment to others in society’ (204). Specifically, this 
attachment is a realisation of one’s moral duties and obligations to the community, 
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a subordination of the individual to the community in regard to moral education 
(Ibid). In the Immortality Ode, the personal connection to God that the individual 
enjoys in childhood cannot be replaced, nor can the brilliance of its illumination be 
replicated, but guidance through moral revelation might still be enjoyed through an 
understanding of one’s connection to fellow man. This illuminating collective 
morality – the ‘light of common day’ (line 77) – is faded divinity, but through it one 
nonetheless maintains a connection to God.  
 A similar transitional narrative to that recorded in Wordsworth’s Ode is 
found in the first book of The Excursion. As in the Ode, the transition is a spiritual 
one from the individual ‘I’ to the collective ‘we’ that attends one’s transition from 
childhood to adulthood. The Poet, recounting the Wanderer’s life to the reader, 
describes his childhood as having often been spent alone in nature, and he ‘all 
alone/ Beheld the stars come out above his head, / And travelled through the 
wood, with no one near, / To whom he might confess the things he saw’ (1.127–
131). It is in his solitude in the wilderness of Athol that ‘…he had felt the power / Of 
Nature, and already was prepared, / By his intense conceptions, to receive / Deeply 
the lesson deep of love…’ (1.191–194). It is in these early childhood years that the 
individual ‘I’ appears to reign supreme. The restlessness of his youth soon takes 
hold, however, and the Wanderer leaves his homeland to become a travelling 
merchant. Although his time is often still spent in solitude, it is during this period 
that the Wanderer experiences the collective ‘we’ of man: ‘Their manners, their 
enjoyments, and pursuits, / Their passions and their feelings; chiefly those / 
Essential and eternal in the heart’ (1.342–344). 
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However, while the Poet’s narrative of the Wanderer’s life appears to 
recount a movement from a childhood spent in the solitude of nature to an 
itinerant and social life in nature, a collective moral and spiritual influence is in fact 
present throughout all stages of the Wanderer’s biography. Rather than a 
transition, the Poet’s narrative explores the way in which the I and the we are in 
constant interaction or, perhaps more accurately, asserts that in ideal 
circumstances they are in constant interaction. 
Firstly, while the Wanderer experienced nature in solitude during his 
formative years, the Poet also reveals that he was raised in ‘virtuous household, 
though exceeding poor!’ and as a result, the Wanderer and his siblings were taught 
‘stern self-respect, a reverence for God’s word, / And habitual piety’ (1.112, 115–
116). Additionally, one of the effects of the Wanderer’s solitary explorations of 
nature is an awareness and openness to his fellow man; in his youth, the Poet 
describes how ‘His heart lay open; and by nature tuned / And constant disposition 
of his thoughts / To sympathy with man, he was alive’ (1.362–364). Lastly, is the 
revelation that spiritual and moral guidance was a constant presence in the 
Wanderer’s early life, not only through the influence of his family, but through the 
influence of institutionalised religion: 
The Scottish Church, both on himself and those 
With whom from childhood he grew up, had held 
The strong hand of her purity; and still 
Had watched him with an unrelenting eye. 
This he remembered in his riper age 
With gratitude, and reverential thoughts. (1.397–402) 
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In contrast to the transition in the Immortality Ode from an individual relationship 
to God and morality in childhood to a collective relationship to God and morality in 
adulthood, The Excursion presents a story of maturation that insists on the 
necessity of moral education that is both subjective and individual as well as 
didactic and collective. The lack of apparent anxiety in relation to this transition is 
explained by the fact that there is, in fact, no transition; the we of community has 
for our representative character, the Wanderer, been present from the start. 
 
‘Let thy friends be as the dead in doom’: Society and 
‘Conversation’ in  “Woodnotes II” 
 
“Woodnotes I” is increasingly revelatory of both the intimacy of the poet’s 
relationship to the wondering peasant, and the nature of that relationship. The 
poem opens with the poet’s description of an archetype, progressing in the second 
stanza to a depiction of the Wonderer himself, revealing the presence of a personal 
relationship between the poem’s narrator and the peasant about whom he speaks 
(And such I knew, a forest seer). In stanza three, the poet recounts an event for 
which he was not present, the peasant’s journey to Maine and his witnessing of the 
felling of a pine tree. This revelation alludes to a dialogue between the two, but this 
dialogue is not made explicit. Finally, in the poem’s fourth stanza, the poet recalls 
an encounter with the Wonderer in which the poet transcribes the words of the 
peasant. The peasant speaks, as it were, for the first time. 
 Throughout ”Woodnotes I,” the nature of the poet’s relationship to the 
peasant is illustrated to be one of mentorship and guidance. It is a relationship in 
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which the poet actively and earnestly participates, asking questions of the peasant, 
as is revealed in the final stanza. Throughout the poem, the poet’s lack of clarity 
regarding the peasant’s relationship to nature is indicated in the preponderance of 
modal vocabulary – nature always ‘seemed as if,’ it never ‘was’ or ‘did.’ In the 
fourth stanza, the poet seeks clarity, asking the wonderer to explain his unique and 
mysterious relationship to the natural world. In answering, for the first time the 
peasant speaks: 
 “You ask,” he said, “what guide 
Me through trackless thickets led,  
Through thick-stemmed woodlands rough and wide? –  
I found the water’s bed 
The watercourses were my guide;  
I travelled grateful by their side,  
Or through their channel dry 
They led me through the thicket damp,  
Through brake and fern, the beavers’ camp, 
Through beds of granite cut my road,  
And their resistless friendship showed. 
The falling waters led me, 
The foodful waters fed me,  
And brought me to the lowest land,  
Unerring to the ocean sand. 
The moss upon the forest bark 
Was polestar when the night was dark; 
  
136 | P a g e  
 
The purple berries in the wood 
Supplied me necessary food; 
For Nature ever faithful is 
To such as trust her faithfulness. 
When the forest shall mislead me,  
When the night and morning lie,  
When sea and land refuse to feed me, 
‘Twill be time enough to die; 
Then will yet my mother yield 
A pillow in her greenest field,  
Nor the June flowers scorn to cover 
The clay of their departed lover. (lines 131–159) 
As in previous descriptions of the natural world, the landscape in which the peasant 
travels is described as helpful and active; it guides, feeds, and shelters him. As such, 
in his reply to the poet, the peasant appears to locate the value of the natural world 
firmly in the phenomenal realm, a world of physical objects. As Carl Strauch notes, 
however, the water imagery in the poet’s speech is suggestive of spiritual 
liberation, and the conclusion of these lines in the prospective death of the 
peasant, underscores this reading (166).  
The undercurrent of spirituality and metaphysicality in this final stanza is in 
fact present throughout the poem. Although it is never overt, throughout 
“Woodnotes I” the poet alludes throughout the poem to the spiritual nature of the 
peasant’s relationship to the landscape he inhabits. Many of these instances have 
been noted above, although without calling attention to their spiritual undertones. 
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In the first stanza, for example, the poet refers to the peasant as a ‘planter of 
celestial plants’ (line 26) and in stanza two he is a ‘pilgrim’ (line 66). It is at the end 
of stanza three, however, that the poet describes the spiritual nature of the 
peasant’s relationship most overtly, albeit modal vocabulary still shrouds the 
description in uncertainty: ‘Go where he will, the wise man is at home, / His hearth 
the earth, - his hall the azure dome; / Where his clear spirit leads him, there’s his 
road, / By God’s own light illumined and foreshadowed’ (lines 105–108). 
 Having become increasingly more aware of the nature of the peasant’s 
relationship to the world around him, in stanza four, the poet is ready for 
confirmation, and asks the peasant to clarify. The answer he receives is not the 
explicit reply of the Wanderer to the Solitary’s despondency in which the spiritual 
value of the natural world is unambiguously asserted. However, “Woodnotes I” 
delineates a preparation, the establishing of a groundwork through the indirect 
spiritual guidance of the peasant. The poet is, by the end of the fourth stanza, 
prepared to undertake a more intimate union with the world around him, and that 
union is the subject of the second “Woodnotes” poem. The peasant has shown 
rather than told the poet, led him by anecdote and example, and by the final stanza 
of the poem has helped transform the poet into a wonderer of nature; this 
wondering is a preparation for a higher state of knowledge (Tuerk). 
 Between them, the “Woodnotes” poems, like Nature, present an ascending 
account of the relationship between man and the natural world. The metaphysical 
undercurrent of the first poem is akin to the first stirrings of the eye of reason as 
the faculty of the understanding, that which is related to the physical, tangible 
elements of nature, begins to be surpassed. That the peasant has performed a 
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pivotal role in guiding the poet to this moment of transition ostensibly illustrates a 
similar emphasis in the first “Woodnotes” poem on what the Wanderer calls man’s 
‘social reason.’ That is to say, like Wordsworth, Emerson seems to emphasise the 
necessity of community, and not only that provided by nature, but also that which 
is offered by one’s confidence in fellow man. As in The Excursion, Emerson defines 
this man narrowly as one who exists outside of normal society and in communion 
with the natural world. A distinguishing factor between Emerson’s vision of society 
and that in The Excursion, however, is the peasant’s aforementioned aversion to 
pontification, his preference for showing rather than telling.  
“Woodnotes I” centres not on the peasant’s explanation of nature’s spiritual 
significance, but on the poet’s personal journey toward the recognition of that 
significance through observation of the peasant’s relationship to nature, through 
stories like that shared in stanza three, and through the peasant’s opaque replies to 
the poet’s questions like that featured in stanza four. If The Excursion is a 
demonstration of conversion through conversation, then “Woodnotes I” is a 
preparation through both conversation and demonstration. No conversion has 
been effected, but the poet is readied for what is revealed in “Woodnotes II.” 
 In eight stanzas, “Woodnotes II” records the narrator’s encounter with an 
animate pine tree, although the presence of the narrator is indicated only by three 
interstitial lines in which the poet reveals the narrative to be a recollection of their 
‘conversation.’ Apart from twice stating ‘Quoth the pine-tree’ (lines 3, 47) and again 
interrupting in the fifth stanza to state that ‘Once again the pine-tree sung’ (line 
188), the poet is silent. The second “Woodnotes” poem continues the ascending 
pattern of the first, building from the foundation of spiritual, social nature on which 
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“Woodnotes I” closed. Although the poem begins rooted in the physical world, with 
the first stanza reading as a catalogue of various natural objects, the fact that the 
speaker is a pine tree and the poet, as such, is listening to nature rather than 
wondering about it, presumes a level of intimacy not seen in “Woodnotes I”. 
 In stanza three, ocular metaphor predominates as the poet’s eye of reason 
first begins to open and, through his communion with nature’s speaker, the pine 
tree, he apprehends for the first time the social element in the natural world about 
which he could only speculate in “Woodnotes I.” Privy now to the ‘triumphant 
piercing sight’ (line 112) that comes when one ‘loves’ but does not ‘adulate’ nature 
(line 109), he understands for the first time the society that she offers: ‘The 
mounting sap, the shells, the sea, / All spheres, all stones, his helpers be’ (lines 110–
111). Crucially, this society with nature comes when one quits all other kinds: 
 Whoso walketh in solitude,  
And inhabiteth the wood,  
Choosing light, wave, rock, and bird, 
Before the money-loving herd,  
Into that forester shall pass,  
From these companions, power and grace. (lines 101–106) 
 With the necessity of solitude established, and the eye of reason first 
beginning to open, the pine tree’s message continues, and in the next stanza, ocular 
metaphor is traded for auditory language as the pine tree’s message transitions into 
a song. Where his earlier speech indicated the sociality of nature, this more 
transcendent, ‘mystic song’ (line 153) reveals to the poet that social nature is 
nothing more than a dream: 
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 To the open ear it sings 
Sweet the genesis of things, 
Of tendency through endless ages, 
Of star-dust and pilgrimages, 
Of rounded worlds, of space and time, 
Of the old flood’s subsiding slime, 
Of chemic matter, force, and form, 
Of poles and powers, cold, wet, and warm: 
The rushing metamorphosis,  
Dissolving all that fixture is, 
Melts things that be to things that seem,  
And solid nature to a dream. (lines 158–170) 
That the spiritual message has progressed from the sociality of nature to something 
more is apparent. Nature cannot offer community here, because it is only a dream. 
The poet is stopped short of transcendence, however, tied yet to space and to time, 
to cold, wet, and warm. 
 Stanza five brings a new caveat to transcendence, one that informs the 
poet’s ascent. Here, the pine tree commands that he ‘Speak not [his] speech my 
boughs among’ (line 189), and instead to listen with open ears to nature’s song 
which ‘Understands the universe’ (line 198). With this, the poet is prepared for the 
final precondition for transcendence, an embrace not only of solitude but a 
rejection of all society: 
 I see thee in the crowd alone;  
I will be thy companion. 
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Quit thy friends as the dead in doom, 
And build to them a final tomb;  
Let the starred shade that nightly falls 
Still celebrate their funerals,  
And the bell of beetle and of bee 
Knell their melodious memory. 
Behind thee leave thy merchandise,  
Thy churches, and thy charities…. (lines 282–291) 
Finally, without speech and only nature’s song as his guide, the poet is prepared for 
an understanding of that third significant question asked in Nature: ‘Whereto is 
matter?’.  
As in Nature, the answer to this question is transcendence. A final time, the 
pine tree asks the poet to ‘Hearken!’ (line 313) revealing the world to be nothing 
more than a ‘divine improvisation / [That] from the heart of God proceeds’ (lines 
325–326), and in an echo of Emerson’s Nature, locates God ‘in pure transparency’ 
(line 375). 
 The ascent that the pine tree traces is from the opening of the eye of reason 
to a conception of transcendence, although not a vision of it, as in the “Prospects” 
chapter of Nature. Integral to this ascent are the increasing calls to leave behind the 
world of men and all its trappings. It is only after the poet quits the world of men, 
ceases to speak, and listens to the song of nature alone, that he reaches a full 
understanding of nature’s transcendent spiritual value. This is not a conversation 
but an open ear, and one that listens not to the words of other men, but to nature’s 
woodnotes. 
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In comparing the second “Woodnotes” poem to Wordsworth’s conception 
of the Romantic triad generally, Joseph Beach declares Wordsworth to have a ‘more 
human point of view than Emerson’ (368; original emphasis). Wordsworth, he says, 
‘is primarily concerned with the way man has built up his spiritual life out of the 
inspirations of nature’ (Ibid). Given the exploration of The Excursion conducted 
above, to Beach’s interpretation I would add that Wordsworth, in this later poem, is 
interested not only in the inspirations of nature, but additionally and more so, he is 
interested in the inspirations of fellow man. The contrast between Emerson’s view 
of the world in the “Woodnotes” poems and Wordsworth’s in The Excursion is in 
fact that it is Emerson who insists that spiritual life be built from nature and from 
nature alone, while Wordsworth’s more human point of view declares nature alone 
to be insufficient. In engaging with the dramatic element in Wordsworth’s 
Excursion, Emerson first posits spiritual growth as a conversation with fellow man, 
only to abandon that for what R.A. Yoder aptly describes as a ‘question-and-answer 
encounter between the poet and nature’ (120). 
 
‘There lives no man of Nature’s worth / In the Circle of the 
Earth’ 
  
 In the “Woodnotes” poems, Emerson’s intellectual and creative detachment 
from Wordsworth is established through his revision of the dramatic or dialogic 
element in The Excursion. In both Wordsworth’s poem and Emerson’s texts, this 
dramatic element plays a constitutive role, informing the account of the Romantic 
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triad found in the works. For Wordsworth, the conversion through conversation 
that occurs in The Excursion exemplifies his redefined social or “Wordsworthian” 
triad. Nature, insufficient to  ‘“keep” / Heights which the soul is competent to gain’ 
(lines 138–139), must be attended by participation in human life and specifically, 
rural and humble life, rather than that of the city. 
 What Beach calls Wordsworth’s ‘more human point of view’ is ostensibly 
found in “Woodnotes I” in the relationship between the poet and the peasant, a 
relationship that clearly echoes and parallels that of the Poet and the Wanderer in 
The Excursion (368). Like Wordsworth’s Wanderer, Emerson’s Wonderer guides the 
poet spiritually, revealing to him the true value of the natural world. Specifically, 
the wondering (and wandering) peasant leads the poet to a transitional moment – 
to the moment of the eye of reason’s first stirrings. Although “Woodnotes I” 
presents a conversation of sorts between two figures, it is not a true dialogue and 
furthermore, the peasant’s instruction or guidance is by example and anecdote 
rather than a didactic narrative like that found in “Despondency Corrected.” As 
shown above, the poet’s true dialogue and the only one of note in the account of 
the world presented ascendingly across the two “Woodnotes” poems, is his 
dialogue with the natural world. More accurately, in fact, Emerson presents an 
account of the triad in which man does not converse with nature, but instead 
listens. 
 Engaging with the dramatic element present in The Excursion, Emerson 
turns the notion of conversion through conversation on its head in “Woodnotes II,” 
ostensibly presenting the song of nature as a dialogue. In this song, the 
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preconditions for a recognition of nature’s spiritual value are an open ear and silent 
tongue, and not only a quitting of the city for rural life, but extreme self-reliance 
from all forms and symbols of society from merchandise to religion, to fellow man. 
The pine tree is most explicit when he states, ‘There lives no man of Nature’s worth 
/ In the circle of the earth’ (lines 255–256). Using a formal element from 
Wordsworth’s poem against him, as it were, Emerson performs his central 
detachment from the British writer’s poetic influence and, more specifically, his 
influence as a philosophic poet. 
 As in Nature, Emerson’s confrontation of and performance of detachment 
from the personal influence wielded by Wordsworth is attended by an attention to 
notions of nation. Yoder has referred to the forester of the first “Woodnotes” poem 
as a ‘specifically American hero,’ and it is true that the landscape to which this 
figure is tied in “Woodnotes I” is firmly rooted in an American landscape, that of 
New England more specifically. Turning the British critique of the American 
backwoodsman into a positive, Emerson presents the rural peasant as a spiritual 
guide and model. However, it is in “Woodnotes II” in which Emerson launches his 
most potent and explicit defence against British taunts of historical and cultural 
lack. Again, transcendence, the goal of the individual’s self-reliant interaction with 
nature, is defined temporally (and spatially) as an eradication of the past through 
emphasis on the present and on the moment. Man without reason is man 
‘misplaced, mistimed’ (line 236) and a ‘fool of space and time’ (line 194). By way of 
contrast, the song that nature sings is one outside of time, older than it (line 280), 
and a witness to its alternative, eternity (line 371).  
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As in Nature, Emerson combines what Weisbuch terms vertical time and 
futurism, and an emphasis on the power of the present moment to render the 
world transparent is attended by an emphasis on a prospective future. That is to 
say, the immediacy or proximity of the pine tree’s vision,  
[God] is the essence that inquires. 
He is the axis of the star;  
He is the heart of every creature; 
He is the meaning of each feature; 
And his mind is the sky,  
Than all it holds more deep, more high. (lines 377–383; emphasis added) 
is joined by an emphasis on its future revelation to us. This futurism is made clear 
from the poem’s opening stanza, in which the pine tree looks forward to a day 
when 
…once again 
O’er the grave of men 
We shall talk to each other again, 
Of the old age behind, 
Of the time out of mind,  
Which shall come again. (lines 35–40) 
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These temporal reimaginings in part constitute Emerson’s confrontation of the 
specifically national influence that Wordsworth as a British writer wields, and of 
British influence more generally. These rethinkings are attended, however, by a far 
more overt confrontation and attempted nullification of America’s cultural lack, 
tied again to notions of futurism. 
 In the poem’s third stanza, the pine tree locates prospective visionary 
capabilities in an explicitly American landscape. More specifically, he locates this 
vision in the natural prospect represented by the Edenic promise of the Western 
frontier: 
 Westward I ope the forest gates,  
The train along the railroad skates; 
It leaves the land behind like ages past,  
The foreland flows to it in river fast; 
Missouri I have made a mart,  
I teach Iowa Saxon art. (lines 83–88) 22 
Later, the pine tree will not emphasise American prospects but rather the 
insufficiency of other models, and specifically those of language, cataloguing 
predominately Western European examples rendered null by nature’s universal 
tongue: 
                                                     
22 The echoes in line 84 of the extract of Wordsworth’s ice skating scene in The Prelude are worth noting, if only 
in passing. 
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 My branches speak Italian,  
English, German, Basque, Castilian,  
Mountain speech to Highlanders,  
Ocean tongues to islanders,  
To Fin and Lap and swart Malay,  
To each his bosom-secret say. (lines 206–211) 
In Yoder’s analysis of the poem, these lines constitute a call ‘to return, not of course 
to the courtly languages of Europe, but to the Pentecostal and universal 
tongue…which is the language of nature’ (122). Although Yoder calls this a return, 
we have seen in Nature that the past and future are for Emerson one and the same, 
a fact that Eric J. Sundquist identifies as a specifically American quality, a result of 
the fact that, for the nineteenth century citizen of the expanding United States, 
‘going back and going forth, are the same: the primitive is Past, but it is also West, 
and West is Future’ (45). This uniquely American conflation of time and space, of 
escaping (and simultaneously embracing) the past through geographical movement, 
is at the heart of Emerson’s second “Woodnotes” poem, and lends new significance 
to the Westward movement noted by the pine above, and its description: ‘It leaves 
the land behind like ages past.’ Emerson embraces and utilises the prospective 
nature of the American landscape of the nineteenth century not only in order to 
nullify the past, but to secure future American ascendancy of both culture and 
spirit. That this ascendancy has literary implications is made explicit in the leading 
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essay of Emerson’s Essays Second Series, published three years after “Woodnotes 
II.” In this essay, Emerson writes: 
Our logrolling, our stumps and their politics, our fisheries, our Negroes and 
Indians, our boats and our repudiations, the wrath of rogues and the 
pusillanimity of honest men, the northern trade, the southern planting, the 
western clearing, Oregon and Texas, are yet unsung. Yet America is a poem 
in our eyes; its ample geography dazzles the imagination, and it will not wait 
long for metres. (CW 3:22) 
Emerson’s “Woodnotes” poems combine antagonistic personal engagement with 
attention to ideas of nation and the cultivation of a national identity. As in Nature, 
the two elements exist simultaneously and alongside one another, neither taking 
precedence over the other.  
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Emerson’s Representative Men 
and Carlyle’s On Heroes, Hero-
Worship, and the Heroic in History 
 
 In their explorations of Thomas Carlyle’s influence on Emerson’s works, 
Patrick Keane, David Greenham, and Richard Gravil focus predominately on the 
Scottish writer’s significance as a transmitter of German idealism. For Keane, Carlyle 
is of significance to Emerson for his ‘entanglements with’ and ‘filter[ing]’ of German 
idealism, presented most overtly in Carlyle’s early work, Sartor Resartus (Keane 83, 
37). In Emerson’s Transatlantic Romanticism, Greenham also centres his exploration 
of Carlyle’s significance to Emerson on the influence wielded by Sartor Resartus. 
Specifically, Greenham considers traces of the text’s influence in Emerson’s essay, 
Nature, particularly in regard to Emerson’s ‘epistemology of form’ – Sartor Resartus 
became a model for Emerson’s ‘way of answering philosophical questions using the 
flexibility of metaphorical expression’ (45). Gravil, too, notes the influence of 
Carlyle’s early text on Emerson’s inaugural essay, summarising that influence 
through a reading of the essay’s “Introduction”: 
[In Nature,] Emerson fuses three of Sartor’s themes in his own introduction: 
the adjuration to escape from the bondage of old clothes; the theme of 
supernatural bases of the natural, which emerges in later chapters as a 
3 
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major thesis; and a Fichtean definition of nature as encompassing “all which 
philosophy distinguishes as the NOT ME.”’ (Romantic Dialogues 94) 
The shared focus of these three transatlantic scholars on Sartor Resartus’ influence 
illustrates what is indeed one of Emerson’s most significant inheritances from 
Carlyle – his transcendental thought. More specifically, this scholarship 
demonstrates the significance of Carlyle’s early text specifically to the American 
writer. 
 Emerson’s affinity for Carlyle’s philosophical novel is immediate. Upon his 
first encounter with the text in 1834, Emerson is enthusiastic enough about the 
work to write a letter to the Scottish writer relaying his praise. Emerson explains 
that his admiration for Sartor Resartus derives from its ability, and the ability of its 
author, to ‘[dispense] that which is rarest, namely, the simplest truths, truths which 
lie next to consciousness,’ truths that, according to Emerson, ‘only the Platos and 
Goethes perceive’ (Correspondence 99).23 In light of Emerson’s admiration for the 
intellect and the expressive talents of both Goethe and Plato, this is the highest of 
compliments. Emerson concludes his praise by thanking Carlyle for the ‘brave stand 
[he] made for Spiritualism in these writings’ (Correspondence 98). 
 Significant in itself for the high praise of Sartor Resartus it contains, 
Emerson’s letter is also important for in its inauguration of a correspondence 
between the two writers that would last for nearly four decades between 1834 and 
1872. That Emerson felt compelled to re-establish a connection with the writer less 
than a year after their first meeting at Craiggenputtock, and that he does so on the 
                                                     
23 Emerson would go on to become Carlyle’s American literary agent of sorts, organising the publication of an 
American edition of Sartor Resartus. 
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basis of his affinity for Carlyle’s transcendental thought, reveals the significance of 
Carlyle’s novel, specifically in the period during which Emerson was in the process 
of composing Nature. However, while Sartor Resartus certainly had a significant 
influence on Emerson’s early essay, as traced by the work of the aforementioned 
scholars among others, and while Keane has shown that traces of its influence can 
also be found in Emerson’s Divinity School Address and in the poem “Threnody,” 
Emerson does not engage directly and antagonistically in these works with Sartor 
Resartus specifically. When Emerson does engage antagonistically and directly with 
one work of Carlyle’s, that text is On Heroes. In this engagement in Representative 
Men, Emerson interacts not with Carlyle’s ideal conception of the world but with 
Carlyle’s account of history – its definition, its movement, its function, and most 
significantly, the individual’s ideal manner of interacting with it. 
 One might wonder, then, if Sartor Resartus had such a significant impact on 
the American writer during the period in which he was composing a seminal essay 
and one founded on the very transcendental thought that is found in the Scottish 
writer’s text, why Nature demonstrates an antagonistic engagement with Aids to 
Reflection rather than Sartor Resartus. In other words, why was Carlyle’s novel 
apparently a less potent source of anxiety for Emerson than Coleridge’s text at the 
time and indeed throughout his literary career? One answer to this question can be 
found by returning to Emerson’s inaugural letter which, in addition to its effusive 
praise, also contains revelatory criticism of Carlyle’s text.  
Aimed predominately at what Emerson calls ‘the oddity of the vehicle’ 
chosen to convey the ‘treasure’ of Carlyle’s message in Sartor Resartus, Emerson’s 
criticism of the text is formal, and he suggests to Carlyle that ‘[a]t least in some of 
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your prefaces you should give us the theory of your rhetoric’ (Correspondence 99). 
‘I comprehend not why you should lavish in that spendthrift style of yours celestial 
truths,’ he continues, ‘Bacon and Plato have something too solid to say than that 
they can afford to be humorists’ (Ibid). That Emerson identified a certain oddity in 
the vehicle of the Carlyle’s otherwise congenial message significantly impacts the 
potency of Sartor Resartus as a source of influence and as a source of anxiety, 
particularly in regard to Emerson’s task in Nature specifically. As we have seen 
previously, Emerson intended his inaugural essay to be an exposition of his first 
philosophy, a treatise regarding his understanding of the relationship between 
man, nature, and God. As a source of guidance and as a source from which he could 
also detach or turn away, Emerson turned to Coleridge, whom he understood to be 
the premier philosophical writer of his day, and to Aids to Reflection, a paradigmatic 
philosophical text. 
Most significantly, however, while Sartor incorporates discussions of history 
and although its central ‘biographical’ narrative conveys Carlyle’s understanding of 
history in several ways, it is a work of fiction and not a historiography. Carlyle’s 
most anxiety-inducing influence for Emerson issues not from the transcendental 
elements of his thought but from his ideas regarding a subject to which the Scottish 
writer arguably paid far more attention throughout his career; Emerson’s most 
anxiety-inducing inheritance or assimilation from Carlyle is his understanding of 
history.  
German idealism was transmitted to Emerson through several sources of 
which Carlyle is only one and not the most significant. Emerson’s thoughts on 
biographical history, however, a subject for which he showed a literary interest as 
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early as his biographical lectures of 1835, and a topic of conversation in many of his 
letters with Carlyle, is dominated in two manners by Carlyle’s influence.  
Firstly, Carlyle was a premier historical thinker of his day. The Scottish writer 
published numerous works on the subject of history, from his early conceptual 
explorations of the subject in essays like “On History” (1830) and “On History 
Again” (1833), to his later historiographical works of which On Heroes is one of 
many, including the aforementioned French Revolution which Emerson in 1838. This 
is to say that Emerson gravitated toward Carlyle’s historical works and would have 
felt the anxiety that comes with being pulled into the orbit of another thinker, 
regardless of his eventual friendship with the Scottish writer. This friendship, 
however, is the second and perhaps most significant factor in the anxiety-inducing 
influence of Carlyle’s biographical understanding of history. In the following pages, I 
will trace in detail the nature of the writers’ correspondence in the years prior to 
the publication of Representative Men to demonstrate that, in addition to Carlyle’s 
published writing on historical subjects, the anxiety-inducing nature of the Scottish 
writer’s influence is exacerbated by his actual efforts to influence Emerson and his 
writing, to make Emerson a man of concrete subjects rather than a writer of 
abstraction. In confronting Carlyle in the pages of Representative Men, Emerson 
confronts not only the anxiety-inducing nature of his intellectual proximity 
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‘I long to see some concrete thing’: Emerson, Carlyle, and their 
Correspondence 
 
 To begin this discussion of Carlyle’s and Emerson’s correspondence, I would 
like to return briefly to their opening exchange of 1833 and more specifically to 
Carlyle’s response to Emerson’s criticism of Sartor Resartus expressed in the 
American’s writer’s inaugural letter. Although Carlyle does not acknowledge the 
content of what he deems Emerson’s ‘saucy’ objections to formal, rhetorical, and 
stylistic elements of the novel, the Scottish writer responds with a similarly 
disparaging account of his own work: 
In any case, God be thanked, I am done with it; can wash my hands of it, and 
send it forth; sure that the Devil will get his full share of it, and not a whit 
more, clutch as he may. But as for you, my Transoceanic Brothers, read this 
earnestly, for it was earnestly meant and written, and contains 
no voluntary falsehood of mine. (Correspondence 103; original emphasis) 
Carlyle’s willingness to wash his hands of Sartor Resartus can be at least partially 
explained by the fact that, despite its recent publication at the time of Emerson’s 
letter, Carlyle had in fact composed Sartor Resartus some years earlier; the Scottish 
writer had long since moved on (Harris 48).24 Carlyle admits as much to his 
American correspondent, writing of the work, ‘…I wrote it four years ago, and could 
not now so write it, and on the whole… “will do better another time”’ 
(Correspondence 103). Carlyle’s final comment also locates Sartor Resartus in a 
                                                     
24 After significant struggles composing the text, Carlyle then encountered difficulties in publishing itand it 
remained in manuscript form from June 1831 until October 1833 when it was finally published serially in 
Fraser’s Magazine. Robert Tarr discusses at length Carlyle’s struggle in both composing and publishing Sartor 
Resartus (xlii–lxxv). 
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broader exploration, one defined by Carlyle’s exploration of the ideal mode of 
literary expression and of what it means to be a writer. Elsewhere in his letter he 
will more specifically locate the work and all contemporary works of literature in a 
more general nadir, declaring his belief that humanity has exhausted all literary 
platforms presently available: 
For you are to know, my view is that now at last we have lived to see all 
manner of Poetics and Rhetorics and Sermonics, and one may say generally 
all manner of Pulpits for addressing mankind from, as good as broken and 
abolished: alas, yes! if you have any earnest meaning which demands to be 
not only listened to, but believed and done, you cannot (at least I cannot) 
utter it there, but the sound sticks in my throat, as when a solemnity 
were felt to have become a mummery; and so one leaves the pasteboard 
coulisses, and three unities, and Blair's Lectures, quite behind; and feels only 
that there is nothing sacred, then, but the Speech of Man to believing Men! 
(Correspondence 103–104; original emphasis) 
Carlyle’s revelation is significant because it situates his later historiographical works 
in an self-described atmosphere of literary experimentation. It is also significant 
simply for what it reveals about Carlyle’s thoughts regarding the state of literature 
and of writing. These sentiments undoubtedly influenced Carlyle’s interactions with 
Emerson and, more specifically, inspired his calls for the American writer to 
embrace a new style alongside new subjects.  
Carlyle’s 1834 letter is also significant for its revelation of the new subject to 
which he has personally turned in attempting to renovate the broken modes of 
expression available to modern writers:  
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Finally, I am busy, constantly studying with my whole might for a Book on 
the French Revolution. It is part of my creed that the Only Poetry is History, 
could we tell it right. This truth (if it prove one) I have not yet got to the 
limitations of; and shall in no way except by trying it in practice. 
(Correspondence 105) 
Readers should understand Carlyle’s new choice of subject in relation to the 
Scottish writer’s more hopeful suggestion in his letter to Emerson that, despite the 
current expressive trough in which humanity finds itself, day will come when the 
mind will ‘anew environ itself with fit modes’ (Correspondence 104). Carlyle 
explicitly situates his new historiographical works in this atmosphere of hope and 
experimentation, revealing that since completing Sartor Resartus, he has ‘been 
trying, am still trying, other methods, and shall surely get nearer the truth, as I 
honestly strive for it’ (Correspondence 104). That is to say, while his account of 
literature first appears pessimistic, Carlyle believes that a new literary form, one 
correspondent to the sacred nature of that which is spoken, will eventually be 
discovered. More specifically, Carlyle believes that the secret to this new form of 
expression is history. This is not to suggest that Carlyle promotes looking to history 
for models of writing. Rather, he promotes the expression of history itself; Carlyle’s 
historiographical writing is in fact decidedly novel insofar as it embraces new 
Victorian techniques.25 
In this first letter, the opposition between Sartor Resartus and Carlyle’s new 
historical works, The French Revolution and The Diamond Necklace, presages an 
                                                     
25 For more information on Carlyle’s embrace of new Victorian historiographical techniques, and of the 
development of these new approaches more generally, see Juliette Atkinson’s Victorian Biography 
Reconsidered (2010). 
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opposition found throughout Emerson’s and Carlyle’s correspondence. Letters 
reveal that Carlyle considers many of Emerson’s works to be representative of an 
expressive mode and an attention to subjects that the Scottish writer had long since 
left behind following the composition and publication of Sartor Resartus, and which 
he associates with the outdated and insufficient modes of the past. As we have 
seen from his first letter to Emerson, the literary future as Carlyle understands it is 
historiography, and in expressing his opinions of almost all of Emerson’s major 
works prior to the publication of Representative Men – Nature, the American 
Scholar Address, the Divinity School Address, and Essays First Series – Carlyle 
encourages Emerson in this new direction. It is against this influence, in addition to 
the congeniality of thought represented by Carlyle’s biographical conception of 
history, that Emerson positions Representative Men, finally responding to Carlyle’s 
criticism of nearly two decades that is traced below. 
 
Upon the publication of Emerson’s first major work, Nature, in 1836, what 
Carlyle understands to be the abstract quality of Emerson’s inaugural essay informs 
the Scottish writer’s tepid response to the text. Carlyle’s comments are admittedly 
positive and complimentary of Emerson’s talents, and he describes the American 
writer as having ‘an ear for the Ewigen Melodien, which pipe in the winds round us,’ 
a comment that coincidentally echoes language Emerson uses in his 1834 letter to 
describe Carlyle’s talents (Correspondence 147).26 However, Carlyle dedicates only  
a single sentence to Emerson’s essay in one letter, and he introduces his comments 
                                                     
26 In his 1834 letter, Emerson writes ‘Believe then that harp and ear are formed by one revolution of the wheel; 
that men are waiting to hear your epical song; and so be pleased to skip those excursive involved glees, and 
give us the simple air, without the volley of variations’ (Correspondence 99). 
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without fanfare between discussion of new editions of Sartor Resartus and 
complaints regarding his latest troubles with ‘the unutterable French Revolution!’ 
(Correspondence 158). While Carlyle is impressed by Emerson’s talent, he has little 
constructive commentary to offer regarding the content of the essay, presumably 
because he disapproves of it or has little to say regarding its abstract subject 
matter.  
One year later, Carlyle is significantly more enthusiastic in his reaction to 
Emerson’s American Scholar Address, and he dedicates a large portion of a letter to 
expounding his compliments: 
…out of the West comes a clear utterance, clearly recognizable as a man's 
voice, and I have a kinsman and brother: God be thanked for it! I could have 
wept to read that speech; the clear high melody of it went tingling through 
my heart… My brave Emerson! And all this has been lying silent, quite 
tranquil in him, these seven years, and the "vociferous platitude" dinning his 
ears on all sides, and he quietly answering no word; and a whole world of 
Thought has silently built itself in these calm depths, and, the day being 
come, says quite softly, as if it were a common thing, "Yes, I am here too." 
(Correspondence 173; original emphasis) 
In the American Scholar Address, Emerson is emphatic and most importantly he is a 
social critic; to this Carlyle responds enthusiastically. For Carlyle, Nature is the 
necessary but ultimately unfinished ‘Foundation and Ground-plan’ of Emerson’s 
work, while the American Scholar Address is true and high melody, a representation 
of the heights to which Emerson can ascend if he only builds on that foundation 
(Correspondence 147). Emerson’s American Scholar Address considers man and 
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society, and man in society, ‘Man Thinking,’ not to be confused with ‘the mere 
thinker’ (CW 1:53). Emerson’s exploration of Man Thinking is a call to action; he 
calls upon America, the ‘sluggard continent,’ to aspire to new intellectual heights, 
to actively live up to this potential. And although Emerson points his finger at 
America specifically in the Address, his critique extends to all those ‘men in the 
world of to-day’ who are ‘bugs, are spawn, and are called “the mass” and “the 
herd”’ (CW 1:65). In Carlyle’s eyes, however, Emerson does not again ascend to 
these heights in the early years of his career, and Carlyle’s subsequent letters to the 
American writer record numerous attempts to push him back toward more 
substantial, pertinent subjects like those discussed in the American Scholar 
Address. 
Perhaps the most notable of Carlyle’s attempts to sway Emerson is his 
response to Emerson’s 1838 Divinity School Address. In a letter, Carlyle explicitly 
defines his exception to the text in terms of Emerson’s tendency toward 
abstraction, that is to say, Emerson’s tendency to resort to descriptions of things 
rather than presenting readers with true revelation. As a corrective, Carlyle 
suggests that Emerson adopt more ‘concrete’ topics and offers history as a specific 
alternative to Emerson’s universal abstractions: 
You tell us with piercing emphasis, that a man’s soul is great; shew us a 
great soul of a man…I long to see some concrete Thing, some Event, Man’s 
Life, American Forest, or piece of Creation, which this Emerson loves and 
wonders at, well Emersonized, depictured by Emerson, filled with the life of 
Emerson, and cast forth from him then to live by itself. (Correspondence 
215; original emphasis) 
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In both Kenneth Marc Harris’s and Robert Weisbuch’s interpretations, Carlyle’s 
critique of the Divinity School Address constitutes a challenge to the American 
writer (Atlantic Double-Cross 179; Emerson and Carlyle 48). In this vein, we might 
consider “History,” an essay Emersonpublished in 1841, at least in part as an 
acceptance of this challenge. In this text, Emerson defines history in explicitly 
Carlylean terms, stating that there is ‘properly no history; only biography’ (CW 2:6). 
However, in this essay, while Emerson explores and  ‘debunk[s]’ traditional 
approaches to historical scholarship, he does not in fact approach history practically 
as he does in Representative Men (Atlantic Double-Cross 179). That is to say, he 
does not take events or the lives of men as his subjects, but instead, like Carlyle in 
“On History” and “On History Again,” considers history conceptually. Thus, while 
“History” might be considered a partial acceptance of Carlyle’s challenge to 
Emersonize more concrete topics, it is not until the publication of Representative 
Men that Emerson truly accepts Carlyle’s challenge and, in doing so, responds to 
Carlyle’s repeated critiques.  
Prior to the publication of Representative Men, however, Carlyle’s criticism 
continues, and in 1841 appears to escalate when it finds its way from the pages of 
Emerson’s and Carlyle’s private correspondence into the public sphere. In his 
preface to the British edition of Emerson’s Essays First Series (1841), Carlyle is not 
overtly critical of the text that he introduces. In fact, ostensibly, his remarks are 
complimentary of Emerson. Carlyle states that the strength of Emerson’s Essays lies 
in the fact that the text provides ‘a direct glimpse into the man and that spiritual 
world of his’ and is ‘the soliloquy of one true soul, alone under the stars’ (x, xi). 
Such gifts of spiritual insight appear positive, but Carlyle emphasises that Emerson’s 
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insights are his alone, relating only to his own soul, under the stars. In the preface 
Carlyle is also conspicuously inattentive to the philosophical value of Emerson’s 
essays, an omission that seems to be quite telling, particularly in light of Carlyle’s 
concluding remarks: 
What Emerson’s talent is, we will not altogether estimate by this Book. The 
utterance is abrupt, fitful; the great idea not yet embodied struggles 
towards an embodiment. Yet everywhere there is the true heart of a man; 
which is the parent of all talent… (xii).  
In short, Carlyle applauds Emerson’s potential, but is clear that he considers these 
essays to be a poor example and use of Emerson’s talents. 
 In 1845, Emerson reveals in a letter the first hints of the lecture series that 
would eventually be published in 1850 as Representative Men. In a letter in which 
the opening subject is the publication of Carlyle’s Miscellanies in America, Emerson 
concludes with an almost offhand mention of what, after over a decade of Carlyle’s 
insistence, ostensibly constitutes an acquiescence to the Scottish writer. Emerson’s 
words, as we have seen previously in regard to The Excursion, are almost 
performative in their indifference. In this instance, however, Emerson’s affectation 
of insignificance is directed at his own work. In a paragraph that begins with talk of 
his garden ‘shamefully overgrown with weeds,’ and includes a brief mention of 
Emerson’s attempts at poetry (‘Fear not, dear friend, you shall not have to read one 
line’), he concludes with the following statements: 
Meantime, I think to set a few heads before me, as good texts for winter 
evening entertainments. I wrote a deal about Napoleon a few months ago, 
after reading a library of memoirs. Now I have Plato, Montaigne, and 
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Swedenborg, and more in the clouds behind. What news of Naseby and 
Worcester? (Correspondence 379) 
From his self-deprecating account of these essays as good only for ‘winter evening 
entertainments’ to his abrupt transition to new topics with the letter’s concluding 
query, it appears that Emerson does all he can to trivialise his latest project. 
Although Emerson directs this minimising language at his own work, the true target 
of Emerson’s indifference is, albeit indirectly, the influence wielded by a British 
writer of temporal and intellectual proximity. In diminishing these biographical 
studies of historical great men Emerson also minimises the significance of his turn 
toward these subjects as an acquiescence to years of Carlyle’s exhortations. 
 Carlyle’s response to Emerson’s revelation is, as expected, is enthusiastic: 
‘Very glad shall I be, my Friend, to have some new utterances from you either in 
verse or in prose!’ he writes (Correspondence 380). As is typical, however, the 
Scottish writer accompanies enthusiasm with counsel, offering a suggestion to 
supplement Emerson’s list of historical figures: 
I wish you would take an American Hero, one whom you really love; and 
give us a History of him,—make an artistic bronze statue (in good words) of 
his Life and him! I do indeed.—But speak of what you will, you are welcome 
to me. Once more I say, No other voice in this wide waste world seems to 
my sad ear to be speaking at all at present. The more is the pity for us. 
(Correspondence 381) 
Although Emerson would indeed add further historical figures to his biographical 
lecture series, they would not be American. Rather, the two figures Emerson will 
add to Representative Men are Shakespeare and Napoleon, both of whom appear 
  
163 | P a g e  
 
in On Heroes as well, and in his portrayal of the latter, as we will see, Emerson 
incorporates a critique of Carlyle’s whole system of history. 
 As noted in the introductory discussion to this thesis, while Carlyle records 
his appreciation for the ‘portraitures full of likeness’ found in Representative Men, 
in a letter to Emerson he also conveys his disagreement with certain aspects of the 
text, namely the ‘end of all these Essays’ (Correspondence 460). Emerson never 
responds to the criticism recorded in Carlyle’s 1850 letter, nor does he respond to 
another correspondence from Carlyle sent a month later. In fact, Carlyle’s letter 
regarding Representative Men marks a period of over a year in which the two 
writers do not correspond, not resuming communication again until 28 July, 1851. 
This period of silence is followed by a general decline in their written 
communication throughout the 1850s and 1860s.27  
The concurrence of a decline in the writers’ correspondence and the 
publication of Representative Men is perhaps only coincidental. However, the 
following exploration of Emerson’s text alongside On Heroes suggests that by 1850 
Emerson and Carlyle have reached an unnavigable ideological impasse. While the 
American writer assimilates Carlyle’s biographical understanding of history as a 
foundation to this own account of history and of the individual’s relationship to it, 
he departs in Representative Men from Carlyle’s thought on several grounds. The 
fundamental ground of all of Emerson’s detachments, however, is his refusal to 
                                                     
27 Highlighting this decline is a comparison of the number of letters exchanged before and after the publication 
of Representative Men. Over the course of the 1830s and 1840s, the first two decades of their correspondence, 
Emerson and Carlyle exchanged 141 letters. In the following decade between 1850 and 1860, the pair 
exchanged only 47. 
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conform to Carlyle’s understanding of hero-worship, a facet of the Scottish writer’s 
understanding of history that permeates all other areas of his philosophy of history. 
 
Economy, Individualism, and History in Representative Men 
and On Heroes 
  
The following discussion centres on the connection Carlyle draws in On 
Heroes between changes in society’s morals, religion, and politics – that is, society’s 
descent into chaos – and its steady progress toward what he views as extreme 
individualism. Carlyle in turn links this individualism to the rise of the market 
economy under which production and consumption have become ‘empty 
procedures in which people become aware only of objects and lose sight of any 
social unity’ (Garofalo 295). Carlyle seizes upon the emergent vocabulary of the 
market to enact a critique of this change and to assert the modern hero-king as an 
ameliorative alternative. As such, Carlyle’s emphasis on the political hero is, as we 
will see, an attempt not only to reassume the divine, transcendent authority lost in 
society’s decline, but also to return order and unity to what he views as modern 
chaos and the disunity of individualism through organising hero-worship.  
 In Representative Men, Emerson, like Carlyle, notes the selfishness of the 
modern era and similarly links society’s self-interest to its growing dependence on 
the market economy. However, while Carlyle asserts that the answer to consuming 
self-interest is the reorganisation of society into organic hierarchical structures, 
Emerson suggests that individuals need more independence. The individual must 
learn that great men do not exist to be worshipped, but rather to be surpassed by 
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greater men and greater achievements. Thus, in Representative Men, consumption, 
an act to which the text repeatedly refers, is a positive one that describes the 
individual’s ideal interaction with the genius of humanity of which history is 
comprised. Emerson’s revision and subversion of Carlyle’s economic vocabulary and 
its relationship to hero-worship constitutes both his detachment from Carlyle’s 
conception of history and from On Heroes, and the American writer’s original 
creation. 
 
Production and Consumption in On Heroes 
 
In his assessment of Carlyle’s historiographical works, Chris Vanden Bossche 
describes how each of they 
…represent an attempt to resolve dilemmas raised by what [Carlyle] and his 
contemporaries perceived as a revolutionary shift of authority in virtually all 
realms of discourse and institutions of power in Western Europe. From his 
vantage point, it appeared not only that authority had shifted, but that the 
transcendental grounds for it had been undermined. (1) 
The shift in authority to which Vanden Bossche refers in this instance is the 
transition away from hierarchical power structures such as those that marked 
medieval feudalism, and their subsequent replacement with ‘democratic and 
individualistic institutions’ (Ibid). For Carlyle, hierarchical society is marked by order 
and productivity in which the individual enjoys a ‘mystified attachment’ to the 
leader (Garofalo 295). Modern society, on the other hand, is the picture of self-
interest in which disorder reigns and community is dissolved. For this loss of 
  
166 | P a g e  
 
community and the promulgation of destructive self-interest Carlyle blames liberal 
capitalism which has left society without hierarchical power structures and a 
centralised authority to ‘[energize] social relations’ (Garofalo 295). 
 In addition to the collapse of traditional hierarchical power structures and 
loss of community, Carlyle associates capitalism and attendant self-interest with 
moral decline. In turn, he suggests, moral decline leads to chaos. In On Heroes, 
Carlyle presents the eighteenth century as the period in which this decline became 
most apparent. Discussing this period in “The Hero as a Man of Letters,” Carlyle 
uses the term chaos more frequently than in any other chapter, emphasising this 
century as the seat of modern problems.28  
Throughout Carlyle’s oeuvre, violence is presented as a manifestation of 
such social chaos and a reflection of society’s lack of necessary power structures. In 
Past and Present, Carlyle describes how the modern English population, ‘isolated, 
unrelated, girt in with a cold universal Laissez Faire,’ descends into violence (181). 
This violence is dictated by self-interest and lack of community like that which 
characterises the ‘Manchester Insurrection’ discussed in Book I of the text, or the 
disturbances caused by Chartism to which Carlyle’s text also refers. Similar 
references can be found in On Heroes, particularly in relation to the violence of the 
French Revolution and to the English Civil Wars. Another earlier exploration of the 
violent intersection between what Carlyle perceives as modern political, moral, and 
economic decline is found in The French Revolution (1837).  
                                                     
28 Interestingly, equally pervasive in this chapter are references to the chaos of writing, or what Carlyle refers to 
as the ‘chaos of Authorship’ and the ‘wild welter of a chaos which is called Literary Life’ (OH 158). It seems that 
there is an interesting connection to be made between Carlyle’s distrust of individualism and his feelings 
regarding his own profession. 
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In The French Revolution Carlyle accepts the necessity of France’s revolution 
insofar as it allowed for a transition from false to true in terms of moral authority. 
Such sanctioning of revolution as a method of moral and political cleansing is found 
in Carlyle’s work as early as Sartor Resartus in Teufelsdrockh’s understanding that 
‘old sick Society should be deliberately burnt…in the faith that she is a Phoenix’ (SR 
175). From the ashes of society, says Teufelsdrockh, a ‘new heaven-born young 
one’ will arise (Ibid). Although Teufelsdrockh makes no explicit reference to 
violence in this instance the notion of revolution, of the destruction of the very 
fabric and foundation of society, is implied. Unfortunately, according to Carlyle in 
The French Revolution, out of the ashes of France’s sick society, nothing new or 
heaven-born emerged. Instead, following the revolution, France was ruled by what 
Carlyle calls ‘the law of Hunger,’ a hunger ‘for all sweet things,’ knowing only that 
‘Pleasure is pleasant’ (French Revolution 39).  
Democratised and thus without a true authority either moral or political, the 
hunger into which the French population descends following the revolution is an 
abandonment to selfish desires and self-interest. References to cannibalism or self-
devouring predominate in The French Revolution, marking what Charles Vanden 
Bossche calls ‘social autophagy,’ or the idea that, without a ruler to cohere and to 
structure it, society will resort to self-destructive cannibalism (85). For Carlyle, the 
French Revolution is unequivocal evidence of this fact with the fraternitè swiftly 
turning against one another, brother sending brother to the guillotine during the 
Reign of Terror.29  
                                                     
29 For a detailed analysis of the imagery of cannibalism in The French Revolution, see Charles Vanden Bossche 
pp.83–86. 
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Carlyle’s references to hunger and (self-)devouring echo the language of the 
free marketplace, implicating economic as well as political change in France’s 
descent into violent chaos. This language and its use in relation to political and 
social strife persists in On Heroes in descriptions of the French Revolution as a 
‘great devouring, self-devouring’ event (OH 206), and in Carlyle’s references to the 
inefficiencies of Parliamentary democracy prior to Cromwell’s Protectorate: 
You sixty men there, becoming fast odious, even despicable, to the whole 
nation, whom the nation already calls Rump Parliament, you cannot 
continue to sit there: who or what then is to follow? "Free Parliament," right 
of Election, Constitutional Formulas of one sort or the other,—the thing is a 
hungry Fact coming on us, which we must answer or be devoured by it! (OH 
198) 
Carlyle’s disdain for democratic institutions here is clear, and it is no surprise that 
both this quotation and Carlyle’s aforementioned references to consumption are 
found alongside repeated references to chaos in the final chapter of On Heroes, 
that which is dedicated to ’The Hero as King’. Without the community-building that 
religious authority once wielded or the hierarchical structures of the feudal past, 
and with the new threats of individualising political and economic structures, 
Carlyle suggests that society requires a new kind of hero, a hero for the modern 
age, whose power and influence is political: the hero king. Carlyle examples this 
modern hero with two figures, Oliver Cromwell and Napoleon Bonaparte. 
 Carlyle’s hero-king commands moral authority implicitly because, for 
Carlyle, ‘there is no act more moral between men than that of rule and obedience’ 
and because faith is ‘loyalty to some inspired teacher, some inspired hero’ (OH 171; 
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12). But Carlyle also aligns the motivation of his hero-kings with their desire to 
reinstate religious structures, or to protect these structures against attacks. 
Cromwell’s actions, for example, are said to have been prompted by the desire to 
return England to a Christian path amidst the ‘sufferings of God’s Church,’ and 
Napoleon is described as having been ‘fighting for God and religion in an age when 
God was no longer believed’ (OH 218; 230). Furthermore, these motivations are not 
the hero-kings’ own, but rather the product of a divine decree; these heroic figures 
are instruments of God’s will (Wellek 67). 
 Napoleon and Cromwell serve a stabilising function in the chaos of modern 
society, wielding their power for good by re-establishing the hierarchy or, to use 
Carlyle’s term, ‘Heroarchy’ (OH 12; original emphasis). However, this heroarchy has 
been replaced in the modern era by ‘Democracy, Liberty, Equality, and I know not 
what: - the notes being all false’ (Ibid). The hero-kings’ stabilising effect on society 
derivess from their ability to organise the chaos into which it has descended and to 
transmit this change ‘downward through the hierarchy,’ transforming society ‘from 
above rather than from below’ (Vanden Bossche 110).  
The French Revolution, for example, although it effects change, does so 
from below; it is a revolution of the masses, and as a result descends into chaos 
that requires organisation and stabilisation through the reimplementation of a 
hierarchical social structure. This reimplementation requires the moral and political 
authority of a single heroic figure, and Carlyle’s description of Napoleon in On 
Heroes stresses not only the chaos into which French society descended following 
the revolution, but emphasises the organisational powers of Napoleon as hero-king: 
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Through his brilliant Italian Campaigns, onwards to the Peace of Leoben, one 
would say, his inspiration is: "Triumph to the French Revolution; assertion of 
it against these Austrian Simulacra that pretend to call it a Simulacrum!" 
Withal, however, he feels, and has a right to feel, how necessary a strong 
Authority is; how the Revolution cannot prosper or last without such. To 
bridle in that great devouring, self-devouring French Revolution; to tame it, 
so that its intrinsic purpose can be made good, that it may become organic, 
and be able to live among other organisms and formed things, not as a 
wasting destruction alone: is not this still what he partly aimed at, as the 
true purport of his life; nay what he actually managed to do? (OH 206; 
original emphasis) 
According to Carlyle, Napoleon’s heroism issues from his ability to organise 
devouring self-interest into something organic and productive. The notion of a 
hero’s ability to produce organic stability from societal chaos recurs throughout 
Carlyle’s historical writing. In Past and Present, he similarly describes the efforts of 
Abbot Samson to organise twelfth century monastic life as an incessant struggle to 
‘educe organic method out of lazily fermenting wreck’ (Past and Present 78). 
Elsewhere he refers to Samson’s ‘clear-beaming eyesight’ that ‘like the Fiat Lux in 
that inorganic waste whirlpool, penetrates gradually into all nooks, and of the chaos 
makes a kosmos or ordered world’ (Past and Present 79; original emphasis).  
 The spiritual and moral power wielded by Abbot Samson, Napoleon, and 
Cromwell, differs in practice but not in kind from other heroic figures detailed in On 
Heroes. Carlyle’s heroes attempt through actions, speech, or text, to spread their 
spiritual message, but the hero-king is distinguished in the text by the active nature 
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of his powers compared to the passive power wielded by other heroes. This 
distinction is particularly apparent in Carlyle’s comparison of John Knox, an example 
of the hero as prophet, and Cromwell in the final chapter of On Heroes: 
The Theocracy which John Knox in his pulpit might dream of as a “devout 
imagination,” this practical man [Cromwell], experiences in the whole chaos 
of most rough practice, dared to consider as capable of being realized. (OH 
194) 
While Knox is able only to imagine society created anew, Cromwell dreams of 
realising a new social order and eventually accomplishes this task, despite the 
manner in which he is presently regarded.30  
In precis, in contrast to the consuming or devouring chaos of the modern 
world, Carlyle’s hero-king, with his moral and political authority, produces from 
chaos an ordered, organised society. He is a figure who creates productive, organic 
society in organising it and returning man to the structure and community of a 
hierarchical system, thus rescuing him from blind self-interest. Carlyle suggests that 
the emergence of a modern hero-king is inevitable; history consistently tends 
toward and seeks order because man himself instinctively and inherently seeks the 
order and heroarchy of authority: 
Thus too all human things, maddest French Sanculottisms, do and must 
work towards Order. I say, there is not a man in them, raging in the thickest 
of the madness, but it is impelled withal, at all moments, toward Order. His 
                                                     
30 Carlyle links the disparagement of Cromwell in the nineteenth century to the failures of the eighteenth. The 
moral failures of this century seem also to have had an effect on their ability to detect heroic qualities: ‘This 
view of Cromwell seems to me the not unnatural product of a century like the Eighteenth. As we said of the 
Valet, so of the Sceptic: He does not know a Hero when he sees him!’ (OH 179). 
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very life means that; Disorder is dissolution, death. No chaos but it seeks a 
centre to revolve round. While man is man, some Cromwell or Napoleon is 
the necessary finish of a Sansculottism. (OH 175–176; original emphasis) 
Society and history inherently move toward order and structure, seeking out 
cohesion whether through spiritual means, as with the hero-prophets, or through 
political means, as with the hero-kings. In all instances, however, Carlyle 
understands man not only as necessitating hierarchical order, but desiring it, 
searching out a centre – a great man – around which to revolve. 
 
Production and Consumption in Representative Men 
 
 In On Heroes, Carlyle uses the language of the marketplace to critique 
capitalism’s individualising and thus destabilising qualities. The self-consuming 
nature of society’s newfound individualism requires an organising ameliorative, an 
authoritative great man who can arrange from society’s chaos something 
productive. In Representative Men, however, Emerson will use the language of the 
marketplace to create an entirely new economy, an economy of history. 
 The true motivation behind Representative Men is not the delineation of the 
qualities that make Emerson’s great men representative, or indeed what defines 
any man as representative. Rather, Emerson’s text is predominately an exploration 
of the value of great men in the broader economy of history it delineates, and for 
thie sreason, my discussion focuses on this economy. 
 For Carlyle, the value of great men lies in what they do – in the tangible 
social changes they effect in their organising, productive function. For Emerson, 
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however, the value of representative men is not in what they do, but in what one 
does with them. It is only through the individual’s interactions with great men, 
interactions that Emerson outlines in detail in the text’s opening chapter, “Uses of 
Great Men,” that man’s intellectual history moves outward in concentric circles, 
progressing. 
 
“Uses of Great Men” and Emerson’s Economy of History 
 “Uses of Great Men” begins by establishing the fundamentals of Emerson’s 
economy of history, defining great men in terms of the goods and services they 
provide. Emerson establishes two ‘kinds of service we derive from others,’ one 
primary and the other secondary (CW 4:4). The secondary service that great men 
offer is ‘direct’: the ‘giving of material or metaphysical aid’ (CW 4:5). Direct giving, 
however, is ‘contrary to the law of the universe’ because it is ‘mechanical’ and thus 
in contrast to the ‘discoveries of nature in us’ (CW 4:6). The primary and most 
significant service that a representative man provides, then, is the ability to 
discover one’s self. Emerson defines this in “Uses of Great Men” as an ‘indirect 
service’ and one that ‘serve[s] us in the intellect’ (CW 4:6). 
 Elsewhere in the text’s opening essay, Emerson defines this quality as being 
‘representative’ of ideas, illuminating one of the meanings behind his title (CW 4:6). 
Emerson most explicitly expresses the relationship between great men and the 
goods and services they offer when he asks hypothetically, ‘How to illustrate the 
benefit of ideas, the service rendered by those who introduce moral truths to the 
mind?’ (CW 4:12). The basic framework of Emerson’s economy of history is one in 
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which intellectual history’s value derives from its revelation of moral truths and in 
which great men play a representative rather than active or generative role. In 
distinction to the economy in which Americans of the nineteenth century 
increasingly participate, Emerson’s economy of intellectual history is a ‘mental and 
moral force,’ always a ‘positive good’: ‘It goes out from you whether you will or not, 
and profit me whom you never thought of…’ (CW 4:8; emphasis added). ‘This,’ 
writes Emerson, ‘is the moral of biography’ (CW 4:9). 
 The ‘profit’ that one receives from history is  both intellectual and spiritual 
progress, the facilitation of movement outward in concentric circles of thought. In 
Emerson’s economy of history, this profit is paradoxically achieved through 
consumption: ‘…we feed on genius and refresh ourselves from too much 
conversation with our mates, and exult in the depth of nature in that direction in 
which he leads us’ (CW 4:15). Later, developing his consumptive metaphor Emerson 
writes:  
The mind is a finer body, and resumes its functions of feeding, digesting, 
absorbing, excluding, and generating, in a new and ethereal element. Here, 
in the brain, is all the process of alimentation repeated, in the acquiring, 
comparing, digesting, and assimilating of experience. (CW 4:61) 
Emerson incorporates these organic or biological metaphors of consumption into 
his economy of intellectual history because they propose a generative model of 
engagement with history, rather than one of exchange. Subverting the 
production/consumption and profit/loss dialectic that governs the market 
economy, Emerson posits a relationship between the individual and history in 
which the individual consumes, offering nothing in exchange, and yet receives only 
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profit. The organic metaphors to which he turns better convey the complex process 
at the heart of Emerson’s economy of history, that which he outlines in “Uses of 
Great Men” after having established the basic framework of his system. To feed on 
or to consume genius is only the first step in a larger and more complex system of 
interactions that roughly follow the biological model of digestion, absorption, 
exclusion, and generation outlined in the quotation above. 
 In Emerson’s economics of history, digestion corresponds to the first 
awakenings of the mind that the ideas of great men inspire. This first step in a 
larger process is defined in “Uses of Great Men” as the awakening of the 
imagination inspired by the ideas of great men: 
Foremost among these activities [of the mind], are the summersaults, spells, 
and resurrections, wrought by the imagination. When this wakes, a man 
seems to multiply ten times or a thousand times his force. It opens the 
delicious sense of indeterminate size, and inspires an audacious mental 
habit. We are as elastic as the gas of gunpowder, and a sentence in a book, 
or a word dropped in conversation, sets free our fancy, and instantly our 
heads are bathed with galaxies, and our feet tread the floor of the Pit. And 
this benefit is real, because we are entitled to these enlargements, and, 
once having passed the bounds, shall never again be quite the miserable 
pedants we were. (CW 4:10) 
According to Emerson, however, ‘Even these feasts have their surfeit,’ and 
eventually ‘Our delight in reason degenerates into idolatry of the herald’ (CW 4:11). 
Emerson’s allusion here to On Heroes and Carlyle’s philosophy of history more 
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generally is not explicit, but it is evident that Emerson’s account of idolatry 
responds to and departs from Carlyle’s notion of hero-worship.  
The idolatry Emerson describes in “Uses of Great Men” corresponds to a 
period of absorption, of having consumed an idea and been subsequently 
consumed by it. Emerson reassures readers, however, that it is a necessary phase in 
the individual’s process of engagement with history. Absorption describes a stage in 
which the individual may become absorbed for a time with an idea, but it is also 
one in which the individual absorbs that idea, assimilating it into their own 
consciousness. ‘Be the limb of their body, the breath of their mouth,’ he writes, 
‘Compromise thy egotism’ (CW 4:17). The embodiment that Emerson describes is 
only a temporary loss of self-reliance, an act of abandonment by which the 
individual also comes into possession of that which they have consumed. Emerson 
reassures readers that this act is naturally and organically followed by one of 
resistance or exclusion, ‘For Nature wishes everything to remain itself’ (CW 
4:16).’The more we are drawn [to an idea], the more we are repelled,’ he writes, 
‘the law of individuality collects its secret strength: you are you, and I am I, and so 
we remain’ (Ibid). 
Central to the law of individuality that Emerson describes in “Uses of Great 
Men” is an act of intellectual detachment echoing that noted in the accounts of 
creative reading previously explored. Describing detachment in the opening chapter 
of Representative Men, Emerson again turns to biological and scientific metaphor: 
In vain, the wheels of tendency will not stop, nor will all the forces of inertia, 
fear, or love itself, hold thee there. On, and forever onward! The microscope 
observes a monad or wheel-insect among the infusories circulating in water. 
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Presently, a dot appears on the animal, which enlarges to a slit, and it 
becomes two perfect animals. The ever-proceeding detachment appears not 
less in all thought, and in society. Children think they cannot live without 
their parents. But, long before they are aware of it, the black dot has 
appeared, and the detachment taken place. Any accident will now reveal to 
them their independence. (CW 4:17) 
Now independent from the idea with which they engaged, but also in possession of 
it via absorption, the individual is free to perform the final step in the economy of 
history outlined Representative Men: generation. Generation is the goal of 
Emerson’s economy and the function of great men, as defined simply in the closing 
paragraph of “Uses of Great Men”: ‘…great men exist that there may be greater 
men…’ (CW 4:20). That is to say, great men exist to expand our thought and to push 
us into new regions or circumferences of the intellect; ‘What they know, they know 
for us’ (CW 4:12). 
It is because great men exist that there may be greater men - because the 
fundamental principle of Emerson’s economy of history is progress - that Emerson 
concludes each of his chapters in Representative Men with the destabilising volta 
on which Carlyle’s aforementioned 1850 letter comments. In each chapter, after 
having spent the previous pages expounding their representative nature, Emerson 
concludes his accounts of historical figures with a refutation of their totalising 
genius. Plato’s works for example are said not to possess the ‘vital authority which 
the screams of the prophets and the sermons of unlettered Arabs and Jew possess,’ 
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and Emerson notes critically that ‘he has not a system’ (CW 4:42, 43).31 
Swedenborg’s books are said to ‘have no melody, no emotion, no humor, no relief 
to the dead prosaic level,’ and Shakespeare is described as having failed to ‘explore 
the virtue which resides in these symbols [of nature]’ (CW 4:81, 124). Beginning 
each chapter in awe of the representative man’s genius only to turn away from it in 
conclusion, Emerson’s prose reflects the notion of progress fundamental to his 
historical economy. There is no man ‘in the procession of famous men,’ says 
Emerson, who ‘is reason or illumination, or that essence we are looking for’ (CW 
4:19). Individual consumers of history must not confuse a new region of thought as 
exposed by an idea for total illumination and rest there. 
Helpful in conceptualising Emerson’s economy of intellectual history in 
Representative Men is the economy of the poet identified by Thomas Birch in 
another of Emerson’s seminal works, Nature. Birch’s economy of the poet is one of 
four identified in Emerson’s essay: in ascending order, the other three economies 
are those of the brute, the capitalist, and the philosopher. The brute economy is 
‘driven solely by animal instinct and physical laws,’ while the capitalist economy is 
‘strictly material (M-Mˊ)’ (387). Although the capitalist, unlike the brute, employs 
his intellectual capacities, ‘his goal is narrowly conceived: to alter the material 
world (M-Mˊ) better to gratify his own or consumers’ desires’ (Ibid). The economy 
of the poet, which succeeds that of the capitalist, is one in which the individual, 
through transcendent, vatic visions converts the world around him or herself into a 
                                                     
31 This latter critique is curious considering Emerson’s own aversion to systematisation, recorded elsewhere in 
Representative Men: ‘The more coherent and elaborate the system, the less I like it’ (CW 4:76). 
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form of ‘intellectual property that serves a public good’ (390). Birch’s definition of 
the poet continues: 
To be more specific, the poet discovers and expresses laws and 
correspondences that unite the human spirit with nature; as more and more 
people comprehend the poet’s discovery, nature ceases to be a material 
object in the possession of an individual and comes to symbolize a creative 
spirit (i.e., the Oversoul) to which all human being belongs. Insofar as 
capitalism treats nature as a commodity, an economy emerges in which 
property and wealth are material, divisible, and privately owned. As one 
moves toward the economy of the poet, however, nature, wealth, and 
property coalesce into a common spiritual resource, indivisible and freely 
accessible to all. (Ibid) 
While Birch’s definition of the economy of the poet identifies nature alone as a 
common spiritual resource, in Representative Men, Emerson adds to this all of time 
and intellectual history. As such, Emerson’s economy of history posits something 
nearer to what Birch identifies as the economy of the philosopher, a system in 
which ‘“wealth” derives wholly from intellectual production,’ transcending the 
material and sensory world entirely and thus in a manner contradictory to the 
‘physiocratic doctrine that nature is the source of all wealth and the key to 
economic development’ (388, 389). 
 In closing and in illustration of the transcendent, ‘philosophical’ nature of 
the economy of history outlined in Representative Men, I will turn one final time to 
“Uses of Great Men”: 
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How to illustrate the distinctive benefit of ideas, the service rendered by 
those who introduce moral truths into the general mind?— I am plagued, in 
all my living, with a perpetual tariff of prices. If I work in my garden, and 
prune an apple-tree, I am well enough entertained, and could continue 
indefinitely in the like occupation. [ . . . ] But if there should appear in the 
company some gentle soul who knows little of persons or parties, of 
Carolina or Cuba, but who announces a law that disposes these particulars, 
and so certifies me of the equity which checkmates every false player, 
bankrupts every self-seeker, and apprises me of my independence on any 
conditions of country, or time, or human body, that man liberates me; I 
forget the clock. 
I pass out of the sore relation to persons. I am healed of my hurts. I am 
made immortal by apprehending my possession of incorruptible goods. Here 
is great competition of rich and poor. We live in a market, where is only so 
much wheat, or wool, or land; and if I have so much more, every other must 
have so much less. I seem to have no good, without breach of good 
manners. (CW 4:13) 
In implicit contrast to the pecuniary measurements of the marketplace, Emerson 
emphasises the intellectual nature of his economy of history. More than simply 
placing it in contrast to the marketplace, Emerson describes engagement with 
history as an economy in which time and space, the fundamental properties in 
which a material economy of any kind are rooted, are abolished, and in their place 
is the pure self of consciousness – the ME. 
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Emerson’s Intellectual and National Detachment in 
Representative Men 
 
 When Emerson finally took it upon himself to consider the more concrete 
subject of history in Representative Men, after years of prompting from Carlyle, 
Emerson did so by engaging antagonistically with the text most representative of 
Carlyle’s conception of history, On Heroes. In engaging antagonistically with On 
Heroes, Emerson confronted Carlyle’s intellectual influence generally as well as the 
influence presented by the Scottish writer’s more immediate personal presence. 
Adopting the structure of Carlyle’s text and incorporating two of its historical 
figures into Representative Men, Emerson used this framework to establish his own 
model of history. Representative Men is indebted to On Heroes more than 
structurally, however, and Emerson also assimilated into his work a fundamental 
element of Carlyle’s historical thought: the notion that history is biographical.  
In exploring the two texts, it is evident that in engaging antagonistically with 
On Heroes and the ideas it contained, Emerson departed significantly from Carlyle’s 
thought. As a result, Emerson’s intellectual definition of biography in 
Representative Men as the ‘genius of humanity’ significantly revises Carlyle’s 
physiognomical understanding of great men and their biographies. In addition, 
Emerson’s detachment from Carlyle’s historical thought results in an altered 
conception of history’s movement. While Carlyle posits a cyclical and revolutionary 
account of history, Emerson embraces a progressive conception of historical 
movement moving outward in ever-widening circumferences of thought. 
The distinctive nature of these elements in Emerson’s system of history 
issue from a central intellectual detachment from Carlyle’s thought on the grounds 
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of self-reliance. Carlyle imagines the function of great men to be organisational, 
providing necessary structure for society, and central to Carlyle’s conception of 
social structure is the notion of heroarchy. What Carlyle views as the chaos of 
modern society evidenced by events like the French Revolution and the Chartist 
rebellion, is a both a product of and a symptom of a loss of hierarchical structures in 
society, politics, religion, and the economy. These structures, now replaced by an 
emphasis on the individual, once knitted society together, giving purpose to an 
otherwise aimless and sundered collection of individuals. Carlyle’s hero for the 
modern age, then, is one who reintroduces these structures and reduces the chaos 
that issues from growing individualism. In describing the chaos of modern society, 
Carlyle utilises the language of the marketplace, emphasising the self-destructive or 
self-consuming nature of individualism in comparison with the organising and 
productive nature of heroarchy, underscoring the connection between new 
economic structures and society’s chaos. 
Emerson, for whom self-reliance is central to all aspects of life, cannot 
embrace the element of hero-worship and heroarchy fundamental to Carlyle’s 
model of history. While Representative Men acknowledges the negative side effects 
of the rising marketplace economy, with Emerson noting as we have seen, that 
‘[w]e live in a market’ in which ‘if I have so much more, every other must have so 
much less.’ Emerson’s indictment, however, is not tied to the individualism that the 
market inspires because, in short, he does not see economic individualism in terms 
of self-reliance. Emerson’s objection to the marketplace is not that it increases self-
reliance; rather, he views the marketplace as simply another system outside of the 
self from which the individual must be free. Detaching fundamentally from Carlyle’s 
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ideas, Emerson constructs an economy of history in which the value of great men 
and of tradition generally is sundered from the world of phenomena, deriving 
instead from the facilitation of self-reliant thought. The function of such thought, 
moreover, is the assumption of consciousness and, as such, the individual’s 
transcendence of country, time, and human body altogether. 
Unlike in Nature and the “Woodnotes” poems, there is no single shift in 
Representative Men correspondent with or expressive of Emerson’s detachment 
from Carlyle’s thought. Rather, the conclusions of each of Emerson’s chapters 
incorporate a jarring subversion of the genius of his representative men, in turn 
reflecting Emerson’s intellectual detachment from the Scottish writer’s conception 
of history. Emerson’s inclusion of Napoleon in his text, a decision referred to only in 
passing in the preceding pages, constitutes an additional and significantly visible 
detachment from Carlyle’s thought. Emerson’s chapter on Napoleon is distinct both 
formally and thematically from the other chapters in Representative Men. The 
chapter ostensibly assumes the same pattern as those chapters preceding it and 
the one dedicated to Goethe that follows, incorporating a shift at the conclusion of 
the discussion that undermines Napoleon’s genius. However, Emerson’s account of 
Napoleon’s character preceding this shift is uncharacteristically negative, and he is 
the only figure included in Representative Men whose impact on history is defined 
as fleeting. Now that Emerson’s economy of history has been sketched in full, it 
becomes clearer why the depiction of Napoleon in Representative Men is 
anomalous and why Emerson should have included it at all. 
Napoleon is the only representative man defined not by his visionary talents 
but by his actions. Such a portrayal mirrors the manner in which the value of great 
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men is measured in On Heroes, but is entirely discordant with Emerson’s historical 
model – that which centres not on what representative men do but on the ideas 
they contribute and the manner in which we interact with them. Emerson includes 
Napoleon as a counterexample to his own conception of history and, it seems, as a 
direct engagement with Carlyle’s model of history. Noting that Napoleon ultimately 
failed in his political aspirations because he approached life with ‘sensual’ and 
‘selfish’ aims, Emerson subverts the very premise of Carlyle’s historical system, 
charging Napoleon with the self-interest that Carlyle not only seeks to avoid, but 
believes Napoleon, like Cromwell, to counteract (CW 4:147). 
Emerson’s account of history in Representative Men is, at its heart, the 
systematisation of transcendence, the application of the temporal re-visionings and 
re-imaginings noted in his spiritual works, to time itself. As in Emerson’s spiritual 
philosophy, in his philosophy of history, acts of abandonment achieve the 
transcendence of that to which one submits. In Nature and in the “Woodnotes” 
poems, this abandonment or relinquishing is to the natural world and it results not 
only in the apprehension of nature’s spiritual value but, ideally, in a transcendence 
of the natural world altogether, defined both temporally and spatially. In 
Representative Men, abandonment is not to nature but to time itself, to the past 
and the influence that it wields. Through this act of abandonment, presented as 
consumption of or feeding upon the past, the individual eventually achieves 
transcendence of time itself, becoming aware of the single universal source from 
which all ideas originate.  
As such, Emerson’s account of history in Representative Men also 
systematises vertical time, collapsing the whole of the past into the self. In doing so, 
  
185 | P a g e  
 
Emerson not only performs a detachment from Carlyle, but also establishes a 
conceptual framework to support the notion that one can detach from all 
influences. In place of the past, Emerson looks to the future yet again, positing 
history as a perpetual widening of intellectual and spiritual circumferences.  
  




 The three transatlantic engagements traced and explored in the preceding 
chapters demonstrate that three of Emerson’s seminal works engage 
predominately and specifically with a single transatlantic text. Nature, the 
“Woodnotes” poems, and Representative Men gain new meaning and significance 
when considered as issuances from Emerson’s antagonistic engagement with 
specific works. In reading Nature in this manner, Emerson’s ideological and stylistic 
volta in “Spirit” and, more significantly, in “Prospects,” is newly illuminated, 
alongside Emerson’s account of atonement as an act or process of reflection. In the 
“Woodnotes” poems, a comparative analysis of the two texts as antagonistic 
engagements with The Excursion brings “Woodnotes I” out of the shadows critically 
and lends the poem new significance not only as the foundation for a spiritual 
ascendancy between the two poems, but as the site of Emerson’s engagement with 
the notion of society in Wordsworth’s reimagined triad. In Representative Men, 
Emerson’s account of history is demonstrated to be an engagement not only with 
Carlyle’s definition of biography, but also a re-vision of Carlyle’s understanding of 
consumption and its relationship to individualism. 
These comparative readings augment recent scholarship like that of Patrick 
Keane, David Greenham, and Samantha Harvey, and indeed the larger transatlantic 
Emersonian genealogy of which these scholars are a part. While transatlantic 
readings of Emerson’s writing tend to focus on demonstrating the various and 
varied strands of Romantic thought found in texts throughout Emerson’s oeuvre, 
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the preceding explorations demonstrate that there are instances in which 
Emerson’s engagement is more direct and pointed. In these instances, Emerson 
engages with texts that are particularly representative of the perceived genius of 
their authors. This is significant both because it demonstrates Emerson engages 
with texts most inducive of anxiety and thus most in need of being detached from, 
and because he engages antagonistically with these works in his attempts to write 
the same kind of texts with which he interacts. In Nature, the treatise of Emerson’s 
first philosophy, he turns to a philosophical exploration of the highest and thus 
most anxiety-inducing calibre, Aids to Reflection. Similarly, in attempting to put this 
philosophy into verse, he turns to a poet of the highest philosophic talents, 
Wordsworth, and to a poem representative of these talents, The Excursion. Finally, 
in composing his own account of history – its definition, its movement, and its uses 
– Emerson turns to Carlyle’s On Heroes which exemplifies the notion of biographical 
history to which Emerson is fundamentally drawn. 
 In expressing his own metaphysical philosophical treatise, philosophical 
poem, and historical text, Emerson combats the incursive influence of these 
representative British texts and asserts his intellectual independence from their 
ideas through antagonistic engagement. His interactions follow the model of 
creative reading expressed elsewhere in his oeuvre, sanctioning, even encouraging, 
assimilation if it is followed by a necessary act of detachment. In doing so, Emerson 
puts into practice, with increasing sophistication, the very account of vertical time 
that he develops in his transcendental spiritual philosophy, collapsing the past (the 
influence Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Carlyle represent) into the present through 
acts of assimilation that do not hinder Emerson’s originality.  
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In Nature, Emerson’s detachment both stylistically and ideologically from 
Coleridge’s thought in Aids to Reflection is abrupt, and while such abruptness is 
characteristic of Emerson’s later prose, it is a stylistic strategy not fully developed in 
Nature. In the “Woodnotes” poems, again there is a single volta or shift, in this 
instance one occurring between “Woodnotes I” and “Woodnotes II.” Again, this 
shift is one in which Emerson departs on ideological grounds with the writer and 
work with which he engages. In this instance, Emerson detaches from 
Wordsworth’s re-conception of the Romantic triad and, specifically, its 
incorporation of a social element. However, in performing this departure or 
detachment, rather than completely severing from Wordsworth formally, Emerson 
engages with and revises Wordsworth’s dramatic mode, more subtly although no 
less potently performing his departure. Finally, in Representative Men, Emerson 
performs no formal break from On Heroes, subtly or otherwise. The detachment he 
performs in this instance is purely ideological; Emerson is confident that his 
ideological detachment is sufficiently developed to stand as independent, self-
reliant thought, without the need for supplementary formal distinction from that 
with which he engages. In each instance, Emerson detaches from the writers and 
works with which he engages on the grounds of self-reliance, departing from 
Coleridge and Wordsworth because their accounts of the Romantic triad are not 
entirely subjective, Coleridge’s mediated by the Bible, and Wordsworth’s by society, 
and departing from Carlyle because his account of history and hero-worship is 
antithetical to Emerson’s self-reliant model. 
 Finally, in all three instances, Emerson’s engagements reveal the 
inextricability of personal and extrapersonal influence that these writers represent. 
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In engaging with Aids to Reflection, Emerson’s ideological and formal detachment 
from Coleridge’s text coincides with a temporal reimagining that pivots on hope 
through prospect, and loads all significance onto a single moment, nullifying the 
weight and significance of the past. These reimaginings and their emphasis on 
subjectivity echo typical nineteenth century responses to European influence and 
British influence specifically, as outlined by such scholars as Robert Weisbuch and 
Stephen Spender. Such temporal reconceptualisations are also found in Emerson’s 
“Woodnotes” poems, specifically the second, again corresponding to Emerson’s 
creative, personal detachment from The Excursion as a representation of 
Wordsworth’s influence. In this sense, transcendence becomes in both instances a 
mode of historical thought. In Representative Men, this thought is systematised and 
history itself is proven transcendable through Emerson’s incorporation of a 
consumptive, economically-inspired and revisionary framework.  
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